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INTRODUCTION

The degree of deference that federal courts confer upon the decisions
of international tribunals is a matter that has vexed the bar and the
bench for well over a century.' Courts remain perplexed by the problem,
and their pronouncements reflect a limited understanding of the role of
international law and international tribunal decisions in domestic
courts.2 The Supreme Court has unhelpfully observed that "we should
1. See, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 457-58 (1899)
(concerning effect to be given to decision of United States-Mexico Claims Commission);
Frelinghuysen v. U.S. ex rel. Key, 110 U.S. 63 (1884) (same); United States ex. rel. Boynton v.
Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 308-18, 321-26 (1891) (same); Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 538-40
(1891) (concerning effect to be given to decision of Alabama Claims Commission); Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. 233, 246-47, 255-274 (1841) (concerning effect to be given to decision
of Jay Treaty Commission establishing boundary of the United States and decision of 1719
Rehoboth Commission establishing boundary between Massachusetts and Rhode Island).
2. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 351 (2002) ("The fact
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give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international
treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret"
it.3 However, such a formulation invites lower courts to misunderstand
and misuse international tribunal decisions. The degree of "respectful

consideration"4 will depend on numerous factors, many of which are
never analyzed, or at least not analyzed systematically. Justice

O'Connor was closer to the mark when she stated that,
[a]s... international tribunals gain strength both in numbers and in
authority, their relationship with the domestic courts of member
nations will be of critical importance.... [O]ur courts will have to

interpret specific provisions of the different treaties and
authorizing statutes to determine what effect to give to the

judgment of various international tribunals.5
But the effect to be given to these decisions will turn on far more than
simply instructions to courts in treaties and statutes, which often are
inoperative, opaque, or omitted altogether. The effect to be given such
decisions ultimately will depend on the approach-or model if you
will-that courts use, knowingly or unknowingly, in conferring

deference.
The deference issue has only been exacerbated in recent years by the
sheer quantity of international tribunals now in existence. International
adjudication is in ascendance. The international judiciary now includes
a tribunal for the law of the sea,6 several mass reparation tribunals,7
is that international and foreign law are being raised in our courts more often and in more areas
than our courts have the knowledge and experience to deal with. There is a great need for
expanded knowledge in the field, and the need is now.").
3. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
4. id.
5. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS
IN NATIONAL COURTS 13, 14, 19 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996). More
recently Justice O'Connor noted that "[a]lthough international law and the law of other nations
are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and
by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
courts." O'Connor, supra note 2, at 350.
6. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Annex VI:
Statute of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1245, 1345-50 (1982); Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annex, Oct. 7, 1994, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 10339, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
7. See, e.g., Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland, Joint Press
Release, ICEP (June 25, 1997), reprinted in INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS,
REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION IN SWISS BANKS app. D at
A-9, (Dec. 6, 1999), available at http://www.icep-iaep.org/final_report/ICEPReport english.pdf.
(last visited February 10, 2003); Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, General Agreement Between
the United States and Iran on the Settlement of Certain I.C.J. and Tribunal Cases, with Related
Statement, Feb. 9, 1996, U.S.-Iran, State Dept. No. 96-84; United Nations Compensation
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international criminal tribunals, 8 trade and investment tribunals,9 human
rights tribunals, ° and several new regional economic integration

tribunals." Scores of international tribunals are now in existence, and
dozens of these have been established in the past twenty years. 2 The
Commission, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991). See also
Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement, The
General Framework Agreement or Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, Nov.
21, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH SUPp., Vol. 7, No. 1
(March 1999); Roger P. Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against
Swiss Banks, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 250, 259-67 (2002) [hereinafter Alford, The Claims
Resolution Tribunal].
8. International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 105, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/53/105 (1999); Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994); Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8,
1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
9. World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2: Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1125; North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10. Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Agreement, European Economic Area,
Agreement Between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a
Court of Justice, 1994 O.J. (L344) 1; Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa, Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov.
5, 1993, Ch. V, arts. 19-44, 33 I.L.M. 1067, 1080; Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of
the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa, Treaty for the Organization
for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa, Oct. 17, 1993, 1997 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
L'OHADA, No. 4, (Official Journal of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law
in
Africa
(OHADA)),
November
1,
1997,
available
at
http://216.239.53.100/search?q=cache:HGmLSkofmw8C:www.ohada.com/traite.php%3Fcategori
e%3D2+journal+ohada&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited February 10, 2003); Central American
Court of Justice, Dec. 10, 1992, in 34 I.L.M. 923; African Court of Human and Peoples Rights,
Protocol to the African Charter of Human and People's Rights, June 9, 1998 reprintedin 20 Hum.
Rts. L.J. 269 (1999) (adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, June 9, 1998);
Court of Justice of the Andean Community, Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena
Agreement, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203, modified by the Cochabamba & Sucre Protocols;
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Court of Human Rights, European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
1I. Court of Justice of the European Communities, Treaty Instituting the European Coal and
Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 143 jurisdictionexpanded by Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 & Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Agency, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5; European Court of First Instance,
Council Decision 88/591, Oct. 24, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L319) 1.
12. See Synoptic Chart, Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT), available at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/publications.html. (last visited February 10, 2003). This
chart identifies 125 international bodies that have international dispute resolution features in
common. See also Ruth MacKenzie & Phillipe Sands, InternationalCourts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 271, 272-74 (2003).
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rate of growth has been so furious that scholars are experiencing
tribunal fatigue; the dizzying pace of change is so rapid that they have
little time to compare and contrast these tribunals and reflect upon their
holistic importance for the development of international law. As a result
federal courts have no system for understanding these tribunals and no
methodology for conferring deference.
Further exacerbating the problem is the striking variety of
international adjudicative bodies and the absence of any canonical
definition of what constitutes an international tribunal. Depending on
the criteria one employs, the universe of international tribunals is
extremely broad or narrow. Broad definitions include within their ambit
almost any inter-governmental fact-finding proceeding performing a
quasi-adjudicatory function, and even private arbitral tribunals
established with or without governmental imprimatur. 13 By contrast,
13. One broad definition includes an entity as falling within the international judiciary if it
makes legal determinations based on international law, was established directly or indirectly by
international agreement, and somehow represents an expression of the international rule of law.
According to the PICT, these entities have certain commonalities that justify their presence within
the international judiciary.
First, all of these entities make legal determinations, and this sets them apart from
other bodies ... which share the same aspiration towards a "just world" but are of a
quintessentially political nature.... And this leads to a second commonality, which is the
fact that in order to make their determinations they all resort to the same body of law:
international law. Third, all of these international bodies have been established directly
or indirectly (i.e., through a decision taken by a body established by treaty) by
international agreements.. .Finally, and perhaps more importantly, collectively they are
the expression of a widely shared need to abandon a world where only States count and
the mighty rule, in favor of an order where certain fundamental common values are
shared, protected and enforced by all members of a wide society, composed of States,
International Organizations and individuals in all their legal incarnations.
See http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/PICT.Synoptic.Chart.2.0.pdf (last visited July 29,
2002). This definition leads to the classification of approximately 125 adjudicative entities as
international tribunals. The PICT has developed a synoptic chart of all the possible international
adjudicative bodies that could be included within a definition of an international tribunal, see the
synoptic chart developed by PICT. See id. An even broader definition has been proposed by one
noted scholar, Hans Smit. He has proposed a definition of international tribunal that is the "the
broadest possible construction," encompassing "all bodies with adjudicatory functions," including
private arbitral tribunals. Hans Smit, American Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral
Tribunals, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 153, 157-58 (1997). Smit even goes so far as to sincerely
argue that an international tribunal includes any private arbitration in the United States in which
"any of the parties before it, or any of the arbitrators, is not a citizen or resident of the United
States." Id. at 158. Smit derives this interpretation based on what he personally intended as the
Reporter for the Commission with the principal responsibility for drafting 28 U.S.C. § 1782,
making the startling assertion that his intent should be regarded as the intent of Congress. Id. at
154-55. In so doing, he eschews the textualist approach to statutory interpretation, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1898-99) ("[w]e do
not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means"), and ignores
traditional concepts of the intentionalist approach. See National Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co.
165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999). See also In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter
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narrow definitions impose exacting criteria that exclude many tribunals
established in the past fifty years, including several mass reparation
tribunals, international criminal tribunals, and human rights tribunals. 4
One organization has identified just over a dozen international tribunals
15
using a narrow definition and over a hundred using a broad definition.
Fortunately, the definitional problem has been addressed in the
United States. The term "international tribunal" is referenced in a
number of United States statutes. 16 From these statutory obligations, as
Rogatory) for the Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) ("we do not
believe it appropriate in this case to accept [Professor Smit's] commentary as persuasive evidence
of the meaning of the statute that the Congress ultimately enacted."). Not surprisingly, U.S. courts
have rejected this approach, for there is nothing in the text or legislative history to support such a
broad definition and it would require federal courts to provide greater assistance to foreign and
international private arbitral tribunals than to wholly domestic arbitral tribunals. National Broad.
Co., 165 F.3d at 188-91.
14. One European scholar has proposed a definition of an international tribunal as a judicial
body that is a permanent entity established by an international legal instrument, utilizing rules of
procedures that preexist the dispute, and rendering decisions that are based on international law
and binding on the parties. See Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals with
Regionally Restricted and/or Specialized Jurisdiction, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, OTHER COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, 285, 290-313

(Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and International Law 1974). See also Cesare P.R.
Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.
J.INT'L L. & POL. 709, 713-15 (1999). Such a restrictive approach excludes many tribunals
established in the past fifty years, including almost all mass reparation tribunals, two of the three
international criminal tribunals, and most human rights tribunals. This narrow definition leads to
the classification ofjust over a dozen adjudicative bodies as international tribunals. The PICT has
essentially adopted this approach, resulting in the inclusion of approximately seventeen to
nineteen tribunals and the exclusion of dozens of others. See PICT Research Matrix,
http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). Although PICT
analyzes nineteen tribunals in detail, not all of them satisfy all of the core criteria. For example,
the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are not permanent entities.
15. Compare the matrix with the synoptic chart published by PICT, available at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html (last visited February 10, 2003) and
http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/publications.html. (last visited February 10, 2003).
16. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (1995),
(a) Except in a case where the agency finds that the public interest requires
otherwise, the second sentence of subsection (b) shall not apply to any portion of an
agency meeting, and the requirements of subsections (d) and (e) shall not apply to any
information pertaining to such meeting otherwise required by this section to be disclosed
to the public, where the agency properly determines that such portion or portions of its
meeting or the disclosure of such information is likely to...(10) specifically concern the
agency's issuance of a subpoena, or the agency's participation in a civil action or
proceeding, an action in a foreign court or international tribunal, or an arbitration, or the
initiation, conduct, or disposition by the agency of a particular case of formal agency
adjudication pursuant to the procedures in section 554 of this title or otherwise involving
a determination on the record after opportunity for a hearing. (emphasis added)
Id; 22 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2002) (authorizing establishment of International Litigation Fund to
assist the Department of State in "preparing or prosecuting a proceeding before an international
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interpreted, one can discern a workable definition for international
tribunals as:
an objective and impartial adjudicative body established by or
with the imprimatur of two or more governments with the power
to make a binding decision as to law or facts. 7

tribunal,or a claim by or against a foreign government or other foreign entity") (emphasis
added); 22 U.S.C. § 6713(d)(2) (1998) Respecting the Chemical Weapons Convention,
[t]he Attorney General is authorized to seek any and all available redress in any
internationaltribunal for indemnification to the United States for any liability imposed
on the United States by virtue of the actions of an inspector of the Technical Secretariat,
and to seek such redress in the courts of the foreign nation from which the inspector is a
national.
Id. (emphasis added).; 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1996) Note (describing assistance to be provided by
national courts to ad hoc Yugoslav and Rwandan international criminal tribunals); 18 U.S.C. §
3181 Note (same); 22 U.S.C. § 262-1 (a) & (d) (1998),
The United States shall not become a party to any new international criminal
tribunal, nor give legal effect to the jurisdiction of such a tribunal over any matter
described in subsection (b), except pursuant to [an Article 11treaty or statute enacted by
Congress]... The term 'new international criminal tribunal' means any permanent
international criminal tribunal established on or after October 21, 1998 and does not
include [the ad hoc criminal tribunals established for Yugoslavia and Rwanda](emphasis
added).
Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994) ("Congress urges the President-... (2) in circumstances which the
President deems appropriate, to encourage the establishment of a national or international
criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia..." (emphasis
added)); 28 U.S.C. § 1696(a) (1994),
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order
service upon him of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign
or internationaltribunal.The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or
request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon application of any interested
person and shall direct the manner of service. Service pursuant to this subsection does
not, of itself, require the recognition or enforcement in the United States of a judgment,
decree, or order rendered by a foreign or international tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1964),
The Department of State has power,.. (1) to receive a letter rogatory issued, or
request made, by a foreign or internationaltribunal,to transmit it to the tribunal, officer,
or agency in the United States to whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after
execution; and (2) to receive a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a tribunal in
the United States, to transmit it to the foreign or international tribunal, officer, or
agency to whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after execution.
Id. (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996) ("The district court in which a person resides or
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or internationaltribunal.") (emphasis added). Only one
of these, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, has been subject to significant analysis by courts.
17. This definition is not found expressly in any statute or any single court decision. But a
careful review of the relevant materials suggests such a derivative definition based on an analysis
of the numerous court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Our prior decisions also read the legislative
history surrounding the adoption of Section 1782 broadly to include 'bodies of a quasi-judicial or
administrative nature' as well as preliminary investigations leading to judicial proceedings.");
Ishihara Chem. Co. v. Shipley Co., 251 F.3d 120, 124-125 (2d Cir. 2001) (proceeding must be
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This definition falls between the two extremes, rejecting a litmus test
that excludes many international adjudicative bodies that do not meet
certain artificial categories, 8 but is not so broad as to embrace the whole
panoply of potential candidate institutions. 9

Given the difficulties in taming and naming this beast, it is not
surprising that federal courts have haphazardly addressed the question

of how much deference should be conferred on international tribunal
decisions. What is needed is a methodology for deference. For the first
time in scholarly literature, this article proposes such a methodology for
all international tribunals based on seven models that have been applied
to different international tribunals and should be applied to dozens
more. These models are placed along a continuum according to the
degree of deference to be conferred. The continuum is graphically
illustrated as follows:

adjudicative in nature in order to permit district court to allow discovery pursuant to statute);
United States v. Sealed 1, 235 F.3d 1200, 1203-06 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing legislative history
of Section 1782); National Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188-91 (2d Cir.
1999) ("international tribunal" does not include private international arbitrations); Fonseca v.
Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1980) (officer applying currency exchange regulations
in which he had "an institutional interest in a particular result" is not "tribunal"); In re Letters
Rogatory Issued by Dir. Of Inspection of Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (2d Cir. 1967)
(Indian income tax officer not "tribunal"); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann int'l, 168 F.3d
880, 881-83 (5th Cir. 1999) ("international tribunal" does not include private international
arbitrations); Okubu v. Reynolds, 16 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1994) (Tokyo District
Prosecutor's Office not "tribunal"); In re Application of Sumar, 123 F.R.D. 467, 470 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (tribunal requires an impartial adjudication without an "institutional interest in a particular
result"); In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., 539 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1976) (use of
word "tribunal" makes it clear that "assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional
courts." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-1052 at 9 (1963)); In re Letters of Request to Examine
Witnesses from Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(holding that "Congress intended to ignore any distinctions between purely judicial bodies and
quasi-judicial administrative bodies; [and] between conventional courts and adjudicative
institutions or individuals, such as the French investigating magistrate.. All were intended to be
included in the term 'tribunal"'); United States v. Meyers, 75 F. Supp. 486, 487 (D.D.C. 1948)
(congressional committee is not tribunal, the word "tribunal" implies body with authority to
adjudicate matters). See also S. REP. NO. 88-1580(1964) reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3788 ("tribunal" intended to include assistance not only to conventional courts but administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world).
18. Such artificial categories include permanence, the use of predetermined procedures, and
the application of international law. See supra note 14.
19. Adjudicative bodies that might elsewhere be defined as an international tribunal include
entities that render non-binding decisions (human rights commissions), arbitrations that resolve
private disputes without governmental input (private international commercial arbitration) or
bodies representing purely domestic endeavors of international import (truth commissions). See
supra note 13.
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Continuum of Deference
Greater Deference

Lesser Deference

For each point along the continuum, the model is briefly presented
and applied to a particular tribunal best illustrating the degree of
deference to be conferred. The normative application of the model is
then outlined to enable federal courts to apply the model in other
contexts or to other tribunals. The presentation of these seven models
will illuminate how federal courts are conferring, and should confer,
varying degrees of deference on international tribunal decisions. It is
hoped that such a presentation will make perspicuous the increasingly
common but unexamined practice of federal court deference to
international tribunal decisions.
The first point along the continuum is the full faith and credit model.
Part I of this article addresses this model, which requires federal courts
to treat decisions of international tribunals in the same manner as state
court judgments." ° Located at one extreme end of this model's
continuum, international tribunal decisions are recognized and enforced
without substantive or procedural review. This model applies when
there are specific, binding instructions in a treaty or statute requiring
direct recognition. The decisions of at least one international
tribunal-tribunals established under the 1965 Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention)--clearly fall within this model.
Part 11 examines the arbitration model, which suggests that, under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 21 decisions of international tribunals sitting as
arbitral bodies shall be recognized and enforced in federal courts absent

20. See infra Part 11.
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970).
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significant procedural defects. 2 Tribunal decisions incorporated under
this model enjoy an extraordinarily high degree of deference, with no
review of the merits of the decision. The Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal is the best illustration of the arbitration model.
Part III examines the foreign judgment model, based on Hilton v.
Guyot,23 which suggests that in the absence of binding instructions in a
statute or treaty, federal courts as a matter of comity should directly
recognize a decision of an international tribunal in the same manner as a
foreign judgment.24 Falling in the middle of the continuum, this is far
weaker than the previous direct enforcement models, but nonetheless
often will lead to recognition of the judgment. Decisions of the
European Court of Justice are ripe for recognition using this model.
Part IV considers the Charming Betsy25 model, which posits that if a
statute is ambiguous and an international tribunal has declared the
statute to be in violation of international law, a federal court shall seek
to interpret the statute to be consistent with the international obligation
as interpreted by the international tribunal.26 The decisions of the World
Trade Organization are the premier example of the use of this model.
Part V presents the Paquete Habana27 model.28 This model does not
directly recognize and enforce international tribunal decisions but rather
acknowledges that international tribunals offer trustworthy evidence of
international law, and federal courts should resort to their decisions
when questions of legal rights depending on international law are
presented for their determination. The decisions of the International
Court of Justice are frequently cited as persuasive authority under this
model.
Part VI presents the special master model, an approach in which an
international tribunal becomes a special master to a federal court under
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to provide
particularized relief to individual claimants.29 Although directly
enforced, tribunal decisions incorporated under this model enjoy an
extraordinarily low degree of deference, with the federal court
exercising the power of full review of every aspect of the tribunal's
decisions. The Claims Resolution Tribunal established to resolve
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part 11I.
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
See infra Part IV.
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, (1804).
See infra Part V.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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Holocaust-era Swiss bank accounts is illustrative of an international
tribunal that has been used in this manner.
Finally, Part VII concludes with the "no deference" model. 3' At the
other extreme end of the continuum, this model posits that in certain
circumstances federal courts should confer no deference on decisions of
international tribunals, finding the decisions irrelevant in resolving
certain questions, such as the scope of constitutional guarantees. A
prime example of the "no deference" model is the attempt in death
penalty litigation to use decisions of human rights tribunals to influence
the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
"cruel and unusual punishment." This model reflects unsuccessful
efforts to interpret the Constitution to give expression to an international
majoritarian impulse reflected in international tribunal decisions.
I.

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT MODEL

The first model for understanding the degree of deference federal
courts confer on international tribunal decisions is the full faith and
credit model. This model begins with an understanding of the manner in
which decisions of sister State judgments are recognized within the U.S.
federal system and then posits that similar treatment has been accorded
to international tribunal judgments. This model applies to scenarios
where a statute or treaty imposes specific, binding instructions on
federal courts, requiring direct recognition. Such an approach reflects
the greatest degree of deference of the models presented. In its broadest
application, it all but confers co-equal status to international tribunal
decisions and domestic state court judgments.

30. See infra Part VIII.
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The ConstitutionalFull Faithand Credit Obligation

Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."'" Congress has
extended that obligation to federal courts by statute, requiring them to
grant full faith and credit to state court judgments:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.32
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was to
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right,
irrespective of the state of its origin.33
As the Supreme Court has recently observed, regarding the recognition
of judgments, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting:
[a] final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons
governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout
the land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes,
in other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains
nationwide force.34
As Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause generally has been interpreted to require every state to
honor the judgments of every other state. "[A] judgment conclusive in
one state is conclusive in all, regardless of the intrusion on state
sovereignty. 35
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Judicata and Full Faith and
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Thus, the Constitution requires that States within the United States
recognize and enforce judgments of another State in the same manner as
they would a decision of their own. Congress has extended that
recognition to the federal system by virtue of section 1738, requiring
that federal courts treat decisions of state court judgments in the same
manner as that state would treat such a judgment.
Can the same be said of international tribunal decisions? Do federal
courts accord foreign or international judgments full faith and credit? At
the beginning of the twentieth century the Supreme Court confidently
stated that no right of full faith and credit "is conferred by the
Constitution or by any statute of the United States in respect to the
judgments of foreign states or nations, and [the Court is] referred to no
treaty relative to such a right."36 But by the turn of the twenty-first
century it is clear that the right of full faith and credit had been
established by treaty with respect to decisions of at least one
international tribunal.37
B.

The Full Faith and Credit Model and ICSID Tribunals

The 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) is
one of the more significant international treaties addressing the
Credit, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47, 58 (2001).
36. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
37. Although not involving recognition and enforcement of international tribunal decisions by
federal courts, it is also noteworthy that Congress has established a regime in the antidumping
and countervailing contexts providing for appeal of agency determinations directly to an
international tribunal established under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Under the implementing legislation, a party may choose to have an agency determination
reviewed by a federal court or an international tribunal. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2). Following the
NAFTA binational panel decision, the International Trade Commission and/or the Department of
Commerce are required on remand "to take action not inconsistent" with the NAFTA binational
panel's determination. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A). Moreover, if a party requests binational
review, the statute stipulates that no federal court "has power or jurisdiction to review the
determination on any question of law or fact." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2). One might say that in this
regard Congress has established a regime in which an international tribunal's decision replaces
that of an Article IIlcourt for purposes of judicial review. Having supplanted the role of the
federal court, there is no occasion for full faith and credit recognition of their decisions by a
federal court. In 2001, five decisions of U.S. agencies were reviewed by NAFTA binational
panels. See International Trade Commission, The Year in Trade 2001 Operation of the Trade
Agreements Program, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 3510, 2002 WL 1388252. There are numerous articles
and at least one appellate case addressing the constitutionality of NAFTA binational panels. See,
e.g., Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2001) cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1039 (2001); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARV.
L. REV. 801, 926-28 (1995); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of FederalPower to International
Organizations:New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 71-77 (2000); Matthew
Burton, Note, Assigning the JudicialPower to International Tribunals: NAFTA Binational Panels
andForeignAffairs Flexibility, 88 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1545-81 (2002).
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recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards.38 With
over 150 signatories, including the United States, the ICSID Convention
is one of the principal mechanisms for foreign investors to protect their
investments abroad. The ICSID Convention was revolutionary because
it signaled a marked advancement in the international legal system. As
Elihu Lauterpacht has observed,
[flor the first time a system was instituted under which non-State
entities.. .could sue States directly; in which State immunity was
much restricted; under which international law could be applied
directly to the relationship between the investor and the host
State; in which the operation of the local remedies rule was
excluded; and in which the tribunal's awards would be directly
enforceable within the territories of the State's parties. 9
The provisions of the ICSID Convention on the recognition of
judgments are remarkable in that they accord to ICSID awards the same
status as a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state. The two
principal provisions are Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention.
Article 53 of the ICSID Convention provides that:
The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in
this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the
terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall
have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this
Convention.4 °
Article 54 provides in relevant part:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting
State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall
treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a
constituent state.4'
38. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
39. Elihu Lauterpacht, Forward to CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY, at xi (2001).
40. ICSID Convention, supra note 38, at art. 53(l).
41. Id. at art. 54(1).
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The implementing legislation in the United States, 22 U.S.C. §
1650a, leaves little doubt as to the status of such ICISD decisions,
providing that
[a]n award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV
of the [ICSID] convention shall create a right arising under a
treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed
by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same
full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a
court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.42
Thus, pursuant to section 1650a, an ICSID award shall be accorded
the same deference as a State court judgment.
The precise contours of section 1650a have been addressed in only
one case in the United States: Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Liberia
(LETCO).43 In LETCO, a French-owned and controlled company sought
to enforce an ICSID arbitration award in the United States. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York directed entry of judgment
against Liberia in 1986 finding that LETCO "is entitled to enforcement
of the pecuniary obligation of the award in its favor, as rectified, in
accordance with the provisions of 22 U.S.C. § 1650a," and ordered that
42. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (1966). See also S. REP. No. 89-137(1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2617 (Statement of Fred B. Smith, Department of the Treasury, Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm.) ("If an action is brought in a U.S. district court to enforce the final
judgment of a State court, it is, of course, given full faith and credit in the Federal court. Section
[1650a] would give the same status to an arbitral award."). It should be noted that ICSID also
administers arbitrations that fall outside the ICSID Convention and therefore are not subject to
enforcement in the United States under section 1650a. In particular, this includes arbitrations for
the settlement of investment disputes between parties one of which is not an ICSID member
country or a national of such a country. NAFTA arbitrations are the best example of such
arbitration proceedings, as neither Canada nor Mexico are signatories to the ICSID Convention.
ICSID may administer such arbitrations under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or under
another set of arbitration rules that appoints ICSID as the administering authority. Such awards
are subject to enforcement under the New York Convention, not the ICSID Convention. See
generally [brahim F.I. Shihata & Antonio R. Parra, The Experience of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN INV. L. J. 299, 344-55
(1999); see also Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Rep. of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1193, n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1982)
(At the enforcement stage, the ICSID treaty, see Convention art. 54, and a supporting
United States statute, 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1976), provide that ICSID arbitrations are to
be enforced as judgments of sister states. We need not decide whether Guinea's signing
of the ICSID treaty would thus waive its immunity from proceedings enforcing ICSID
awards, for this is a proceeding to confirm an AAA arbitration.).
43. In re Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov't of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The case of MINE v. Guinea is inapposite as it dealt with a non-ICSID
arbitration notwithstanding the alleged existence of an ICSID arbitration clause. The court never
addressed the validity of the non-ICSID arbitration award, finding that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. See Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the "annexed arbitration award...be docketed and filed by the Clerk of
this Court in the same manner and with the same force and effect as if it
were a final judgment of this Court."' Liberia subsequently sought to
prevent execution of this judgment by arguing, inter alia, that as a
sovereign, it was immune from the court's jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The federal district court rejected
this argument, ruling that Liberia had waived its jurisdictional immunity
by signing a concession contract subject to ICSID arbitration. Such
action, the court concluded,
leaves little doubt that the signatories to the Convention intended
the awards made pursuant to its provisions be given full faith and
credit in their respective jurisdictions.... Liberia clearly
contemplated the involvement of the courts of any of the
Contracting States, including the United States as a signatory to
the Convention, in enforcing the pecuniary obligations of the
award.45
LETCO is a straightforward example of a federal court granting full
faith and credit to an ICSID award in the same manner as a state court
judgment. While the decision is unremarkable, the consequences of
44. In re Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov't of Republic of Liberia, Order dated Sept. 5, 1986
reprintedin 2 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 187, 187 (1987).
45. LETCO, 650 F. Supp. at 76. The Court separately ruled that Liberia's claim that it was
immune from execution of the judgment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was
rejected with respect to properties used for commercial activities falling under the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA. See id at 77-78. See also ICSID Convention, supra note 38, at art.
54(3) ("Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of
judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought."); Liberian E.
Timber Corp. v. Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1987).
There has been some commentary suggesting that the Court should not have analyzed its
subject matter jurisdiction with reference to the FSIA. Such commentators have reasoned that
Article 54 requires contracting states to automatically recognize an ICSID award, excluding the
defense of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of
ArbitrationAwards Under the ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
175, 185 (1996); Dorothy Black Franzoni, International Law - Enforcement of International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Arbitral Awards in the United States, 18 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 113 (1988). However, Article 54 as implemented by 22 U.S.C. § 1650a,
simply requires a federal court to treat an ICSID award in the same manner as it would "a
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States." Had Liberia consented to
the jurisdiction of a State or federal court by virtue of a choice of law clause or forum selection
clause in a contract, and then subsequently argued before a federal court that it lacked jurisdiction
to execute the default judgment rendered pursuant thereto, the court again would have considered
its subject matter jurisdiction and found jurisdiction based on Liberia's waiver of immunity under
the FSIA. See Eckert Intern., Inc. v. Gov't of Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji, 32 F.3d 77
(4th Cir. 1994). The immunity question would have raised in both contexts, and the waiver of
immunity would be effective in either to defeat Liberia's challenge to the federal court's
jurisdiction.
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such an approach is not. With respect to pecuniary obligations, it puts a
decision of an international tribunal on the same plane as a domestic
judgment. This raises the question of why an ICSID tribunal should be
accorded such status. The objectives inherent in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause provide clues.
One objective of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to promote
"unification, not centralization... leav[ing] each state with power over its
own courts but bind[ing] litigants.. .by prior orders of other courts with
jurisdiction."46 Accordingly, under the constitutional system, the "faith
and credit given is not to be niggardly but generous, full...," such that
"local policy must at times be required to give way."47 One would be
hard-pressed to argue that the ICSID Convention has any such
grandiose objectives of the unification of judicial systems on the
international plane, binding ICSID tribunals with the judicial branches
of the signatory countries. But it does provide a unity of sorts. Article
54 requires courts to respect judgments of ICSID tribunals even if such
respect would require local policies to yield. The unity established is
thus functional; ICSID tribunals decide the case, and national courts
execute the judgment. Awards rendered by ICSID tribunals are
recognized and enforced by national courts, as these courts effectively
become a judicial adjunct executing an international award without
review.
A further goal of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to promote the
finality of judgments. As the Supreme Court has put it,
[i]t is just as important that there should be a place to end as that
there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has had
his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his
view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision... merely
retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to
expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the
first.48
Thus, the finality is promoted in that "once the judgment is final
within a state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally requires that
the judgment be accorded the same effect in all states."49 As applied to
ICSID decisions, the drafters of the ICSID Convention assumed that
host States would honor ICSID tribunal awards, but were particularly
concerned that foreign investors might not. Thus, the full faith and
46. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585 (1951).
47. Id. at 584.
48. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). For an elaboration on this objective, see Sterk,
supra note 35, at 60.
49. Sterk, supra note 35, at 61.
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credit obligation was seen as "necessary to balance the situation in
favour of the host State, should the investor not comply with an
award."5 The full faith and credit obligation addresses this problem by
promoting the finality of a tribunal award in all signatory states. The
sovereign interests of the forum state where enforcement is sought are
not a basis for re-litigating claims or collaterally attacking judgments
rendered. Once an ICSID decision becomes final and binding, it
becomes so not only for the parties, but also for the forum where
enforcement is sought. As an ICSID tribunal put it, "the Convention
excludes any attack on the award in national courts."'"
Article 54 was thus incorporated into the Convention to promote
finality by directing national courts to recognize and enforce ICSID
tribunal decisions without review. But the Convention also sought
finality by means of certain instructions to the parties. Complementing
Article 54 are the obligations of Article 53, which stipulate that "[t]he
award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention."52 If Article 54 binds courts to recognize judgments of
ICSID tribunals, Article 53 binds litigants to ICSID awards, obligating
them to respect and honor the decision. As one noted commentator has
put it, "Article 53 thus establishes a complete parallelism between the
obligation to comply with the award and the possibility of enforcement
of that obligation through domestic courts. 53 In fact, Article 53 goes
further than Article 54 in that the former renders an award res judicata
as to all its provisions, while the forcible execution in the latter is
limited to the pecuniary obligations.54 The focus of the binding nature of
ICSID tribunal decisions is directly on the parties to the ICSID
proceeding and indirectly on national courts where enforcement may be
sought. By virtue of Article 53, parties commit to honor the award and
waive the right to appeal the decision in national courts, and national
courts shall respect such a commitment and enforce such a waiver. The
requirement in Article 53 that the award is not "subject... to any
remedy" further underscores that a "party to ICSID proceedings who is
dissatisfied with the award may not turn to another forum for relief for

50. Christoph H. Schreuer, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 1102 (2001).
51. Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. The Republic of Guinea, Decision on
Annulment, 22 Dec. 1989, 4 ICSID REP. 84.
52. ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at art. 53.
53. Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force,
Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 287, 294 (1987).
54. Id.at 329.
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the same claim."55
Article 53 thus establishes the doctrine of res judicata for ICSID
tribunal awards. The binding nature of these awards on the parties is a
component of the full faith and credit obligation. To paraphrase the
Supreme Court, by the provision for full faith and credit, the local
doctrine of res judicata becomes part of international jurisprudence. 6
Taken together, Articles 53 and 54 require, at a minimum, that the
parties and the enforcing national court give res judicata effect to the
ICSID award. Having litigated and lost a question in one competent
tribunal, the party cannot re-litigate the same question in another forum.
The award is binding on the same parties, both in that international
forum and any national signatory forum.
C.

Normative Application

The full faith and credit model will rarely be appropriate for
application by federal courts. The essential requirement under this
model is a federal mandate to grant full faith and credit to decisions of
international tribunals. This mandate may be embodied in implementing
legislation or a self-executing international agreement.
The full faith and credit obligation as applied to ICSID tribunals
reflects the obligations to treat judgments as final and binding and the
same as constituent state court judgments. Can the same be said of other
international tribunals? Yes and no. To the extent that prevailing parties
may request a national court to grant full faith and credit in order to
execute a judgment, no other treaty to which the United States is a
signatory provides similar entitlements. But to the extent that the full
faith and credit obligation embodies the concept of res judicata,
preventing questions resolved in an international forum from being relitigated in a national forum, one could argue that the decisions of other
international tribunals may enjoy a similar status. Although the ICSID
Convention is unique in expressly providing for full faith and
credit-requiring States to "enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a
court in that State" 7-it is not unique in providing that parties must
treat international tribunal decisions as final, binding, and not subject to
appeal. The International Court of Justice is illustrative.
The U.N. Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice
55. Schreuer, supra note 50, at 1085.
56. Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942) ("By the Constitutional provision for
full faith and credit, the local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally, became part of
national jurisprudence.").
57. ICSID Convention, supra note 38, at art. 54(1).
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(ICJ) express similar language as Article 53 of the ICSID Convention.
Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that "[e]ach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
58
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates
that, "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case"59 and Article 60
provides that "[t]he judgment is final and without appeal."6 These

provisions expressing the binding nature of ICJ decisions are not
unique. The agreements establishing the World Trade Organization, 6'
the United Nations Compensation Commission,62 the Iran-United States

Claims Tribunal,63 and the United States-Mexico Claims Commission 6'
contain similar provisions.
While these provisions are "binding" on the United States in the
sense that the United States incurs international responsibility for failure
to abide by them, the harder question is whether they are "binding" on

U.S. federal courts. Scholars have vigorously debated the issue, with
some arguing that these rules are not "self-executing" and therefore not
binding on the courts,65 while others contending that such rules are an
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
59. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
993.
60. Id. at art. 60.
61. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. XVI:4, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1152 (1994) ("Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.").
62. See Decision Taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission, U.N. Compensation Commission, 6th Sess., 27th mtg. Doc S/AC.26/1992/10 (1992)
Provisional
Rules
of Procedure),
art.
40(4)
available at
(UNCC
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec_10.pdf. (last visited February 10, 2003). (UNCC decisions
"final and are not subject to appeal or review on procedural, substantive or other grounds.").
63. Claims Settlement Declaration, art. IV, 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981) ("All decisions and awards
of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.").
64. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 426-27 (1899),
The contracting parties [Mexico and the United States] agreed to consider the result
of the proceedings of the Commission as a full, perfect, and final settlement of every
claim upon either Government, arising out of any transaction of a date prior to
ratification of the Convention, and to give full effect to the decision of the Commission
or the Umpire without objection, evasion, or delay; and they further engaged that every
such claim.. should from and after the conclusion of its proceedings be considered and
treated as finally settled, barred, and thereafter inadmissible.
Id.
65. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on
the Nature ofLegal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 61, 64 (1997) (WTO obligations not selfexecuting; "the WTO rules, and certainly therefore the results of a dispute settlement panel, do
not 'ipso facto' become part of the domestic jurisprudence that courts are bound to follow as a
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expression of U.S. foreign policy and a court's failure to treat them as
final and conclusive would usurp the executive function.66 The better
argument is that decisions of international tribunals must be recognized
and enforced by federal courts under this model only if and to the extent
there is a federal mandate embodied in legislation or a self-executing
agreement requiring courts to treat the decisions as such. It is axiomatic
that a "non-self-executing treaty" is a "treaty that may'not be enforced
in the courts without prior legislative 'implementation"'67 and to treat
international agreements as conclusive expressions of executive will
binding upon the courts absent self-execution would obviate the
distinction inherent in the doctrine.
In some cases, Congress has clearly stated that an international
tribunal decision shall not be recognized in the courts.68 In other cases
Congress has concluded the international tribunal decisions shall be
recognized in the courts." In still other instances, Congress has
mandated that any adverse decision of an international tribunal is a
matter for the political branches and creates no private right of action in

matter of judicial notice."); A. Mark Weisburd, InternationalCourts and American Courts, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 929 (2000) ("Rather than seeing a non-existent delegation in the
ratification of the Charter and the Statute, it would make more sense to see those instruments,
collectively, as a non-self-executing treaty."). See also Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980
F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal decisions not "directly binding.").
66. Louis Henkin, ProvisionalMeasures, US. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 679, 682 (1998) (In Belmont, Pink, Ex parte Peru, and Hoffman, the Supreme Court
"spoke of the duty of the federal courts to give effect to the foreign policy of the United States as
determined and expressed by the executive branch. There can be little doubt that the same
principles should be binding on state courts.").
67. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 695 (1995).
68. La Abra, 175 U.S. at 440-43, 460-61. Following judgment by United States-Mexico
Claims Commission allegedly secured by claimant's fraud, Congress passed legislation requiring
retrial of case in domestic court of claims reviewable in federal court; Congress has,
power to make the distribution of moneys in the hands of the Secretary of State [paid by
Mexico pursuant to Commission judgment].. .depend upon the result of a suit.. brought
in a court of the United States.. .for the purpose of determining whether the La Abra
Company.. had been guilty of fraud in the matter of the claim that it presented to the
commission. The act of 1892 is to be taken as a recognition.. of the legal right of the
company to receive the moneys in question unless it appears upon judicial investigation
that the United States was entitled by reason of fraud.. to withhold such moneys from it.
Id.
69. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a:
An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID]
convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary
obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full
faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of
one of the several States.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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federal courts.7" But absent implementing legislation, federal courts
have never concluded that an international agreement establishing a
tribunal is self-executing such that, as a matter of federal law, federal
courts shall recognize and enforce their decisions as final and binding.7'
Moreover, with regard to the ICJ, federal courts have addressed
whether the relevant provisions of the Charter and the Statute are selfexecuting, and have suggested in dicta that certain articles of the U.N.
Charter are self-executing, 72 while others are not.73 As for Article 94, no
court has ever had occasion to address whether it is self-executing as
between state parties,74 but one court has held it creates no enforceable
70. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(f) (1994) (If the WTO panel report or Appellate Body report is adverse
to the United States, USTR shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees
concerning whether to implement the report's recommendation and, if so, the manner of such
implementation); see also 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a) (1994) (If WTO Appellate Body finds that
International Trade Commission action is not in conformity with certain WTO obligations, the
Trade Representative may request agency to issue an advisory report on whether statute permits
agency to take steps that would render its action not inconsistent); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994)
(No provision of WTO agreements, nor application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect); 19 U.S.C. §
3512(c) (1994) (No person other than the United States shall have a cause of action under any of
the WTO agreements by virtue of congressional approval of WTO agreements or may challenge
any action or inaction by any agency of the United States on the that ground that such action or
inaction is inconsistent with the WTO agreements).
71. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998); Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco, Corp., 980 F.2d
141, 144-46 (2d. Cir.). Of course, a federal court's refusal to act in accordance with an
international tribunal's decision may subject the United States to international responsibility. See
Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT, 71 (June 5, 1998),
[t]hrough the refusal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
enforce the Avco award, the United States has violated its obligation under the Algiers
Declarations to ensure that a valid award of the Tribunal be treated as final and binding,
valid, and enforceable in the jurisdiction of the United States. It is a well-settled
principle of international law that every international wrongful act of the judiciary of a
state is attributable to that state.");
Id.;
see also infra text accompanying notes 123, 234-237.
72. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 (D.C. Cal. 1950);
Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621-22 (Cal. 1952);; Curran v. New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212
(N.Y. Spec. Term 1947).
73. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-75 (7th Cir. 1985)
(citing cases).
74. The most likely context in which this may arise in the coming years will be in the pending
death penalty case between Mexico and the United States. See Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) available at http://www.icj-cij.org. (last visited February 10,
200). Mexico likely will prove successful in its claim that the United States has violated the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, given the factual similarities of its claim and that of
similar litigation successfully brought by Germany against the United States in 2001. See
LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 128, 40 I.L.M. 1069 available at
http://www.icj-cij.org. (last visited February 10, 2003). If so, then for the first time in history a
prevailing state party may seek recognition of a final and binding I.C.J. decision against the
United States in federal courts.
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private rights of action.75 Whether provisions operate by themselves
without legislation is a matter of the drafter's intent.76 The fundamental
distinction drawn from the cases is that when a provision is clear,
definite and uses mandatory language, it generally reflects the framers'
intent that it has operative effect without further implementation.77
Applying this approach, the relevant language is equivocal. The Charter
uses promissory language-"[e]ach Member... undertakes to comply""
while the Statute uses mandatory language-the decision has "no
binding force except between the parties and in respect to that particular
case" and "[t]he judgment is final and without appeal."79 Giving
meaning to all these provisions, one might say there is a promise to
comply with a decision, but an obligation as between the parties to treat
it as final, binding and not subject to appeal. To that extent, and only
that extent, these provisions appear to be self-executing.
Taken together, these provisions could provide the essential elements
mandating res judicata effect to be given to International Court of
Justice decisions in national courts. That is, it could be argued that the
same parties who present a question before the International Court of
Justice cannot re-litigate the issues resolved before national courts. If
the International Court of Justice found that it had jurisdiction and
concluded that an international obligation had been violated, as between
those parties, that same question could not be re-litigated in their
national courts. Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute would require that the
decision of the ICJ preclude the same parties from re-litigating the same
question."0
Thus, to the extent that the full faith and credit obligation connotes
75. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
76. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 312-14 (1829). A number of factors are cited as
relevant in determining drafter's intent. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
77. See, e.g., Frolova 761 F.2d at 374 (Article 56 is "not the kind of promissory language that
will create a judicially enforceable right"); see Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 621-22,
[W]hen the framers of the charter intended to make certain provisions effective without
the aid of implementing legislation they employed language which is clear and definite
and manifests that intention.. .The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in
promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and
definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons
immediately upon ratification.
Id.
78. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94, para. I (emphasis added).
79. Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 59, 60 (emphasis added).
80. 3 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 19201996 at 1655-56 (3d. ed. 1997) (combined effect of Articles 59, 60, and 61 of the ICJ Statute is
that "the judgment creates a res judicata."). For a fuller discussion, see David M. Reilly & Sarita
Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court ofJustice on National Courts, 28
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435, 452-55 (1996).
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the obligation to grant res judicata effect to decisions of the original
forum, the ICJ Statute incorporates such an obligation. But ,one should
not take from this the fullest obligations inherent in full faith and credit.
Full faith and credit incorporates not only the defensive obligation
preventing non-prevailing parties from re-litigating issues presented, but
also the offensive obligation to execute and enforce judgments without
regard to competing sovereign interests. Lacking any language requiring
such confirmation, the decisions of the International Court: of Justice do
not enjoy this fuller version of faith and credit. In addition, even if
decisions of the ICJ enjoy res judicata effect, the limits of a full faith
and credit model should not be ignored. To say that ICJ decisions merit
full faith and credit is not to suggest a private right of action,8 or thirdparty issue preclusion, with non-parties utilizing. decisions of the ICJ
against a state party or a state party using the ICJ decision against nonparties.8 2 Nor is it to suggest that decisions of the ICJ might in any way
enjoy stare decisis in national courts. But in requiring that parties treat
the decisions as final, binding and not subject to appeal, the Statute
confers a finality on decisions that precludes parties from re-litigating
decided issues at the national level.
More generally, it should be emphasized that simply because an
international treaty requires the parties to treat an international tribunal
decision as final, binding and not subject to appeal, one should presume
this to be directed at the parties to the litigation, not the national courts
enforcing the decision. The ICSID Convention stands alone in
instructing national courts to treat tribunal decisions in the same manner
as a judgment of a constituent state court. For this reason it is the only
international tribunal that clearly falls within the full faith and credit
model. As for other international tribunals, whether federal courts will
give res judicata effect.to their decisions will depend, among other
things, on whether -the United States is a signatory to the convention
establishing the tribunal, and whether the United States was a party to
the dispute. Assuming both, one may view the parties' obligation to
treat the decision as final and binding to include an obligation on the
judicial branch to hold the political branches to their obligation, i.e., to
give the decision res judicata effect. But in the absence of both, one
should not assume that federal courts would treat the decision of an
international tribunal as having res judicata effect, without some review
of the integrity of the process that led to that decision. As Michael
81. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua, 859 F.2d at 937-38.
82. But see Reilley & Ordonez, supra note 80, at 456-65. See also Sterk, supra note 35, at
101-03 (discussing res judicata effect on non-parties).
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Ramsey has argued, "integrity of the prior judgment is a precondition of
effectuating the policies of res judicata '8 3 and, at least in the foreign
judgment context, federal courts will investigate whether the judgment
has the requisite integrity before enforcing the judgment. The same
could be said of decisions of international tribunals. As discussed
below, for those international tribunals upon which the United States
has not placed its imprimatur of approval, another model-such as the
foreign judgment model-may be more apropos.
In sum, the full faith and credit model falls at the extreme on the
continuum of deference because national courts must accord
international tribunal decisions co-equal status with a state court
judgment. In implementing the ICSID Convention, Congress has
mandated that the "pecuniary obligations" of an ICSID tribunal decision
"shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if
the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one
of the several States."' With respect to the monetary obligations, the
decisions under this model stand alone in enjoying the same status as
internal judgments. Thus, direct recognition and enforcement of the
decision is guaranteed without reservation. No other model comes close
to this degree of deference. Other models posit direct recognition and
enforcement, but they are subject to significant reservations. The
arbitration model provides an extremely effective mechanism for
direction recognition and enforcement of international tribunal
decisions. Attempts at recognition, however, will invariably be
challenged on the grounds that significant procedural defects rendered
the decisions fatally flawed. The foreign judgment model is even less
deferential, anticipating that a federal court will scrutinize the decisionmaking process to guarantee the integrity of the decision. Only after its
integrity has been confirmed will the court recognize the decision. In its
broadest application, the full faith and credit model affords federal
courts almost no discretion; the international tribunal decision shall be
recognized and enforced.

83. Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity", 83 IOWA L. REV. 894, 899
(1998).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a).
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THE ARBITRATION MODEL
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The arbitration model is a modest retreat from the full faith and credit
model. Its principal difference is that federal courts will recognize and
enforce the decisions of an international tribunal unless one of the
grounds for non-enforcement set forth in the applicable treaty has been
satisfied. This review mechanism is the approach taken with respect to
foreign arbitral awards and provides a limited but significant check on
the enforceability of such decisions. In the absence of more specific
instructions, the arbitration model recognizes that under the Federal
Arbitration Act certain international tribunals are empowered to render
arbitration awards and that federal courts will recognize and enforce
those awards with a significant degree of deference.
A.

Recognition andEnforcement Under the New York Convention

The principal vehicle for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
agreements and awards is the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly
known as the New York Convention."5 With over 130 signatories, the
New York Convention enjoys extraordinary application and isone of
the hallmarks for the facilitation of international commerce. The
purpose of the New York Convention is to "encourage the recognition
and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.""8

85. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
86. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520, n. 15 (1974).
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According to the drafters of the New York Convention, two of its
principal achievements were that it "gave a wider definition of the
awards to which the Convention applied" and it "reduced and simplified
the requirements with which the party seeking
recognition or
87
enforcement of an award would have to comply.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act provisions implementing the New
York Convention, a party to the arbitration may apply to a federal court
for an order confirming the award against any other party to the
arbitration and the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the New York Convention.88 This approach, similar
to the approach implemented in other countries, provides an extremely
effective mechanism for enforcing foreign arbitral awards in any other
state that is a party to the New York Convention.
In the United States context, determining whether a decision rendered
by an international tribunal is subject to New York Convention
enforcement depends on three factors: (1) the genesis of the tribunalthat it is constituted as a result of an agreement in writing between the
parties; (2) the result of the tribunal-that it render an enforceable
"arbitral award" that is binding on the parties; and (3) the relationship
between the parties-that it be international and "commercial" in
nature. 89

First, for an award to be enforceable under the New York
Convention, the tribunal must have its origins in an arbitration
agreement. The Convention defines an arbitration agreement broadly:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.9"
In the United States, courts have a liberal policy favoring the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and
87. U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf. 26/SR.25, at 2 (1958).

88. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970).
89. See supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. 1; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§
201-208.

90. See supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. II.
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agreements. 9' In keeping with the liberal policy favoring arbitration,
courts have taken a broad definition of what constitutes a written
arbitration agreement.92
The second requirement for New York Convention enforcement is
that the international tribunal renders an "arbitral award." The term
"arbitral award" is broadly defined in the New York Convention to
include ad hoc and permanent adjudicative bodies. Article I of the New
York Convention provides in relevant part that:
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.
2. The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made
by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.93
If an arbitral tribunal has rendered an award, contracting states must
recognize the award as binding and enforce it,94 subject to the limited
grounds for non-enforcement set forth in Article V of the New York
Convention.95

91. As the Supreme Court has put it,
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the
agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved. A parochial refusal by the courts of one
country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties
to secure tactical litigation advantages.... The invalidation of such an agreement...
would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would.. reflect
a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-19 (internal quotation and punctuation omitted).
92. For a useful illustration of this liberal policy as reflected in attempts to bind non-parties,
see Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Amer. Arb. Assoc., 64 F.3d 773, 776-80 (2d Cir. 1995).
93. See supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. I.
94. Id. at art. Ill.
95. The grounds for non-enforcement under Article V of the New York Convention are the
following:
(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused...if that party
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The third requirement is not mandated by the New York Convention
but is embodied in a reservation of the United States. Article I
authorizes states upon accession to declare that the Convention will only
apply to international awards and only to "commercial" relationships.96
The United States has taken a reservation, which as implemented by the
Federal Arbitration Act, provides that:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as

commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or
agreement... falls under the Convention. An agreement or award
arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has
some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.97
The "international" obligation is liberally applied. For example, an

arbitral award rendered in the United States between two foreign parties
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
(2) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that:
The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or
The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy
of that country."
Supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. V.
96. See supra note 85, New York Convention, at art 1.
97. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
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was deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 202.98 In the context
of international tribunals it will be rare that this obligation is not
satisfied. The "commercial" obligation likewise is liberally construed to
be as broad as the reaches of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.99 To the extent that an international
tribunal has rendered an award arising out of a relationship between the
parties that is commercial in nature, the obligation of this New York
Convention reservation will be satisfied.
B.

The ArbitrationModel and the Iran-UnitedStates Claims
Tribunal

Applying these requirements to international tribunals, raises
questions as to the first requirement that the award have its genesis in an
arbitration agreement. In the international tribunal context, this is a
question of whether an arbitration agreement embodied in an
international treaty granting jurisdiction to an international tribunal is
effective and binding not only for the states that sign such a treaty but
also their nationals who are arbitrating a particular dispute arising from
such grant of jurisdiction. This issue is particularly relevant for those
treaties that establish international tribunals that do not require the
diplomatic espousal of claims but rather permit nationals of a
contracting state to bring an action directly before the tribunal. The
international agreements establishing the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal are illustrative.
Following the seizure of the United States embassy on November 4,
1979, the United States quickly seized millions in Iranian assets. On
January 19, 1981, on the last day of the Carter Administration, the
United States and Iran signed the Algiers Accords establishing the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal to resolve claims by American nationals
against the government of Iran arising out of the Iranian revolution."'
98. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Had Congress
desired to exclude arbitral awards involving two foreign parties rendered within the United States
from enforcement by our courts it could readily have done so.").
99. The Southern District of New York found that section 202 is broader than the interstate
and foreign commerce clauses in section I of the Federal Arbitration Act. Sumitomo Corp. v.
Parakopi Compania Maritima, S.A., 477 F.Supp. 737, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) aff'd 620 F.2d 286
(2d Cir. 1980). That clause of the FAA in turn has been construed by the Supreme Court as an
expression of congressional intent "to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the
Commerce Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
115 (2001) quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
100. The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Jan. 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981), reprinted in I IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB.
REP. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
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As the Supreme Court described it, the purpose in "[t]he establishment
of the Tribunal was to preclude litigation by Americans against Iran in
American courts, so the United States undertook to terminate such legal
proceedings, unblock Iranian assets in the United States, and nullify all
attachments against those assets."'' Given that claims in federal courts
were foreclosed, the tribunal took a novel approach to international
adjudication by permitting private parties to directly pursue actions
against the government of Iran, without the assistance of the United
States. Any decisions rendered by the tribunal in favor of these
claimants were subject to enforcement and execution from Iranian
assets that had been frozen and transferred to an Algerian escrow
account. However, any decisions concerning Iranian counterclaims had
no direct enforcement method. Iran was required to seek enforcement in
federal courts. It did so pursuant to the New York Convention.
Perhaps the most significant case illustrating the use of the New York
Convention to enforce the decisions of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal is Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould,
Inc. ' 2 In Gould, an American corporation, Hoffman Electric
Corporation (Hoffman), entered into contracts with the Iranian Ministry
of Defense in the 1970s. Following the Iranian revolution in 1979,
Hoffiman sued for breach of contract in the District Court in the Central
District of California and obtained a writ of attachment on Iranian assets
held in the United States. After Iran and the U.S. signed the Algiers
Accords in January 1981, establishing the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, and after President Reagan issued the Executive Order 12294,
suspending all claims in federal courts, the district court vacated the
attachment and dismissed the claim without prejudice." 3 Hoffman then
filed claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for breach of
contract, and Iran counterclaimed. The Tribunal rendered an award in
Iran's favor, ruling that Gould was to pay $3.6 million and return certain
military equipment to Iran. Because the Algiers Accords provided no

Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047,
reprinted in I IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 9.
101. United States v. Sperry, 493 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1989).
102. 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989). The other oft-cited case involving recognition and
enforcement of Tribunal decisions in the United States is Iran Aircraft Indus., et. al. v. Avco
Corp., 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992). In this case, the Second Circuit refused to enforce a Tribunal
award based on one of the grounds for challenging the award in the New York Convention.
However, Avco does not address whether the treaty adequate as an arbitration agreement or
whether Tribunal decisions are arbitral awards within the meaning of the New York Convention.
The Second Circuit presumes both to be true. Id. at 145-46.
103. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1360; Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14, 111 (Feb. 26, 1981).
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enforcement mechanism for arbitration awards in Iran's favor, 1 4 Iran
successfully sought recognition and enforcement in the United States
pursuant to the New York Convention in federal district court. On
appeal, Gould argued that the New York Convention "applies.. .only as
to those awards that derive from an arbitral agreement in writing to
which the parties voluntarily submitted."'' 5 The Ninth Circuit concurred
with Gould's argument that an arbitral award must emanate from a
written agreement, but construed the Algiers Accords as representing
the required written agreement.
[B]ecause the President acted within his authority on behalf of
United States citizens, the real question is not whether Gould
entered into a written agreement to submit its claims against Iran
to arbitration, but whether the President-acting on behalf of
Gould-entered into such an agreement. The answer is clearly
yes. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher initialed the
Accords in his role as an agent for the President; and thus, the
requirements of Article II, 1 [of the New York Convention] are
satisfied.0 6
Alternatively, the Court argued that even if the United States
government lacked authority to enter into the agreement in writing
required under the Convention, Gould "ratified" the actions of United
States by filing its7 claim and arbitrating it before the Iran-United States
0
Claims Tribunal.1
Applying this principle broadly, the implications are profound.
Following the logic of the Ninth Circuit, if a state lawfully enters into an
agreement that vests an international tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve
claims of its nationals, it does so on behalf of its nationals and that, for
purposes of enforcing an arbitral award against a national, such an
agreement between states satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of the
New York Convention that there be an agreement in writing.' 8
104. See Gould. 887 F.2d at 1360-61.
105. Id. at 1363.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1364.
108. Although the breadth of such authority is quite extensive, it flows naturally from the
authority of states to regulate international relations and to settle international disputes. As the
Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, put it,
[T]he United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the
claims of its nationals against foreign countries.... Under such agreements, the President
has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign
governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration
procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States
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Moreover, by pursuing a claim before the international tribunal, the
national ratifies the decision of the state to enter into the agreement, and
such ratification occurs notwithstanding the fact that he or she has no
alternative forum to pursue the action.
The second requirement for New York Convention enforcement is
that the international tribunal render an "arbitral award." The key
language in Article I is that the "term 'arbitral awards' shall include not
only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those
made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have
submitted."'' 9 A simple reading of this provision would lead one to
conclude that an arbitral award may be rendered by any permanentlyestablished adjudicative body.
With respect to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the Ninth
Circuit in Gould only discussed this particular requirement in passing. It
simply noted that, as a permanent arbitral body that renders arbitral
awards, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal satisfies the
requirements of Article I of the Convention. " Such a superficial
analysis is unfortunate, for the precise contours of the term "permanent
arbitral bodies" are unclear and one should hesitate to include all
international tribunals under this rubric. Many international tribunals are
engaged in functions that intuitively one would exclude from the
category of arbitration. Among these include tribunals responsible for
prosecuting crimes, determining human rights violations, and resolving
personnel and administrative disputes. Even if the tribunal is engaged in
resolving commercial disputes, is Gould's superficial analysis correct
that international tribunals are sitting as "permanent arbitral bodies" and
as such their decisions are "arbitral awards" within the meaning of the
New York Convention?
The preparatory work of the New York Convention suggests

claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all
might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But
is also undisputed that the "United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its
citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without
exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a
whole."
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-680 (1981) (citations omitted). Thus, if the United
States has the broader authority to extinguish or settle claims of its nationals against foreign
governments, it also has the lesser authority to provide its nationals with an alternative forum for
redress of their grievance.
109. Supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. I, para. 2.
110. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1362 ("Article I discusses the scope of the Convention, stating that it
'shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards....' The Convention defines
'arbitral awards' to include those 'made by permanent arbitral bodies'. ... The Tribunal's award
satisfies th[is] requirement[] as well.").
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otherwise. One drafting committee report states that:
The expression "arbitral awards" was understood.. .to include
awards made by arbitral bodies appointed for each case (whether
selected by the parties or by an organization), as well as awards
made by permanent arbitral bodies established in accordance
with the law of a contracting State."' "
This may suggest a reference to international tribunals, but more
likely it is a reference to standing municipal arbitral bodies, as existed in
certain Communist countries." 2 Elsewhere, this same report suggests
that the Convention was not intended to cover arbitration between
States. In explaining the title to be given to the treaty, the Committee
noted that:
[T]he expression "international arbitral awards"...normally
referred to arbitration between States. Since the draft Convention
does not deal with arbitration between States, but with the
recognition and enforcement in one country of arbitral awards
made in another country, the Committee adopted the title "Draft
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards", which reflects more accurately the object of
the Convention. 113
This is further supported by the text of the New York Convention,
which requires that the award be "made in the territory of a State.""' 4
The text and preparatory materials suggest that international tribunals
established solely to resolve interstate disputes are not intended to be
subject to traditional enforcement mechanisms under the New York
Convention. But it does not follow that international tribunals, such as
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established by treaties to resolve
interstate disputes and disputes involving a private party are never
111.
Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and
Comments by Governments and Organizations, Doc. E/2704 and Corr.1, Mar. 28, 1955, part F,
reprinted in

GIORGIO GAJA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK

CONVENTION, PART Ill, PREPARATORY WORKS at llI.A.l.3 (1978).
112. That the USSR suggested including a reference to permanent arbitral bodies may suggest
that permanent municipal arbitral bodies were intended, as the USSR was one of the countries
that have such permanent arbitral bodies. See id.; see also Gould, 887 F.2d at 1363 n.9; Leonard
V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1061 (1961) (The Convention
"also applies to awards made by permanent arbitral bodies, a provision which covers arbitration
before trade tribunals of Communist countries.").
113. Supra note 11,Draft Convention, at lll.A.l.2 (emphasis added).
114. Supra note 85, New York Convention, at art. I; see also STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 29 (1990).
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subject to New York Convention enforcement. Rather, the Convention
was intended to regulate the recognition and enforcement in one country
of awards rendered in another country. Most international tribunals
render "anational" awards governed by the international legal system
and not subject to the control of a single national state."' They therefore
should not be viewed as arbitral awards subject to New York
Convention enforcement. Absent evidence of intended subordination to
the laws of the forum state, the tribunal's decisions should be viewed as
subject to the international legal system and not municipal supervision.
That said, if an international tribunal decision was rendered in
another country and subject to the laws of that country as the lex
arbitri,"6 it should be treated as a foreign arbitral award." 7 Finding
intent to subordinate the tribunal's decisions to national laws may be
difficult to ascertain. One of the clearest signs of such subordination is
if the tribunal's proceedings reference the New York Convention," 8 or
are subject to international commercial arbitration rules that clearly
contemplate New York Convention enforcement, such as the rules of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), or the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Applying this approach to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
classifying its decisions as "arbitral awards" within the meaning of
Article I of the Convention seems appropriate. As one commentator has
noted regarding the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the "choice of
the UNCITRAL Rules... is very significant""' 9 in discerning the lex
arbitriintended by the United States and Iran.
The UNCITRAL Rules chosen by the drafters of the [Algiers]
Accords demonstrate.. .that it can be 'taken for granted that there
is an applicable national law' (footnote omitted).... [T]he
presumed intent of the parties adopting the UNCITRAL Rules
calls for municipal review as clearly as if the choice instead had

115. For a discussion of "anational" and "delocalized" awards, see generally Jan Paulsson,
Arbitration Unbound: Award Detachedfrom the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 358 (1981); Toope, supra note 114, at 19-44.
116. Lex arbitriis the law of the place of arbitration and governs most of the procedural
aspects of the arbitral process. For a brief synopsis of the concept of lex arbitri,see Jack J. Coe,
Jr., Pre-hearing Techniques to Promote Speed and Cost Effectiveness - Some Thoughts
ConcerningArbitral Process Design, 2 PEPP. DIS. RES. L. J. 53, 58-59 (2002).
117. For a detailed discussion of this distinction, see David D. Caron, The Nature of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of InternationalDispute Resolution, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 109-129 (1990).
118. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1122(2).
119. Caron, supra note 117, at 138.
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been the American Arbitration Association Rules or the ICC
Rules.' 0
As to the third requirement that the arbitral award is "international"
and arise out of a "commercial" relationship, the Ninth Circuit in Gould
had little difficulty concluding that an award of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal is "international" because "the Tribunal sits at The
Hague, which is in the Netherlands, which is a contracting State" and
because "the award is obviously not domestic in nature because Iran is
As to the "commercial"
one of the parties to the agreement."''
requirement, the court noted the obligation and without discussion
simply concluded that it was satisfied.'22 Such a cursory conclusion is
unfortunate but nonetheless correct. The dispute between the parties
arose out of a contractual relationship between an American corporation
and the Iranian Ministry of Defense regarding the provision of military
equipment. It therefore fell squarely within traditional concepts of
commercial activity.
But the "commercial" obligation may render certain decisions of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal unenforceable in the United States
under the New York Convention. For example in one recent dispute
between Iran and the United States, the Tribunal ordered the United
States to pay Iran over $5 million as a result of a breach of the Algiers
Accords. More specifically, this breach involved a U.S. federal court's
refusal to enforce a tribunal decision notwithstanding the Algiers
Accord obligation of the United States to treat all awards as final and
binding.2 3 Assuming Iran is unable to secure enforcement by other
means, one would expect that if Iran sought enforcement in the United
States pursuant to the New York Convention, a federal court would

120. Id.
at 139.
121. Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th

Cir. 1989).
122. Id.

Under the plain meaning of the statute then, three basic requirements exist for
jurisdiction to be conferred upon the district court: the award (1) must arise out of a
legal relationship (2) which is commercial in nature and (3) which is not entirely
domestic in scope. These three conditions are clearly satisfied here.
Id.
123. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT (June 5, 1998) paras.
61-76. For a discussion of the case, see Anuj Desai, Case No. A27: The Iran-UnitedStates Claims
Tribunal'sFirst Award of Damagesfor a Breach of the Algiers Declarations, 10 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 229 (1999). The case arose out of the Second Circuit's refusal to enforce a Tribunal
decision on the grounds that the American claimant did not have an opportunity to present his
case within the meaning of Article V of the Convention. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp.,
980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1992).
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conclude that a dispute between the United States and Iran concerning a
violation of an international agreement did not constitute a commercial
relationship.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal represents a remarkable
example of an international tribunal falling within the arbitration model.
The two governments agreed to an adjudicative process to resolve
interstate disputes as well as disputes between private parties and the
respective governments. The "arbitration agreement" was entered into
when the United States and Iran signed the Algiers Accords. This
agreement was done on behalf of their respective nationals and is
binding upon them to the extent they pursue an action before the
tribunal. Decisions of the tribunal are resolved according to arbitration
rules that contemplate supervision by Dutch courts. Finally, the awards
rendered by the Tribunal are international in nature and generally
involve commercial relationships between Iran and private parties. As
such, the awards rendered by this tribunal are foreign arbitral awards
subject to New York Convention enforcement. As the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal stated in a recent case, although the Tribunal is
"clearly an international tribunal," the "mechanism available in the
United States for the enforcement of Tribunal awards is the ... New
124
York Convention."
C.

Normative Application

The arbitration model posits that federal courts will treat the
decisions of certain international tribunals as foreign arbitral awards
enforceable pursuant to the New York Convention. In applying this
model, assuming the parties are seeking direct recognition and
enforcement, federal courts must begin their analysis by first
determining whether the international tribunal fits another model
requiring greater deference. That is, federal courts must ask if there is
any binding federal lex specialis applicable to the specific international
tribunal that may trump the lex generalis of the New York Convention.
For example, although an ICSID tribunal award likely would satisfy all
the requirements of the New York Convention, the requirements of the
ICSID Convention as implemented by 22 U.S.C. § 1650a obviate the
need to apply this model to that tribunal.
In this regard it is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit in Gould wholly
failed to undertake this first step. Although the Algiers Accords requires
that "[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and
124. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT (June 5, 1998), at
paras. 58, 61.
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binding,"' 125 the Gould court simply assumed without discussion that the
New York Convention applied. Of course, credible arguments can be
made that this obligation is not directly binding on federal courts, 26 but
it is nonetheless disturbing that the Gould court failed to address this lex
specialis.
In the absence of a binding federal lex specialis requiring greater
deference to the tribunal decision, federal courts should ascertain
whether they should defer to tribunal decisions in the manner prescribed
by Congress in the Federal Arbitration Act implementing the New York
Convention.2 7 This legislation requires recognition and enforcement if
(1) the tribunal had its genesis in a written arbitration agreement; (2) the
tribunal rendered an enforceable "arbitral award;" and (3) the
relationship between the parties was "international" and "commercial"
in nature. For international tribunals, federal courts should examine
whether the first requirement is satisfied, either by virtue of the treaty
establishing the tribunal or some other legal instrument constituting an
arbitration agreement. For the second requirement to be fulfilled federal
courts should satisfy themselves that the states establishing the
international tribunal intended for it to be subject to the lex arbitri of the
forum state or otherwise subject to New York Convention enforcement.
That is to say, if an award is made in Geneva or The Hague by an
international tribunal, is it subject to the supervision of the Swiss or
Dutch courts, respectively? If not, such decisions are not arbitral awards
enforceable under the New York Convention. For the third requirement,
federal courts should confirm that the award is "international" (which
rarely will be an issue) and that the relationship between them is
"commercial." For many international tribunals (human rights tribunals,
criminal tribunals) the relationship between the parties is decidedly not
commercial in nature.
Of course, federal courts are regularly required to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. So
frequent is this practice that they may fail to appreciate the unique
features of arbitration before international tribunals and simply assume
that the New York Convention applies. The celebrated case of Iran
Aircraft Indus. v. Avco is a cautionary tale illustrating the simplicity

125. Claims Settlement Declaration, Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-lran, art IV, para. 1, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL.
TRIB. REP. 10 (1983).
126. Compare Avco, 980 F.2d at 144-45 with Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States,
Award No. 586-A27-FT (June 5, 1998) ("A27") at paras. 61-71.
127. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (1970).
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with which federal courts address international tribunal decisions. 128 In
that case, the Second Circuit concluded that the obligations in the
Algiers Accords that the United States treat Tribunal awards as final and
binding only required treatment at least as favorable as that accorded to

foreign arbitral awards. It then rather summarily concluded that the New
York Convention a fortiori applied.129 Unlike Gould, no analysis was
undertaken as to whether there was an arbitration agreement between

the parties, whether the award was a "foreign arbitral award" of a
"permanent arbitral body" or whether the relationship between Avco
and Iran was "commercial" in nature. While each of these requirements
no doubt could be found in that case applying reasoning similar to
Gould, the failure to even address the issues is disturbing.

Federal courts can anticipate that in the future they will be asked to
apply the arbitration model to the decisions of other international
tribunals. Application of these norms should guide federal courts in

ascertaining whether to utilize the arbitration model. The decisions of
two other tribunals-the Claims Resolution Tribunal and

the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea-are illustrative.
The tribunal established to resolve claims to Holocaust-era dormant

Swiss bank accounts, the Claims Resolution Tribunal, 3° is a good
example of an international tribunal that fits the arbitration model.
Under the first phase of the Claims Resolution Tribunal proceedingsthe CRT I proceedings -the claimant and defendant sign a Claims
Resolution Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the dispute to the
Claims Resolution Tribunal for resolution.' 32 Consistent with Article 2
of the CRT I Rules,'33 the tribunal will not arbitrate claims to dormant
accounts until it has received a Claims Resolution Agreement signed by
the parties, in which the claimant and the defendant "agree that the
128. Avco, 980 F.2d at 141.
129. Avco, 980 F.2d at 145-46.
130. The CRT was created by the Independent Claims Resolution Foundation chaired by
former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. The Foundation was established by the
Swiss Federal Banking Commission, the public supervising entity of Swiss banks, and the
Independent Committee of Eminent Persons ("ICEP"). ICEP was created pursuant to a
Memorandum of Understanding between the World Jewish Restitution Organization, the World
Jewish Congress, and the Swiss Bankers Association. See Alford, The Claims Resolution
Tribunal, supra note 7, at 259-60.
131. For a discussion of the distinction between the first and second phases of the Claims
Resolution Tribunal, see id at 260-67. The second phase of the CRT more aptly fits the "Special
Master model discussion below. See infra text accompanying notes 334-349.
132. See Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunal,supra note 7, at 276, n. 183.
133. Article 2 provides that "Claims are submitted to the Claims Resolution Tribunal by
filing, directly or through a[n] Ernst & Young contact office or otherwise, a signed claims
resolution agreement." See Rules of Procedure for the Claims Resolution Process, at
http://www.icep-iaep.org/crp/crprules.htm. (adopted Oct. 15, 1997) (last visited Feb. 28, 2003)
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Claimant's claim to the above dormant account shall be resolved by the
31 4
Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland.'
Under the CRT I Rules, the tribunal decisions are expressly subject to
13 6
Swiss law'35 and CRT decisions have been reviewed by Swiss courts.
The relationship between the parties is commercial in nature arising out
of a banking relationship between a Swiss bank and foreign clientele.
As such the CRT I proceedings fall within the arbitration model and
should be enforced as such.
By contrast, litigation under the Law of the Sea Convention is an
example of an international adjudicative process that appears to be a
likely candidate for the arbitration model, but upon analysis does not fit.
Pursuant to Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (LOS Convention), 3 7 parties may choose among several options
to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
LOS Convention, including the options of interstate arbitration or
submitting the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) sitting in Hamburg.'3 8 Utilizing the above analysis, as
Gould suggests, Article 287 arguably constitutes the arbitration
agreement that would be binding as between the parties. However, the
failure to include institutional rules such as the ICC or UNCITRAL or
otherwise subordinate the adjudicative process to the municipal law of
Germany is evidence that such a tribunal does not constitute arbitration
subject to enforcement in national courts under the New York
Convention. Moreover, the disputes arising before the ITLOS often will
concern core disputes between countries that are not commercial in
nature.' 39 As such, decisions of ITLOS should not be recognized under

134. Claims Resolution Agreement, at http://www.icep-iaep.org/crp/cra.htm. (last visited Nov
1.2002).
135. Article 16 provides in relevant part that "The relationship between the claimant and the
Swiss bank shall be governed by Swiss law, except as provided by these Rules of Procedure." See
Rules of Procedure for the Claims Resolution Process at http://www.icepiaep.org/crp/crprules.htm. (last visited Oct. 15, 1997).
136. Decisions of the CRT have been subject to adjudication before the Swiss Federal Court
pursuant to Article 176 of the Swiss Act on Private International Law ("SPILA"). PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 40-41 (Andreas Bucher & Pierre-Yves Tschanz eds.
1996).
137. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Third U.N Conference on the Law of
the Sea, art. 287, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1322-23.
138. Such an approach was taken in the case of M/VSaiga, in which Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines and the Republic of Guinea originally submitted the case to arbitral proceedings
pursuant to Article 287 of the LOS Convention and subsequently transferred the dispute to the
ITLOS. Judgment of the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case, paras. 1-4, 40-45 (July 1, 1999) 38 I.L.M.
1323, available at http://www.itlos.org. (last visited February 10, 2003).
139. See, e.g., ITLOS Press Release 43, Case on Conservation of Swordfish Stocks Between
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the arbitration model.
Assuming the decisions of an international tribunal fit the arbitration
model, a federal court should grant significant deference. In
implementing the New York Convention, Congress has mandated an
arbitral award shall be confirmed against any other party to the
arbitration and the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the New York Convention. 4 ' While this does not
mean that decisions of international tribunals are directly effective in the
United States,' it does mean that "[i]f an award has been rendered, that
award must be enforced unless the party against whom enforcement is
sought presents evidence that one of the limited defenses enumerated
under Article V of the [New York] Convention is applicable."' 42
III. THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT MODEL

C.'

A third model for federal court deference to decisions of international
tribunals is the foreign judgment model. Under this approach, as a
matter of comity, a judgment rendered in a foreign court will be given
conclusive effect in federal courts without a review of the merits of the
decisions, unless there are grounds to believe that the judgment should

Chile and the European Community in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean, at http://www.itlos.org
whether the European Community
(last visited Dec. 21, 2000). (ITLOS "called upon to decide ...
has complied with its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to
ensure conservation of swordfish in the fishing activities undertaken by vessels flying the flag of
any of its Member States in the high seas adjacent to Chile's exclusive economic zone,....and
whether the 'Galapagos Agreement' of 2000 was negotiated in keeping with the provisions of the
UN Convention.")
140. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 207.
141. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1992).
142. Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 588 (3d Cir. 2001).
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be impeached. The foreign judgment model posits that decisions
rendered by certain international tribunals are candidates for similar
treatment. In particular, this model applies to those situations where
direct recognition is sought, and courts have no binding federal mandate
from a statute or self-executing treaty as to what effect to give to their
judgments.
A.

Recognition and Enforcement Under Hilton v. Guyot

The landmark case enunciating U.S. policy regarding recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is found in Hilton v. Guyot.'43 In
Hilton, two Americans in Paris operating a firm under the name A.T.
Stewart & Co. had contractual relations with a French firm, Charles
Fortin & Co. Disputes arose regarding adjustment of certain accounts
and French judgments were rendered in favor of Charles Fortin & Co.
Unable to execute the judgment in France, Bertin Guyot, liquidator of
the firm of Charles Fortin & Co. sought recognition and enforcement of
the judgment in the United States. After an exhaustive review of the
approaches of other countries regarding the enforcement of foreign
judgments, the Supreme Court articulated the classic test for recognition
of foreign judgments:
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen
of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a
sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from
the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears
to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction
of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its
proceedings are according to the course of a civilized
jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the
judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the
matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the
merits tried in the foreign court unless some special ground is
shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was
affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of
international law, and by the comity of our own country, it
should not be given full credit and effect.144

143. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
144. Id. at 159-60. The Supreme Court went further than this and ultimately held that there
was an
independent ground upon which we are satisfied that the comity of our nation does
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As applied over the past century, Hilton has become foundational for
two reasons. First, the grounds it articulates for non-recognition of a
foreign judgment-lack of due process, lack of personal or subject
matter jurisdiction, insufficient notice, fraud, public policy, etc.-have
become codified in decisions, statutes, and commentaries. Both the
Restatement of Foreign Relations and the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act adopt principles that find their genesis in
the Hilton formula.'45
Second, Hilton is important because the basis for recognizing foreign
judgments is founded on international comity.
The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within
its territory.. .by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate
within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our
greatest jurists have been content to call "the comity of nations."
... "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.'46
Thus, the basis for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments rests on
ill-defined notions of international comity. Although uncertain in its
application, in practice federal courts are quite willing to recognize
foreign money judgment creditors on this basis, provided the Hilton
safeguards are satisfied.
While Hilton principles have become fundamental as the basis for
recognizing foreign judgments, there is little evidence that federal courts
have had occasion to utilize Hilton specifically, or international comity
generally, as grounds for recognizing and enforcing international
tribunal judgments. The most important example comes from the late
not require us to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the court of France; and that
ground is the want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect to be given to the
judgments of this and other foreign countries.
Id. at 210. However, this reciprocity requirement has not been followed in subsequent lower court
cases, principally because, applying Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, the recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment is deemed to be governed by state common and statutory law. For an
extensive commentary on this, see Richard H. M. Maloy & Desamparados M. Nisi, A Message to
the Supreme Court: The Next Time You Get a Chance, Please Look at Hilton v. Guyot; We Think
it Needs Repairing,5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999).
145. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4; 13 Pt. 11 U.L.A. 58-59
(2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
146. 159 U.S. at 163-64.
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19th century La Abra trilogy of cases concerning the enforcement of
United States-Mexico Claims Commission decisions.'47 Following that
Commission's decision in favor of the La Abra Silver Mining Co.,
among others, and payment by Mexico to the United States pursuant
thereto, Mexico alleged that these claims were procured by fraud and
should not be disbursed to the claimants. The Supreme Court agreed,
and rested its argument on international comity.
International arbitration must always proceed on the highest
principles of national honor and integrity. Claims presented and
evidence submitted to such a tribunal must necessarily bear the
impress of the entire good faith of the government from which
they come, and it is not to be presumed that any government will
for a moment allow itself knowingly to be made the instrument
of wrong in any such proceeding. No technical rules of pleading
as applied in municipal courts ought ever to be allowed to stand
in the way of the national power to do what is right under all the
circumstances. Every citizen who asks the intervention of his
own government against another for the redress of his personal
grievances must necessarily subject himself and his claim to
these requirements of international comity."'
The Court then in the first case of the La Abra trilogy denied the
claimants request for a writ of mandamus requiring disbursement of
these funds, finding that it was within the President's discretion to
negotiate again with Mexico to have these claims retried, and in the
meantime it was appropriate for the President to withhold payment.'49
Subsequently, the United States refused to have the claims resubmitted
to the international tribunal, proposing instead to have them investigated
and retried domestically. 5° Congress subsequently authorized review of
the claims in U.S. courts and denial of the claims in the event they were
found to have been procured by fraud.'' The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of these congressional measures and declined to order
disbursement of the52 funds paid by Mexico pursuant to the international
tribunal decisions.
147. Frelinghuysen v. United States ex rel. Key, 110 U.S. 63 (1884); United States ex rel.
Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306 (1891); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
423 (1899).
148. Key, 110 U.S. at 73-74; see also Boynton, 139 U.S. at 322; La Abra Silver Mining Co.,
175 U.S. at 434, 458, 463.
149. Key, 110 U.S. at 74.
150. Boynton, 139 U.S. at 324-26.
151. La Abra Silver Mining Co., 175 U.S. at 441-43.
152. Id. at 450-99.
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Of course, the La Abra trilogy of cases does not fit the classic
scenario of enforcement of an international tribunal judgment. The
treaty between Mexico and the United States stipulated what effect to be
given to the Commission's decisions, Mexico had already made
payment to the United States, and the principal question was whether
the United States could refuse to make downstream disbursement to the
claimants of the amounts paid by Mexico.' 53 Nonetheless, the basis for
the denial of the claims is remarkably similar to Hilton. To use Hilton
language, the judgment of the United States-Mexico Claims
Commission "should be held conclusive upon the merits.. .unless some
special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing
that it was affected by fraud... or that.. .by the comity of our own
country, it should not be given full credit and effect."' 54 The third case
of the La Abra trilogy contains virtually identical language:
We might well doubt the soundness of any conclusion that could
be regarded as weakening.. .the force that should be attached to
the finality of an award made by an international tribunal of
arbitration. So far from the act of Congress having any result of
that character, the effect of such legislation is to strengthen the
principle that an award by a tribunal acting under the joint
authority of two countries is conclusive between the governments
concerned and must be executed in good faith unless there be
ground to impeach the integrity of the tribunal itself'55
With the exception of the La Abra trilogy of cases, there are no
reported instances of an attempt to use this model to refuse recognition
in the United States of an international tribunal judgment. Of course, it
is rare for an international tribunal to render a money judgment that is
not at the same time a "foreign arbitral award" subject to enforcement
under the arbitration model set forth above. Itis also uncommon for an
international judgment creditor to seek recognition of an international
tribunal decision in federal courts. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising
that there are so few cases to support a foreign judgment model.
Having said this, there are logical reasons why the policies that
support recognizing foreign judgments should apply with equal force to
international decisions. As the Third Circuit has noted, at the root,
comity concerns reflect a desire to promote predictability, stability, and
respect for the rule of law.
The primary reason for giving effect to the rulings of foreign
153. Id.at 426-29.
154. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 159-60.
155. La Abra Silver Mining Co., 175 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added).
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tribunals is that such recognition factors international
cooperation and encourages reciprocity. Thus, comity promotes
predictability and stability in legal expectations, two critical
components of successful international commercial enterprises. It
also encourages the rule of law, which is especially important
because as trade expands across international borders,
the
156
necessity for cooperation among nations increases as well.
Such concerns are of equal weight in the international judgment and the
foreign judgment context.
This is particularly so where the United States is not a party to the
treaty establishing the international tribunal or has not otherwise
consented to the tribunal's jurisdiction. In such contexts, respect for
foreign judgments will be based on common law notions of
international comity, in the absence of express legislative or executive
pronouncements regarding the degree of deference to be given such
judgments. International tribunal decisions fit the foreign judgment
model most clearly when they are truly alien, that is, they do not involve
the imprimatur of the United States reflected in treaty accession or
jurisdictional consent. Absent such consent, federal courts should
undertake the Hilton analysis and respect judgments of international
tribunals on the basis of international comity.
Finally, one should underscore that recognition and enforcement of
foreign or international judgments could apply both offensively and
defensively. Comments to the Restatement on Foreign Relations
explain:
The judgment of a foreign state may not be enforced unless it is
entitled to recognition. Whether a foreign judgment should be
recognized, may be an issue, however, not only in
enforcement.. .but in other contexts, for example where the
defendants seeks to rely on a prior adjudication of a controversy
(res judicata), or whether either side in a litigation seeks to rely
on prior determination of an issue of fact or law.'57
Thus, in any discussion regarding the recognition and enforcement of
decisions of international tribunals, one should keep in mind that such
recognition may come in the form of a defensive claim of res judicata or
an offensive claim to have a judgment executed.

156. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz Ag, 270 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2001).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. b (1987).
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The ForeignJudgment Model and the European Court of
Justice

As noted above, there are no reported instances in the past century in
which decisions of an international tribunal have been subject to
enforcement and recognition using a foreign judgment model.
Nonetheless, there is nothing to prevent decisions of certain
international tribunals from enjoying recognition and enforcement under
the foreign judgment model. A brief examination of the possibility for
recognition of decisions of the European Court of Justice is illustrative.
The European Court of Justice is an international tribunal established
by the Treaty of Rome with the responsibility to ensure "that in the
'
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."158
There is an extremely intricate and fluid relationship between Member
State national courts and the European Court of Justice. Perhaps most
significant, under the "preliminary reference" procedure of Article 234,
formerly Article 177, a national court may request the European Court
of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty
or the validity and interpretation of acts of Union institutions if such a
preliminary ruling is necessary to enable the national court to give
proper judgment in a case pending before it.' 59 Upon rendering any such
decision, the national court is bound to apply the determination of the
0
European Court of Justice to the case before it.16
A U.S. federal court has not yet had occasion to recognize and
enforce a decision of a Member State national court incorporating a
decision of the European Court of Justice. Nonetheless, in at least two
instances federal courts have dismissed actions to permit Member State
national courts (and the European Court of Justice as appropriate) to
determine whether violations of EU competition law have occurred. In a
third case, a federal court was faced with a dispute that had previously
been subject to decisions by a European national court and the European
Court of Justice. These cases underscore the confidence that federal
courts have in the decision-making process of European national courts
and the likelihood that they would enforce a foreign judgment
158. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 220, O.J. (C 340) 3,
269 (1997).
159. Id. at 234.
160. See, e.g., Case 52/76, Benedetti v. Munari, 1977 E.C.R. 163, 26,the Court of
Justice has jurisdiction to 'give (...)
rulings' concerning the interpretation 'of this
Treaty' and that 'of acts of the institutions of the Community'. It follows that the
purpose of a preliminary ruling is to decide a question of law and that that ruling is
binding on the national court as to the interpretation of the Community provisions and
acts in question.
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incorporating an ECJ decision.
In Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,161 the
federal district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over claims
alleging that the A.C. Nielsen Company engaged in anticompetitive
activity in Europe. The plaintiff sought to assert claims that the
defendants had violated the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome,
requesting the district to assert supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims in addition to the Sherman Act claims. The court exercised its
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction because such a claim
raised novel and complex issues of State law. The court noted that, even
if this claim were cognizable, normally it would be brought in a
European national court:
which would apply its own substantive and procedural rules and
remedies in giving effect to the Treaty [of Rome], and would
have the option of seeking an opinion from the European Court
of Justice on questions of European Community law. This court
does not have that option; it would 1have
to decide what European
62
Community law would be, de novo.
In Capital Currency Exchange, N. V. v. National Westminster Bank
PLC, 63 the plaintiff, a Netherlands Antilles corporation, and its New
York affiliate alleged that British banks and their officers engaged in
antitrust violations by denying banking services to the plaintiffs and its
affiliates. The district court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens
grounds, finding that England is an adequate forum for plaintiffs'
claims. On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the finding that plaintiffs
could not bring Sherman Act claims before English courts but could
challenge and secure monetary damages for defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct under Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome."6
Finally, in Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 165 a federal district
court faced a claim that defendants engaged in a worldwide price-fixing
and market allocation conspiracy that had the direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect of artificially inflating the price of the
product in the United States. Significantly, the case had previously been
the subject of litigation in German court, with a preliminary
determination to the European Court of Justice, 6 6 which found that the
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

127 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 417.
155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at609-10.
593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Case 1/81, Pfizer, Inc. v. Eurim Pharm GmbH, 1981 E.C.R. 2913,

5.
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use of a national trademark to exclude competition from the sale of
goods acquired in another member state of the European Union violated
the Treaty of Rome.167 The federal court did not need to reach the
question of the preclusive effect of these decisions, finding that "even
assuming the truth of plaintiffs allegations that the United States
price.. .has risen since the expiration of defendants' patent, plaintiff has
failed to allege any facts demonstrating a causal connection between
defendants' conduct in Europe and the price increase in the United
States."' 68
None of these cases involved requests to recognize and enforce a
decision of the European Court of Justice. But all of them clearly
express confidence in the ability of Member State national courts-and
the European Court of Justice-to adjudge questions and fashion
remedies to address anticompetitive behavior in violation of the Treaty
of Rome. Taking these cases to their logical conclusion, one may apply
the following heuristic. Assume that a Member State national court was
seized of a claim alleging violations of EU competition law and
referenced an Article 234 preliminary question to the European Court of
Justice. Assume further that the European Court of Justice made a
determination that there had been a violation of the Treaty of Rome,
leading the European national court to incorporate that determination
into its own decision and subsequently to award monetary damages.
Having no alternative to enforce the judgment in Europe, the successful
claimant then sought enforcement of the monetary award in the United
States, while the defendant argued that the judgment should not be
recognized and enforced, in particular on the grounds that there had
been no violation of the EU competition law.
Assuming such a scenario, applying Hilton offensively for
enforcement purposes, there is every reason to think that a federal court
would utilize Hilton principles in assessing whether to recognize and
enforce a decision of a European national court incorporating the
decision of the European Court of Justice. The federal court would ask
the traditional Hilton questions, such as whether the parties before the
national court and the European Court of Justice had an "opportunity for
a full and fair trial.. .before a court of competent jurisdiction."' 69
Assuming that the federal court is satisfied these criteria were met, it
would enforce the judgment of the Member State court, which in turn
had incorporated the determination of the European Court of Justice. In
so doing, it would analyze the procedural fairness of the European Court
167. Id. at 13.
168. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 593 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
169. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
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of Justice and assess whether comity considerations merit recognition of
its decisions.
Applying another heuristic of defensive recognition of the judgment,
assume that a federal court-unlike Information Resources-exercised
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over competition
claims alleging a violation of the Treaty of Rome. Assume further that
the parties to the dispute had parallel litigation in a Member State
national court, which found no violation of the Treaty of Rome. The
European Court of Justice used an Article 234 reference determination
to arrive at such a finding. In such a situation, the U.S. federal court
arguably would not be forced to "decide what European Community
law would be de novo,', 17 ' but could simply apply Hilton principles in
assessing whether to give preclusive effect to the determination of the
Member State decision incorporating the decision of the European
Court of Justice.
In both hypothetical scenarios, a federal court would recognize and
enforce the decision of a Member State national court incorporating a
dispositive determination of the European Court of Justice. In both
cases, the determination whether to recognize the Member State
national court judgment incorporating the European Court of Justice
decision would be made in the same manner as other foreign judgments
are recognized. In both cases a federal court would be utilizing a foreign
judgment model to recognize the decision of an international tribunal.
C.

Normative Application

The foreign judgment model posits that federal courts will treat the
decisions of certain international tribunals in the same manner as
foreign judgments enforceable as a matter of international comity. In
applying this model, assuming the parties are seeking direct recognition
and enforcement, federal courts must begin their analysis by first
determining whether or not the international tribunal fits one of the
other two models previously discussed that require greater deference. If
there is a federal mandate, such as 22 U.S.C. § 1650a or a self-executing
treaty, specifically addressing recognition of that tribunal's judgments,
federal court recognition should be pursued according therewith. In the
absence of binding federal lex specialis, courts should ascertain whether
the international tribunal decision satisfies the requirements of the
arbitration model by applying the requirements of the New York
Convention as implemented in the United States.
170. Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411,417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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With respect to the European Court of Justice, for example, there is
no federal legislation requiring recognition or enforcement of their
decisions, and the fact that the United States is not a signatory to the
Treaty of Rome and never otherwise agreed to be bound to their
decisions precludes application of the first model. The decisions of the
European Court of Justice also do not satisfy the arbitration model
because, although sitting in Luxembourg, its decisions are not subject to
their court's supervision. Nor do the ECJ decisions generally arise from
a commercial relationship between the parties. Application of the
arbitration model to that tribunal would therefore be inappropriate. But
as suggested, a federal court may face a scenario in which a party seeks
recognition and enforcement of an ECJ decision embedded in a Member
State money judgment, in which case the foreign judgment model may
be applicable.
In the event that neither the full faith and credit model nor the
arbitration model are appropriate, upon request for direct recognition of
an international tribunal decision a federal court should decide whether
to recognize and enforce the decision based on international comity
principles that animate from Hilton v. Guyot. Comity counsels that such
decisions are not enforced as a rule of law, but rather out of "practice,
convenience, and expediency," promoting the substantial value of
"discouraging repeated litigation of the same question" in multiple
fora. 7 ' The fundamental question for this model of enforcement is the
integrity of the process that gave rise to the judgment. When an
international tribunal having jurisdiction inquires into the relevant facts
and law, judicially, honestly, and with the intent to reach the right result,
a federal court should not "sit as a court of appeal from that which gave
the judgment."'72 In most cases this should result in the recognition and
enforcement of the decision of the international tribunal.
Federal courts can anticipate that in the future they will be requested
to recognize and enforce--defensively or offensively-a decision of an
international tribunal absent a binding federal mandate instructing them
as to what deference to be given to their judgments. This model
responds to that scenario. While the European Court of Justice may be
one of the clearest examples of a decision of an international tribunal
that could be recognized in the United States under a foreign judgment
model, there are other international tribunals that are also likely
candidates. International tribunals that involve interstate arbitrations
involving money judgments are the most promising. Assuming the

171. Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900).
172. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387 (1926).
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previous discussion is correct-that interstate arbitration generally is not
subject to enforcement under the New York Convention-then it is
likely that monetary judgments rendered by these international tribunals
adjudicating claims between states fall within the foreign judgment
model. As the Restatement on Foreign Relations has noted, "[f]oreign
arbitral awards not falling under the [New York] Convention are
generally enforceable in the United States in the same manner as foreign
judgments..., whether or not they have been judicially confirmed in the
state where made."' 73 Two international tribunals, the United Nations
Compensation Commission and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, are illustrative.
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was
established by the United Nations Security Council to resolve claims
arising out of the Gulf War brought against Iraq by countries espoused
on the behalf of their nationals. The decisions of the UNCC are
rendered by a panel of commissioners and subject to the approval of a
governing council established by the United Nations Security
Council.'74 Such decisions do not fit the arbitration model outlined
above because, among other things, there is nothing to indicate that the
UNCC, located in Geneva, is subject to the supervision of the Swiss
courts.'75 It is truly an "anational" tribunal applying international law
and under the supervision of the United Nations. It therefore does not

render awards subject to enforcement under the New York Convention.
Nor does the UNCC clearly fit the full faith and credit model, for
although the United States is a party before the UNCC and agreed that
UNCC decisions are "final and are not subject to appeal or review on
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

487 cmt. h; see also id. at § 487 note 8
(Actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards not falling under the Convention must
therefore must [sic] be brought in State courts, or in federal courts in exercise of
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Most State arbitration statutes do not provide for
enforcement of foreign awards; and there is no equivalent to the Uniform Foreign
Country Money Judgments Act. Nevertheless, arbitral awards rendered in foreign states
have been freely enforced in the United States, and recognition or enforcement has been
.refused only on grounds that would justify refusal to recognize or enforce foreign
judgments.").
174. S e e generally
The
Government
Council,
available
at
http://www.unog/ch/uncc/governin.htm (last visited February 10, 2003) (describing the
Governing Council); The Commissions, available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/commiss.htm (last
visited February 10, 2003) (describing the UNCC Commissioners).
175. See generally Decision Taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 (1992) (UNCC Provisional Rules of
Procedure), available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec_10.pdf. (last visited February 10,
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'
procedural, substantive or other grounds,"176
this obligation likely is not
self-executing, i.e., is not a federal mandate binding on federal courts.'
The judgments of the UNCC are enforced through funds received by
the United Nations from revenues generated from the sale of Iraqi oil.' 78
As a result, the current mechanism for payment to successful claimants
gives them little incentive to satisfy judgments in other fora. This is less
true for claims that were wholly or partially unsuccessful before the
UNCC. In those situations, claimants may wish to pursue litigation in
national courts, an option contemplated by the UNCC procedures.'79 If a
claimant pursues such a claim before national courts or in arbitration,
Iraq may seek defensive recognition of the UNCC decision to preclude
or limit the claim presented, as it has done in at least one context.' A
federal court faced with such an argument could apply Hilton principles
to determine whether the UNCC decision should be recognized and

176. Id. at art. 40(4).
177. This obligation is contained in "provisional rules" adopted by a decision of the
Governing Council of the UNCC. See id. This entity was established by the U.N. Security
Council as an organ of the UNCC and is responsible for establishing the criteria for the
compensability of claims, the rules and procedures for processing the claims, and the guidelines
for the administration and financing of the Compensation Fund. Its membership is composed of
the same member states as the U.N. Security Council. The decisions of the Governing Council
require majority approval for adoption. See The Governing Council, available at
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/governin.htm. (last visited February 10, 2003). Thus, the obligation was
imposed by a decision of the Governing Council, an entity that is an organ of the UNCC, which
itself was established by the Security Council, which in turn was established by the U.N. Charter.
If the self-execution doctrine concerns a determination as to the framer's intent as to the operative
effect of the agreement, this obligation was imposed by an entity and found in a document that is
too attenuated to discern such intent.
178. See generally http://www.unog.ch/uncc/introduc.htm (last visited February 10, 2003)
(describing role of UNCC).
179. The UNCC approach is supplemental to other avenues of compensation, including
contractual arbitration clauses and litigation in foreign courts. See United Nations Compensation
Commission, Further Measures to Avoid Multiple Recovery of Compensation by Claimants, U.N.
Doe. No. S/AC.26/1992/13 (1992), available at http://www.unog.chluncc/decision/dec_13.pdf.
(last visited February 10, 2003).
180. In 1973 Iraq and Turkey entered into an agreement to build a pipeline to transport crude
oil from Kirkuk, Iraq to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Iraq contended that the UNCC decision was
res judicata, precluding Botas' claim in arbitration. On August 6, 1990 the U.N. ordered Turkey
to shut down the pipeline, which it did, suffering extensive losses. Botas claimed damages in
excess of $1 billion and on September 27, 2001, the UNCC awarded Botas Petroleum Pipeline
Corp. $176,340,655, dismissing the remaining portions of the claim because the injury was not
directly caused by the Gulf War. See Report and Recommendation Made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning the Sixth Installment of "El " Claims, U.N. Doe. S/AC.26/2001/18
(2001) at 29-40, paras. 97-152, available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/reports.htm. (lalt visited
February 10, 2003). Botas subsequently sought to re-litigate some of the issues presented to the
UNCC pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Iraq-Turkey agreement, to which Iraq responded by
contending that the UNCC decision was res judicata as between the parties. No award has yet
been rendered. Interview with James Loftis, former Senior Legal Officer, United Nations
Compensation Commission (Aug. 9, 2002).
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enforced.
Another international tribunal that may fit the foreign judgment

model is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (Claims Commission)
located in The Hague. The Claims Commission was established as part
of the Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on December 12,

2000.8 ' The Claims Commission decides, among other things, claims
for loss, damage or injury by either nation or its nationals resulting from
the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. This tribunal does not fit the full faith and
credit model, as the United States is not a party and there is no federal
mandate requiring U.S. court recognition of their decisions. Nor does
the tribunal fit the arbitration model. Neither the Peace Agreement nor
the Rules of Procedure established by the Commission indicate that the
decisions of the Commission are subject to the supervision of the Dutch
courts or otherwise enforceable in national courts under the New York
Convention. The Commission is required to apply relevant rules of
international law (not national law) and all decisions are final and
binding, with the parties committed to honor all decisions and pay any
monetary awards." 2

While the Claims Commission is still in its infancy and has not yet
begun rendering awards, its decisions are the result of interstate
arbitration arguably enforceable in national courts under a foreign
judgment model. Unlike the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the
rules of procedure of the Claims Commission are based, not on the
UNCITRAL Rules, but on the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between States.'83 The arbitration
therefore is truly "anational." In addition, the arbitration is interstate in
that all of the claims are either state-to-state claims or espousal claims
brought by the respective governments on behalf of their nationals.
Significantly, unlike the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, there is no
independent mechanism for the enforcement of decisions of the Claims
Commission. Consequently, to the extent the awards of the Claims
Commission are not satisfied by other means or in other fora, they may
be subject to enforcement proceedings in national courts, including the
United States. As suggested above, a federal court seized of an action
for recognition and enforcement of a decision of the Claims
181. Agreement Between The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
and The Government of the State of Eritrea, Dec. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 (2001), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/RPC/E-E%20Agreement.html (last visited February 10, 2003).
[hereinafter Peace Agreement].
182. Id. at art. 5 (13), (17); Rules of Procedure, arts. 18(4), 19 (on file with author).
183. Supra note 181, Peace Agreement, at art. 5(7).
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Commission should apply international comity principles enunciated in
Hilton v. Guyot, and recognize any decision by the Claims Commission
in the same manner as it would a foreign judgment.'84
Finally, the decisions of the International Court of Justice may also
fall within the foreign judgment model. Assuming that a federal court
were to conclude that the relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter and
the Statute of the ICJ are not self-executing," 5 then a prevailing
country's attempt to secure direct recognition and enforcement of an ICJ
decision may fit this model more closely than the full faith and credit
model. For example, assume Mexico prevails in the pending litigation
before the ICJ regarding alleged violations by the United States of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 186 and then seeks to have that
decision recognized and enforced in the United States. Absent a finding
of self-execution the decision of the ICJ should be recognized as a
matter of international comity. Relying on Hilton and the La Abra
trilogy, Mexico could argue that "an award by a tribunal acting under
the joint authority of two countries is conclusive between the two
governments concerned and must be executed in good faith unless there
be ground to impeach the integrity of the tribunal itself."' 87 Thus, unless
there is some ground to impeach the integrity of the decision, or there is
some binding federal mandate requiring a contrary result,'88 a federal
court should treat the decision of the ICJ as conclusive as between the
parties.
Assuming the decisions of an international tribunal fit the foreign
judgment model, as a matter of comity a national court should grant
significant deference to the international tribunal. The above analysis
demonstrates that a foreign judgment model may be appropriate where
parties to foreign or international litigation seek recognition of those
184. It is noteworthy that at least one federal court has refused to dismiss a class action suit
brought for events arising out of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war on forum non conveniens grounds,
concluding that the Claims Commission provided an inadequate forum for resolution of the
claims. In so doing, the court engaged in a forum non conveniens analysis to determine that that
particular tribunal could not provide the necessary guarantees that Commission awards would be
recognized by the Ethiopian government. Nemariam v. The Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The clear implication, however, was that an
international tribunal may prove an adequate forum with sufficient safeguards that their awards
will be given effect. Id. at 395 ("[W]e recognize that the decision is a close one, particularly in the
light of.. .the district court's observation, with which we agree, that there is nothing in the record
to suggest the plaintiffs' awards will be set off against debts owed by Eritrea to Ethiopia. Neither,
however, is there any legal barrier to such a set off.").
185. See supra text accompanying notes 58-79.
186. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) available at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2003)
187. La Abra Silver Mining Co., 175 U.S. at 463.
188. See Breard,523 U.S. at 376; infra note 249.
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decisions in federal courts. Having said this, the narrow scope of such a
postulation should be underscored. This model suggests that federal
courts should recognize decisions of international tribunals on the basis
of Hilton-style international comity. It does not suggest a broader
notion, espoused by some scholars, that "[c]omity... expresses an

appreciation of different assignments and a global allocation of judicial
responsibility, sharpened by the realization that the performance of one
court's function increasingly requires cooperation with others."' 89
Comity in the Hilton sense is much narrower. It simply suggests that the
judicial acts of another nation-or group of nations acting
collectively-are worthy of respect when the actual litigants in those
fora seek recognition of those decisions in our courts. That is to say, to
conclude that comity should be a factor when litigants appear before a
foreign court acting alone necessarily imports the larger notion that this
is true when litigants appear before an international tribunal established
by several nations acting in concert. The comity concerns that merit
recognition of decisions of other national courts apply with equal if not
greater force for recognition of decisions of supra-national courts.
As noted above, the foreign judgment model is less deferential than
the previous two models because there is no congressional mandate to
recognize and enforce judgments, and therefore recognition is conferred
as a matter of international comity. Moreover, the scrutiny that a federal
court will undertake in deciding whether to recognize a judgment is far
more exacting and rigorous for foreign judgments than for arbitration
awards recognized under the New York or ICSID Conventions.
Nonetheless, federal courts traditionally recognize foreign judgments
liberally, and one would expect that in most cases international tribunal
decisions would satisfy the Hilton criteria. As one noted scholar has put
it in discussing foreign judgments, although the command of the full
faith and credit clause
does not... apply to foreign-country judgments, ... the attitude

toward enforcement of judgments rendered by other jurisdictions
seems to carry over to foreign-nation judgments as well, thus
making the United. States-without benefit of any treaties or
federal statute-among the most receptive nations with regard to
recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments. 9 °
189. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 711 (1998). For a
detailed discussion distinguishing different types of international comity, see Ramsey, supra note
83. Ramsey defines Hilton international comity as "judicial comity." See id. at 897-902.
190. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, United States of America, in
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 123 (Charles Platto & William G. Horton,
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Given the integrity with which most international tribunal proceedings
are conducted, one would expect that such a receptive attitude to
recognition of international tribunal decisions would also obtain in this
country.
IV. THE CHARMING BETSY MODEL

A fourth model for domestic courts to confer discretion on decisions
of international tribunals is through statutory construction. Under this
approach, there are no'binding instructions in a statute or treaty as to
what effect to give to the international tribunal decision. Nor is the court
even requested to directly recognize and enforce the decision. Rather,
the decision is considered as part of the process of interpreting and
construing a domestic statute.
A4.

Charmning Betsy as a Rule of Statutory Construction

The interpretative approach of construing statutes to be consistent
with international law had its genesis in 1804 with Chief Justice
Marshall's decision -in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy."' In
Charming Betsy, a United States statute enacted in February 1800...
prohibited any commercial intercourse between the United States and
France, and authorized the seizure of and sale for forfeiture of any
United States vessel destined for any port within the French Republic or
sold for the purpose that they may proceed to such port. 19' A United
eds., 2d ed. 1993).
191. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
192. On the "Quasi-War with France" that led to passage of this legislation, see generally
"The Reestablishment of the Navy, 1787-1801, Historical Overview and Select Bibliography," at
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm. (last visited February 10, 2003).
193. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118-19.
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States vessel included "[a]ny vessel owned, hired or employed wholly
or in part by any person residing within the United States, or by any
citizen thereof residing elsewhere."' 94 On July 3, 1800, the American
frigate Constellation seized the Charming Betsy destined for the French
island of Guadeloupe and thereafter sold it in forfeiture pursuant to the
statute. The Charming Betsy was originally an American vessel that had
been sold in 1800 to one Jared Shattuck, a former United States citizen
residing in St. Thomas. Shattuck became a naturalized Danish citizen in
1796 and, upon completion of the sale, documented the ship as a Danish
vessel. On appeal of the forfeiture of the ship, the Court held that
[A]n act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or
to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law
of nations as understood in this country. 95
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the "correct
construction" of the statute is that the vessel must be owned by a United
States citizen "not at the time of the passage of the law, but at the time
when the act of forfeiture shall be committed."' 19 6 Having further found
that Shattuck, in swearing allegiance to the Danish crown, took himself
"out of the description of the act" as a United States citizen, the Court
concluded that "the CharmingBetsy, with her cargo, being at the time of
her recapture the bona fide property of a Danish Burgher, is not
forfeitable, in consequence of her being employed in carrying on trade
' 97
and commerce with a French island."'
Since that time federal courts have regularly applied the Charming
Betsy doctrine. The Charming Betsy doctrine has been crystallized into
a rule of statutory construction. The Restatement (Third) Foreign
Relations summarized the rule as follows: "Where fairly possible, a
United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United
States."'19
194. Id.at 118.
195. Id.
196. Id.at 119.
197. Id.at 120-21.
198. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 114 (1987); see also O'Connor, supra note 2, at
350 ("The court on which I sit has held, for more than two hundred years, that acts of Congress
should be construed to be consistent with international law, absent clear expression to the
contrary."). For useful discussions of the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction, see

Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L. J. 479 (1998); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role
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Significantly, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction
was established to promote separation of powers.'99 As the Supreme
Court has observed, separation of powers is a prophylactic device that

of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103
(1990); Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in an Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L. J. 185 (1993).
199. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco]
It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. This canon of construction is a valid approach whereby unexpressed
congressional intent may be ascertained. It serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations, which could result in international discord.
Id. (citations omitted).
[T]he Court has until now recognized that Benz and McCulloch are reserved for
settings in which the extraterritorial application of a statute would implicate sensitive
issues of the authority of the Executive over relations with foreign nations. The
strictness of the McCulloch and Benz presumption permits the Court to avoid, if
possible, the separation-of-powers and international-comity questions associated with
construing a statute to displace the domestic law of another nation. Nothing nearly so
dramatic is at stake when Congress merely seeks to regulate the conduct of United
States nationals abroad.
Id. at 264-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) ("In a number of cases the Court has heeded the essence of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's admonition in... The Charming Betsy..., by holding that an Act of Congress
ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains
available." (citations omitted)).
The presence of such highly charged international circumstances brings to mind the
admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Charming Betsy..., that an act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains. We therefore conclude, as we did in Benz, that for us to sanction
the exercise of local sovereignty under such conditions in this delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed.... This is not to imply, however, any impairment of our own
sovereignty, or limitation of the power of Congress in this field. In fact, just as we
directed the parties in Benz to the Congress, which alone has the facilities necessary to
make fairly such an important policy decision, we conclude here that the arguments
should be directed to the Congress rather than to us.
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963) (citations
omitted).
[Hiere such a "sweeping provision" as to foreign applicability was not specified in
the Act.... For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations
there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It
alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where
the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.
We, therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed to the Congress rather
than the courts.
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957). For a detailed discussion
of Charming Betsy as a doctrine of constitutional avoidance, see Bradley, supra note 198, at 52433. But see Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 686-87
(2000) (arguing that Charming Betsy is not a canon of constitutional avoidance, reasoning that
when the Supreme Court originally described it as such in Catholic Bishop it was by accident).
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promotes the concept that "good fences make good neighbors.""2 ° In the
international context, Charming Betsy plays an important role of
gatekeeper, limiting the instances in which the legislative branch is
construed to have encroached on executive authority in the foreign
affairs arena. The Charming Betsy canon serves as a "braking
mechanism" discouraging courts from over-enforcing federal
enactments in a manner that has negative foreign relations consequences
associated with violating international law."' The Supreme Court,
applying Charming Betsy, explained that a statute should not be read to
"give rise to a serious question of separation of powers which in turn
would have implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive
2 2 Before
over relations with foreign nations.""
sanctioning such an
interpretation with international implications, "there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.""2 3 In short, the
power of the Executive to conduct foreign affairs necessarily means that
legislative encroachments in this arena are not only of international
concern, they are also of constitutional import.
That Charming Betsy promotes separation of powers is noteworthy
because, as discussed below, federal courts are often forced to prioritize
among canons of statutory construction, and a canon that has
constitutional underpinnings will trump other canons that do not. This is
particularly relevant in understanding the nexus between Charming
Betsy and the deference that federal courts are required to give to
administrative agency determinations under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC.2 °4 As the Supreme Court stated in DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Trades Comm 'n, courts presume that Congress neither
intends to usurp authority of a coordinate branch or infringe
constitutionally protected liberties of its citizenry, and any
administrative agency determination to the contrary is impermissible.2"5
200. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995); see also Rosales-Garcia v.
Hollan, Nos. 99-5683, 99-5698, 2003 WL 742589, at *23 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The [Charming Betsy]
canon of constitutional avoidance is a majoritarian default rule. That is, the canon draws its
legitimacy from the premise that Congress generally does not intend for its statutes to exceed
constitutional limits.").
201. Bradley, supra note 198, at 532.
202. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500.
203. Id.(discussing and summarizing reasoning in McCulloch).
204. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, a federal must undertake a two step process in
which it first asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." If so,
the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Second, if
Congress expressed no intent on the matter, or Congress' purpose and intent is unclear, the court
must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute if it falls within the range of permissible
construction. Id. at 842-43.
205. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
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Therefore, where constitutional concerns may be implicated, the Court
will decline to defer to an agency's interpretation and will construe a
statute so as to "make[] unnecessary passing on the serious
constitutional questions that would be raised by the [agency's]
understanding of the statute., 20 6 As discussed in detail below, one might
view the Supreme Court as essentially conflating Charming Betsy and
Chevron such that one must apply constitutional avoidance
presumptions when undertaking a Chevron analysis. Any agency
interpretation that requires a court to rule on a constitutional question
when there are other interpretations is unreasonable.2 7
B.

The Charming Betsy Model and the World Trade Organization

The relevance of the Charming Betsy canon is presented in starkest
relief in the context of U.S. federal court considerations of the relevance
of WTO obligations and WTO decisions. Direct recognition of WTO
decisions by private parties is precluded by the implementing
legislation,2 8 leading parties to invoke Charming Betsy. As a
consequence, federal courts increasingly have been forced to consider
the relevance of adverse WTO decisions in the interpretation and
application of federal statutes.
Because WTO obligations are almost always presented within the
context of reviewing administrative decisions, the relationship between
Charming Betsy and Chevron deference is particularly relevant. As
U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988). An agency determination would:
normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the
intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.
Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in... The Charming Betsy and has for so long
been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. As was stated in Hooper v.
California, the elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to,
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.... The courts will therefore not lightly
assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted)
206. Id. at 588.
207. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Given the presumption against
extraterritoriality that the Court accurately describes, and the requirement that the intent to
overcome it be 'clearly expressed,' it is in my view not reasonable to give effect to mere
implications from the statutory language as the EEOC has done.").
208. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (no person other than the United States shall have a cause of action
under any of the WTO agreements by virtue of congressional approval of WTO agreements or
may challenge any action or inaction by any agency of the United States on the that ground that
such action or inaction is inconsistent with the WTO agreements).
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noted above, in DeBartolo the Supreme Court opined that while an
agency's decision will "normally be entitled to deference" under
Chevron, another rule of construction rooted in Charming Betsy requires
that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute
to avoid such problems."2" 9 Following DeBartolo, the Court of
International Trade has analyzed WTO decisions in light of the general
requirement that "Chevron must be applied in concert with the
10
CharmingBetsy doctrine when the latter doctrine is implicated.
These general principles have had specific application in a number of
cases. In practice this has led to an approach that effectively collapses
the Charming Betsy canon into the Chevron analysis. Under Chevron,
the court asks first "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." If so, the court "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."2 " ' Second, if Congress
expressed no intent on the matter, or Congress' purpose and intent is
unclear, the court must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute
if it falls within the range of permissible construction.2 12
Applying Chevron in light of Charming Betsy has led to a number of
important conclusions. First, the Charming Betsy canon has no
functional application where congressional intent is clear and courts are
undertaking Chevron step-one analysis. If a statute admits of only one
interpretation, courts must give effect to that interpretation, whether or
not it violates a pre-existing international obligation. "When confronted
with a conflict between an international obligation and U.S. law, it is of
course true that an unambiguous statute will prevail over the
international concern. 213
The most concrete example of this arose in the interpretation and
application of legislation to protect endangered sea turtles. In 1989
Congress passed legislation requiring, among other things, prohibiting
the importation of shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology
that may adversely affect endangered sea turtles, subject to presidential
209. 485 U.S. at 574-75.
210. Hyundai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1344 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1999); But cf Timken Co. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1238-39, (Ct. Int'l Trade
2002), available at 2002 WL 31008981 at *7 ("While an unambiguous statute will prevail over a
conflicting international obligation, an ambiguous statute should be interpreted so as to avoid
conflict with international obligations. In the case of statutory interpretations by agencies,
however, judicial review must take place within the confines of either Chevron or Skidmore
deference.") (citations omitted).
211. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
212. Id. at 843.
213. Hyundai, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1343-44.
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certification that a foreign government has adopted a regulatory
program governing the incidental taking of sea turtles that is comparable
to the United States. 214 Applying this statute, the Court of International
Trade enjoined the United States from permitting the importation of
shrimp from countries that were not certified as having a regulatory
program that required all ships harvesting shrimp to use turtle-excluder
devices (TEDs).1 Several countries brought action against the United
States before the WTO alleging that this legislation as implemented
violated the United States' international obligations. A WTO panel and
the WTO appellate body agreed, ruling that section 609 was a
permissible conservation measure but was being enforced in a
discriminatory manner. 6 Following the WTO panel's decision, the
State Department modified the regulations in an attempt to bring U.S.
law into compliance with its international obligations."1 7 A subsequent
WTO decision affirmed these regulations as WTO permissible.218 On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court ignored the relevance of the
WTO decision and the State Department's attempt to issue regulations
in conformity therewith. Applying the first prong of Chevron, the
Federal Circuit ruled that the statute unambiguously permits importation
of shrimp from noncertified countries.2" 9 Consequently, the court stated
that "because the meaning of section 609 is clear, we need not reach the
question of how much deference we ought to accord the State
Department's interpretation of section 609, or whether the State
Department's interpretation would minimize potential conflicts with
international trade agreements. 22 '
Thus, if the only possible construction is one that is consistent (or
inconsistent) with United States' international obligations, Charming
Betsy and Chevron both counsel that a court must give effect to the
unambiguously-expressed congressional intent.22 As the Federal Circuit
214. Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988 (1990).
215. Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
216. Id. citing United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
1998 WL 720123 (Oct. 12, 1998).
217. Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162
Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg.
36,946 (July 8, 1999) (the "1999 Guidelines"). Principally the regulations no longer required
country certification, and would accept TED certification on a shipment-by-shipment basis even
for vessels from uncertified nations. Turtle Island, 284 F.3d at 1290.
218. 284 F.3d at 1291 citing United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 2001 WL 671012 at *101 (Jun. 15, 2001).
219. Turtle Island, 284 F.3d at 1291-96.
220. Id. at 1297.
221. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (6 Cranch) 64,118 (1804) ("an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.") (emphasis
added); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
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has emphasized, regardless of the fact that "the Uruguay Round
Agreements have been incorporated into United States law by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act.... [I]t remains true ... that in the event
of a conflict between a GATT obligation and a statute, the statute must
prevail. 222 If this results in the United States violating its international
obligations, it is Congress that must remedy the situation.223
Given that the same conclusion will result under both canons of
construction where congressional intent is clear, the synthesizing of
Charming Betsy into the Chevron analysis is only relevant where the
statute is ambiguous. When the statute is ambiguous, courts interpreting
WTO decisions have reached a number of different conclusions. First,
where the administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute is
consistent with the WTO obligation, courts reviewing the interpretation
have upheld it under Chevron step two analysis. Second, where the
administration interpretation (or lower court decision) is inconsistent
with the international obligation, courts have applied Chevron and
Charming Betsy and reversed the decision. Third, where the
international obligation is ambiguous (and in particular where it grants
discretion to the state as to the means of compliance with the
international obligation), courts defer to the administrative agency.
Fourth, where the statute is ambiguous and has been interpreted to be
inconsistent with international obligations, the WTO has held that this
interpretation is a violation of the WTO and should be corrected.
The first lesson arose in Warren v. EPA,224 where the administrative
agency modified its regulations following an adverse decision by the
WTO in Reformulated Gasoline. In 1990, Congress passed legislation
amending the Clean Air Act to require the use of reformulated gasoline
in certain urban regions. In implementing this legislation, the
Environmental Protection Agency discriminated against foreign refiners
in establishing rules regulating emissions from conventional gasoline. In
1995, the WTO ruled that such an approach violated the United States'
national treatment of international obligations under the WTO.225 In
response, the EPA modified its regulation to be nondiscriminatory, and
issue," the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
222. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also 19
U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994) ("No provision of [the WTO Agreements] nor the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United
States shall have effect.").
223. Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667-668
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Caterpillar v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
224. 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 619-20.
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environmental groups challenged the agency action. The D.C. Circuit
denied the challenge. Relying on Chevron, the court held that the statute
was silent as to whether the EPA could rely on factors other than air
quality, and that it was a permissible construction of the statute for the
EPA to consider the WTO decision in revising its regulations.
Under step two of Chevron, we think that the agency's
interpretation is permissible.... In the particular circumstances of
this case our usual reluctance to infer from congressional silence
an intention to preclude the agency from considering factors
other than those listed in a statute is bolstered by the decision of
the WTO lurking in the background. Since the days of Chief
Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
congressional statutes must be construed wherever possible in a
manner that will not require the United States to violate the law
of nations. ... The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118, (1804).... [T]he EPA's consideration of factors other
than air quality is not precluded by anything in [the statute]; in
this case, moreover, that consideration appears to be congruent
with... the Supreme Court's instruction to avoid an interpretation
that would put a law of the United States into conflict with a
treaty obligation of the United States. 2 6
The second lesson is that where the administration interpretation is
inconsistent with the international obligation, courts have applied
Chevron and CharmingBetsy and reversed the decision. In Caterpillar
v. United States, an agency's interpretation was rejected under a
Chevron step two and Charming Betsy analysis because the agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute violated an international treaty
obligation.227 In that case, the Court of International Trade relied on
Charming Betsy to conclude that "in order to prevail in its proposed
exegesis of the statute, the Government must convince the Court that
Congress intended [the statute] to deviate from the prohibition in the
1947 GATT. ' '228 Significantly, the Court's approach clearly indicated
that departure from an international obligation must be found in
"express Congressional language to the contrary," and absent such

226. Id.at 624. (citations omitted). In a similar vein, the Court of International Trade (CIT)
recently held that a federal statute and regulations were consistent with the view expressed by the
WTO Appellate Body. The CIT described WTO decisions as "non-binding decisions the
reasoning of which may help inform this Court's decision" in applying Chevron and Charming
Betsy. Timken Co. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1238-39, (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002),
available at 2002 WL 31008981 at *7-8.
227. 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1244, 1247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
228. Id.at 1248.
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language, "the venerable canon of construction [of Charming Betsy] to
interpret Congressional acts consistently with international obligations

overcomes the exercise of ventriloquism urged upon the Court by the
'
Stated differently, the presumption that Congress does
Government."229

not intend to act in a manner inconsistent with international law leads to
the corollary that a Chevron step two analysis leaves no room for a

construction that is not consistent with an international obligation. 230
The third lesson of these cases is that where the international

obligation is ambiguous, courts will defer to the agency's determination.
In Hyundai, a case involving the termination of an antidumping duty in
the manner required by the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the court
recognized that "Chevron must be applied in concert with the Charming
Betsy doctrine when the latter doctrine is implicated,"2 3' but concluded
that the international obligation gave states discretion in implementing

the international obligation.232 Given this, the court concluded that as
229. Id. at 1249. Similarly, in Federal-Mogul, the Federal Circuit relied on Charming Betsy in
observing that "GATT agreements are international obligations, and absent express Congressional
language to the contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with international
obligations." It then interpreted the statute and concluded that the agency's determination was
GATT consistent while the CIT's approach was not. See Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States,
63 F.3d 1572, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The Act presented Commerce with a choice between
methodologies.. .that are tax-neutral, on the one hand, and methodologies that are not tax-neutral,
on the other. Tax-neutral methodologies clearly accord with international economic
understandings, negotiated by this country, regarding fair trade policy.") Of course, this case did
not squarely present the problem of an agency interpretation that violated international
obligations. It only reversed a lower court's conclusion that the agency's decision was not entitled
to Chevron deference.
More recently, in one case, Acciali Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. U.S., 206 F. Supp.2d 1344, 135657 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002), the Court of International Trade declined to address an agency
interpretation that was inconsistent with an earlier WTO decision involving the same issue but
different parties. See id; see also Acciali Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. U.S., No. 2002-10 slip op.,2002
WL 342659 at *15 (Feb. 1, 2002). In addition, in its subsequent post-remand decision in Acciali
Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. U.S., 217 F. Supp.2d 1345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) ("AST I1") the court did
not address the relevance of a more recent WTO panel decision involving exactly the same facts
and same parties. See United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from
the European Communities, WT/DS212/R (July 31, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last
visited February 18, 2003). The CIT's decision, issued days after the WTO panel decision, was
inconsistent with the WTO panel decision.
230. The legislative history of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act strongly supports this
presumption. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826(l) (1994), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 1994
WL 542751 at * 15 (Statement of Administrative Action) (The URAA, "including the authority
granted to federal agencies to promulgate implementing regulations, is intended to bring U.S. law
fully into compliance with U.S. obligations under [the WTO] agreements.").
231. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334,1343 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).
232. Specifically, the WTO Antidumping Agreement provided that "[iff.. the authorities
determine that the antidumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately."
Id. at 1344. (emphasis original).
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"the Antidumping Agreement provides the administering authority
discretion to determine whether revocation is appropriate... [i]t follows
that the administering authority also has discretion to determine whether
injurious dumping would be 'likely' to occur in the future" and whether
the antidumping duty should not be revoked.23 3
Fourth, Charming Betsy has now come full circle and is becoming
relevant for World Trade Organization's review of federal court's
statutory interpretation in the United States. In one case, the WTO,
aware of the relevance of Charming Betsy doctrine in United States
jurisprudence, has expressed the importance of its use in federal courts.
In a recent countervailing duty case in which the use of one
methodology would be consistent with WTO obligations and another
would not, the WTO panel concluded that the United States statute in
question grants the discretion to the executive branch to use either
methodology.234 It then noted that a decision of the Federal Circuit
interpreted the ambiguous statute to be inconsistent with WTO
obligations and found that "[w]e fail to see how the U.S. Department of
Commerce could exercise its alleged executive discretion... in a WTOcompatible manner when it is prohibited by its Courts" from doing so.235
It then held that "[t]o the extent that [the statute], as interpreted by the...
Federal Circuit.. .requires the... Department of Commerce to apply a
methodology... [it] is preventing the United States from exercising a
' It concluded by recommending
WTO-compatible discretion."2 36
that the
United States bring its measures into conformity with its WTO
obligation, i.e., interpret the statute to be consistent with the
international obligation.237 The Appellate Body reversed the panel,
finding that nothing in the appellate court's interpretation of the statute
would prevent the Department of Commerce from complying with its
WTO obligations. 38 The Appellate Body did not, however, reach the
233. Id. More difficult is the situation where a treaty provision is potentially ambiguous but
the WTO has clarified the interpretation to be given to the provision in an unrelated case. In
Corus Staal BV,the Court of International Trade recently found that "[wihen faced with an
ambiguous statute and ambiguous international agreement, the court should defer to Commerce's
interpretation," notwithstanding that the agency's interpretation is inconsistent with the
international obligation as interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body in an unrelated case. Corus
Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, No. 2003-25, slip. op., 2003 WL 919310 at *7-8 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Mar. 7, 2003). The Court described WTO decisions as not binding and of "very limited
precedential value." Id. at*8.
234. United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the
European Communities - Report of the Panel, WT/DS212/R (July 31, 2002), p. 95, para. 7.156,
availableat http://www.wto.org. (last visited February 18, 2003).
235. Id.

236. Id at 97-98, para. 8.1.
237. Id.at 98, para. 8.1.
238. United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the
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question of a possible WTO violation where legislation was enacted
"granting discretion to its authorities to act in violation of its WTO
'
These decisions underscore the importance of federal
obligations."239
courts and agencies applying Charming Betsy to interpret a statute
consistent with WTO obligations to avoid a WTO finding that its
interpretative decision is in violation of those obligations.
C.

Normative Application

The Charming Betsy model arises in those contexts, such as WTO
decisions, in which the parties are not seeking direct recognition and
enforcement of the decision, the international tribunal has opined on the
legality of United States legislation or practice, and the parties then use
that decision to influence the subsequent interpretation of the statute or
regulation by a federal court. It provides an extremely important
mechanism for indirect recognition of international tribunal decisions.
In applying this model, federal courts should begin by confirming
that the parties are not seeking direct recognition and enforcement of the
decision. A request to treat the decision of the international tribunal as
"binding" on the court or res judicata as between the parties may be an
attempt at offensive or defensive recognition, respectively. If so, the
court should confirm that none of the requirements for direct
recognition are satisfied. If none of those models apply or it is otherwise
clear that the parties are not seeking direct recognition, then the federal
court must wrestle with the international tribunal decision in
determining how best to interpret the statute in light of the international
obligation.
In this regard, two points are particularly noteworthy. First, it is
largely irrelevant whether or not the decision of the international
tribunal is binding in the traditional sense. 4 ° In fact, the Charming Betsy
canon has been applied in conjunction with Chevron deference in the
context of GATT panel decisions, which universally are recognized as
non-binding decisions. 4 ' This suggests that the Charming Betsy canon
may be useful as a tool for human rights tribunals or other adjudicative
European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002), p. 68-69, para. 159, available at

http://www.wto.org. (last visited February 10, 2003).
239. Id. at 68, para. 159, n. 334.
240. There is much debate in the international trade bar as to whether WTO decisions are
binding. Compare John H. Jackson, supra note 65, at 61-64 with Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less is More, 90 AMER. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (1996).

241. Footwear Distributors and Retailers of Amer. v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078, 10911095 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994); see also Hyundai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d
1334 1343-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999)(discussing Footwear).
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bodies that render non-binding awards in articulating and crystallizing
international norms that may be subsequently considered by domestic
courts. A case in point is the non-binding decision of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States finding that
the Helms-Burton law violated a number of international obligations.24 2
To the extent that the statute could be construed not to conflict with
international law, a federal court may apply Charming Betsy and
interpret its ambiguous terms consistent with those norms, using such
decision as one aid in its analysis of international law.
Second, the analysis of Charming Betsy noted above may explain
federal courts' seeming unwillingness to confer greater status on
decisions of international tribunals. The Supreme Court's celebrated
case in Breard v. Greene is illustrative.243 In that case, the Court first
noted that "we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation
of an international treaty rendered by an international court."2" It then
rejected the claims on several grounds. First, consistent with but not in
express reliance upon Charming Betsy, the Court attempted to reconcile
the statute with the international obligation. 45 If the international
242. See Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Resolution
AG/DOC.3375/96 Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, reprinted in 35 I.L.M.
1322 (1996).
243. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The essential legal and factual issues are
straightforward. Following a conviction and death sentence in 1993, Angel Breard exhausted his
state court remedies and filed for habeas relief in 1996. For the first time, he argued in federal
court that his rights under.the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention)
had been violated. Finding that Breard should have raised this argument in state court, the federal
district court concluded that he had procedurally defaulted the claim. In January 1998, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 373. Paraguay instituted proceedings before the ICJ on April 3, 1998
alleging that the United States violated its international obligations by arresting, detaining, trying,
convicting and sentencing a Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, without affording him
his consular rights under the Vienna Convention. With Breard scheduled for execution on April
14, 1998 by the Commonwealth of Virginia, on April 9, 1998 the ICJ rendered an interim order
indicating that the United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed. Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus
in the United States Supreme Court and a stay application to 'enforce' the ICJ's order. In
addition, Paraguay filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint before the Supreme Court,
citing its original jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution over cases "affecting
Ambassadors.. .and Consuls." Id. at 374-75.
244. Id. at 375.
245. Id
[l]t has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express
statement to the 'contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.... This proposition is embodied in the Vienna
Convention itself, which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention "shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State," provided
that "said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended."
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obligation is so construed, the Court avoided a conflict between the

statute and the treaty. Second, although recognizing that the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations is the supreme law of the land under
the U.S. Constitution, the Court concluded that when inconsistent
legislation is enacted subsequent to the treaty, "the statute to the extent
of conflict renders the treaty null. 246 The Court sub silentio engaged in
a Charming Betsy analysis. If CharmingBetsy stands for the proposition
that "that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the

law of nations if any other possible construction remains" and that for a
court to "sanction the exercise of.. .sovereignty under such conditions in
this delicate field of international relations there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed, 2 47 the Court
simply ruled that the affirmative intent of Congress was clearly
expressed, and this intent must be given effect.2 48 Given what it

perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be the clear intent of Congress, the
Court was unable to go further with Charming Betsy and construe the

statute to avoid a potential violation of international law. Finding it
"unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are
pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court

earlier," the Court concluded that "[n]onetheless, the Court must decide
questions presented to it on the basis of law.

249

246. Id. at 376. According to the Court, subsequent to the Vienna Convention, in 1996
Congress passed legislation which provides that "a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in
violation of 'treaties of the United States' will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary
hearing if he 'has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings."
Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2).
247. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.10,21-22 (1963).
248. As the Court put it, although the Vienna Convention "arguably confers on an individual
the right to consular assistance following arrest... Breard's ability to obtain relief based on
violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this subsequently enacted [legislative] rule....
This rule prevents Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights
prejudiced him." Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added).
249. Id.at 378. In Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua, the D.C. Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in dicta. In response to the ICJ's decision in Nicaragua v. United States, the
Court noted that "unless Congress makes clear its intent to abrogate a treaty, a court will not
lightly infer such intent but will strive to harmonize the conflicting enactments." Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 936-37 (1988). The Court went on to find
that appellants' challenge that a congressional act violated an international obligation must fail
because they lack standing and because under our constitutional framework, a prior treaty can
never preempt a subsequent statute. Id.at 937.
The International Court of Justice has now in the subsequent case of LaGrand unequivocally
concluded that the federal statute as applied is inconsistent with international obligations.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 128 (Nov. 13) available at http://www.icjcij.org. (last visited February 10, 2003). But this will not change the analysis for a federal court.
While the international obligation is now clear, federal courts simply have no authority to ignore
the clear intent of Congress. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. In Breard, the Supreme Court concluded
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The Charming Betsy model falls fourth on the continuum of

deference because unlike the first three models, there is no attempt to
secure direct recognition and enforcement of the decision. The
Charming Betsy model seeks only indirect recognition and even then
only when the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is in question.
Nonetheless, this model is more deferential than others because it is the
last of the models that is mandatory in nature. As a matter of statutory
construction, if the statute is ambiguous and is subject to an
interpretation that is consistent with international law, the federal court

shall interpret the statute consistent with that international obligation.
The content of that international obligation should be greatly influenced
by the decision of the international tribunal interpreting the statute in
light of the international obligation. The WTO has even gone so far as
to state that if a federal court does not interpret a particular statute in a

certain manner, it will incur international responsibility for violating a
WTO obligation.25 ° In this sense, the federal court defers to the decision
of the international tribunal to circumscribe the parameters of
permissible statutory construction.

that courts must follow the statute notwithstanding a potential violation of an international
obligation, and federal courts will not alter their mandate simply because an international tribunal
has confirmed that the federal statute as applied violates international obligations. One can almost
anticipate that courts will follow the admonition in Charming Betsy progeny that Congress "alone
has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the
possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain. We, therefore,
conclude that any such appeal should be directed to the Congress rather than the courts." Benz v.
Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). For a discussion of court activity following LaGrand, see
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case,
27 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 428-29 (2002) ("The judiciary continues to ignore violations of the
Vienna Convention, as if the ICJ had not spoken."). In a similar vein, assuming there were an
adverse decision by the ICJ in the pending death penalty case brought by Mexico against the
United States, see Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) available
at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited February 18, 2003), one would expect federal courts to again
refuse recognition of such a decision in light of Breard's finding that congressional intent is clear.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 234-237.
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A fifth model for determining the degree of deference that should be
accorded to decisions of international tribunals is based on the approach
taken in Paquete Habana.2" ' This theory posits that international law is
part of our law and that the contours of that law can be defined by
reference to decisions of international tribunals. It is similar to the
previous discussion regarding the Charming Betsy model, in that it
looks to international tribunals as evidence of the content of
international law. It is distinct, however, because Charming Betsy serves
only as an international *law check on the interpretation of an ambiguous
United States statute. This approach declares that international' law is
part of United States law, and then looks to decisions of international
tribunals to ascertain the content of t'hat law. This model thus has the
potential for international tribunal decisions to. serve as persuasive
authority for incorporating international. law norms into federal court
decisions.
A.

Paquete Habana andDiscerningInternationalLaw

The details regarding Paquete Habana are well known and require
little elaboration here. The question before -the Court was whether the
fishing vessels were subject to capture by the armed vessels of the
United States during the Spanish-American War. The Court argued that,
"[b]y an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries.
ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing
vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish,

251. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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'
have been recognized as exempt... from capture as prize of war."252
The
Court lamented the lack of a "complete collection of the instances
illustrating" this rule of international law, and therefore found it salutary
to "trace the history of the rule, from the earliest accessible sources,
through the increasing recognition of it, with occasional setbacks, to
what we may now justly consider as its final establishment in our own
country and generally throughout the civilized world.""25 What is
noteworthy in the Court's historical analysis is the degree to which
decisions of national prize tribunals were paramount in its survey. Of
course, in 1900 there were no relevant international tribunals, only
national courts. But at the time a recognized branch of the law of
nations was prize jurisdiction under maritime law, which was subject to
enforcement by national courts. Not surprisingly, the Court's central
focus was on the pronouncements of other courts, particularly the
preeminent admiralty court in the world at that time, the English High
Court of Admiralty. In justifying the seizure of the Paquete Habana,
counsel for the United States relied heavily on the English court's 1798
decision in The Young Jacob and Johanna, where Sir William Scott,
then Lord Stowell, stated that

in former wars it has not been usual to make captures of these
small fishing vessels; but this rule was a rule of comity only, and
not of legal decision; it has prevailed from views of mutual
accommodation between neighboring countries, and from
tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. In the
present [American Revolutionary] war there has, I presume, been
sufficient reason for changing this mode of treatment; and as they
are brought before me for my judgment they must be referred to
the general principles of this court; they fall under the character
and description of the last class of cases; that is, of ships
constantly and exclusively employed in the enemy's trade.5
The Court recognized the potential damage this case could have to its
thesis that under international law fishing vessels were exempt from
seizure as prize of war. It therefore sought to distinguish the case as the
mere application of an express order from the English government in
1798 to seize French and Dutch fishermen with their boats. It further
diminished the importance of this decision by noting that "the period of
a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have

252. Id. at 686.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 693 (quoting The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 C. Rob. 20, 165 Eng. Rep. 81
(Adm. 1798)).
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enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy
or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a
'
settled rule of international law."255
Thus, what could have been a
troublesome case against the proposition that there was a rule of
international law was used by the Court as the seed of custom that
germinated over a century into a rule of law.
The Court then marshaled evidence of this process of germination by
reference to other prize tribunals, to government proclamations, to state
practice in the nineteenth century, and to the works of jurists and
commentators citing national court prize jurisprudence as "trustworthy
'
evidence of what the law really is."256
For example, the Court cited the
works of several commentators, including Carlos Calvo's 1896 work.
Calvo's study analyzed prize tribunal jurisprudence of the courts of
France, England and the United States in support of the proposition that
coastal fishing vessels are exempt from seizure as prize.257 Summarizing
these sources, the Court held that:
The review of the precedents and authorities on the subject
appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day,
by the general consent of civilized nations of the world, and
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an
established rule of law.. .that coast fishing vessels.., unarmed
and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and
bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.258
In essence the Court relied on judicial decisions and commentary
thereon to reformulate an eighteenth century statement of custom into a
nineteenth century established rule of international law.
One may well object to the selectiveness and reliability of all of the
sources relied upon by the Court. The dissent dismissed the writings of
commentators as mere "persuasive lucubrations" and instead relied
upon The Young Jacob and Johanna in support of the view that the
'
exemption is "a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision."259
Recent commentators have described Paquete Habana as a "hollow
shell."26 They suggest that the evidence relied upon by the Court to
establish customary international law is selective and that "the bulk of
255. Id. at 694.
256. Id. at 694-708.
257. id. at 703.
258. ld at 708.
259. Id. at 719-20.
260. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 672 (2000).
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evidence suggests that nations refrain from seizing fishing vessels when
there is no military or economic value in doing so."26 ' Regardless, the
relevant point for present purposes is that Paquete Habana has clarified
that in determining the content of international law, judicial decisions
serve as a critical element in the process of ascertainment. As the Court
put it,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators.... Such works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of
their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.262
Paquete Habana is thus critical to understand the sources to be used
by federal courts in ascertaining international law. It echoes earlier
pronouncements by the Supreme Court in United States v. Smith, which
sets forth the classic formulation that the law of nations "may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by
judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." '63 Although less
celebrated than Paquete Habana,2" the Supreme Court in Smith took a
similar approach in examining the sources of international law to define
and recognize piracy as a violation of the law of nations. In Smith, the
Court examined the works of jurists and judicial decisions, particularly
the High Court of Admiralty in Britain, to conclude that piracy was a
common law violation of the law of nations punishable in municipal
courts even absent statutory authority.26 5
Modern jurisprudence also confirms the propriety of using judicial
decisions to ascertain the content of international law. The classic
formulation regarding sources of international law recognizes that
judicial decisions are one means for determining its content.266
Moreover, the formulation articulated by the Court in Smith-that the
law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting.. .judicial decisions
261. Id.
262. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
263. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
264. Ascertaining whether that the act of piracy is a violation of the law of nations is a less
difficult judicial task than establishing that a fishing vessel exception for prize law has ripened
into an international norm.
265. Smith, 18 U.S. at 163.
266. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 ("The [International Court of
Justice] shall apply.. .judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.").
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recognizing and enforcing that law"E67 -has been cited repeatedly and
relied upon by lower courts in recent decades.268 It is thus well
established that reference to judicial decisions to establish the content of
international law is a legitimate exercise by federal courts. As applied, it
suggests that international tribunals will be critical to determine the
content of international law, when such a determination is necessary to
resolve cases or controversies before federal courts. As Justice Cardozo
put it, "[i]nternational law... has at times, like the common law within
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable
from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests
'
its jural quality."269
B.

The Paquete Habana Model and the InternationalCourt of
Justice

There are few if any areas within United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence that have utilized international law more than cases
involving domestic boundary disputes. Boundary disputes are resolved
based on a tapestry of statutory and federal common law, which in turn
is pasted together from international law norms, property concepts,
contract law, and sovereignty principles.27 As. the Court observed in
United States v. Maine, it "has consistently followed principles of
international law in fixing the coastline of the United States."27' That the
United States Supreme Court would rely on international law to resolve
interstate boundary disputes is not surprising. Water and boundary
disputes within the United States "were and continue to be analytically
indistinguishable from international boundary disputes. ' For example,
267. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61.
268. Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 266 F.3d 1045, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2001); Sampson v. F. R.G.,
250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th
Cir. 1999); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1992); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d
109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2nd Cir. 1980); Nguyen Da
Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1344 (N.D. Ga., 2002); Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (E.D. La.,
2001); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C., 2000); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (D.N.J., 1999); Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J.,
1998); U.S. v. Kakwirakeron, 730 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (N.D.N.Y., 1990); U.S. v. Buck, 690 F.
Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y., 1988); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542, 546 (D.D.C., 1981)aff'd 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
269. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
270. Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows ofJudicial Process: Special Masters in
the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 654 (2002).
271. United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 93 (1986).
272. Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State
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in noting the absence of a definition for "inland waters" in the
Submerged Lands Act, the Court stated,
Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defining
inland waters to this Court.... It is our opinion that we best fill
our responsibility of giving content to the words which Congress
employed by adopting the best and most workable definitions
available. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone.. .provides such definitions.... Furthermore the
comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many
of the lesser problems related to coastlines that, absent the
Convention, would be more troublesome." 3
In addition, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for such
disputes has precluded the development of any significant jurisprudence
by our own lower courts, further underscoring the need for persuasive
authority. And perhaps most fundamental, the delimitation of coastal
boundaries inherently has an international aspect; "it cannot be
dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its
'
municipal law."274
One might say that the Supreme Court has presumed
that domestic boundary disputes should be resolved using the same rules
applied in international boundary disputes. Dividing lines may have
"less importance for... states united under a general government than for
states wholly independent. Nonetheless, the same test will be applied in
'
the absence of usage or convention pointing to another."275
Consequently, the rich body of international law concerning land and
water boundaries has long been an authoritative source for the Supreme
Court.276 While the Court has "relied in particular"27 7 on treaty law, it
also has utilized decisions of the International Court of Justice. Reliance
by the Supreme Court on one famous decision of the International Court

Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027, 1067 (2002).
273. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 164-65 (1965).
274. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, at 132 (Dec. 18). See also United States
v. California,381 U.S. at 168 ("California may not use such [straight] base lines to extend our
international boundaries beyond their traditional international limits against the expressed opinion
of the United States.").
275. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 380 (citation omitted).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 503
U.S. 569, 587-88 & n.10 (1992); United States v. Louisiana (The Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1985); United States v. Maine (The Rhode Island and New
York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504, 526 (1985); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 188-89
(1975); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 35 (1969) (The Louisiana Boundary Case);
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 164-65 (1965); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1,
68-82 (1960); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 379 (1934).
277. United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. at 94.
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Norway),278 is

illustrative.
The Fisheries Case involved a dispute about the right of British
fishermen to fish in and near Norwegian coastal waters. From the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, British fishermen refrained from
fishing within Norwegian waters. However, beginning in 1906, they
began fishing off the coast of Norway, leading to numerous incidents
involving their seizure and arrest. The legal dispute between the United
Kingdom and Norway centered on identifying the outer limits of
Norwegian territorial and inland waters. 9 Rugged and broken
throughout, the Norwegian coast has a "very distinctive configuration"
with numerous large and small islands, islets, rocks and reefs, making
boundary delimitations extremely difficult.28 ° The United Kingdom
preferred to draw lines based on arced circles closely mirroring the
coast, while Norway preferred to draw straight lines from outer edges
(trace parallele), or alternatively lines drawn based on "historic
grounds" reflected by her longstanding assertion of jurisdiction.2 8' The
ICJ ruled in Norway's favor, concluding that it notoriously had applied
a straight-line system of delimitation consistently and uninterruptedly
and that foreign States tolerated the Norwegian practice. 82 It further
found that certain departures from this methodology that inured to the
benefit of Norway were justified by the historic practice of granting
exclusive fishing licenses, which showed that the area in question was
'
regarded as "falling exclusively within Norwegian sovereignty."283
The
historic practice of granting exclusive fishing rights to Norwegians, the
ICJ concluded, is "founded on the vital needs of the population and
attested by very ancient and peaceful usage, [and] may legitimately be
'
taken into account in drawing a line."284
278. 1951 I.C.J. 116.
279. Id. at 128. Inland waters are subject to the complete sovereignty of the nation and the
coastal nation has the privilege to exclude foreign vessels altogether. Territorial waters remain
within the control of the coastal state, but innocent passage by foreign vessels cannot be denied.
The Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 22.
280. FisheriesCase, 1951 l.C.J. at 127.
281. Id. at 128-32.
282. Id. at 138.
283. Id. at 142
Even if a certain "deviation was too pronounced... [Norway] has relied upon an
historic title.. namely, the exclusive privilege to fish and hunt whales granted at the end
of the 17th century [to a Norwegian national]...under a number of licenses which
show... [that] the fishing grounds pertaining thereto were regarded as falling exclusively
within Norwegian sovereignty.
Id.
284. Id
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The Supreme Court has relied upon the Fisheries Case in four
cases,28 5 and in three of these cases the decision featured prominently. In
the Louisiana Boundary Case, the Supreme Court noted the Fisheries
Case as evidence of perceived long-standing principles of international
law pertaining to the use of low-tide elevations to delimit the territorial
sea. 286 The Court noted that the ICJ judgment had been relied upon by
the drafters of Article 11 of the Convention on Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. Essentially, the Court relied upon the case as
evidence of the drafter's intent in adopting Article 11 of the Convention,
which in turn was used by the Court to resolve the case.287
In the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, the Court applied a
four-part test to determine whether the Mississippi Sound was an
"historic bay." This test required (1) an exercise of authority over the
area; (2) continuity of this exercise; (3) acquiescence of foreign nations;
and (4) the vital interest of the coastal nation. 288 The Court cited the
Fisheries Case in support of three of these four factors. First, it cited the
ICJ judgment as evidence of the existence of a "vital interest"
requirement.289 Second, it cited the discussion of the United States'
policy in the ICJ judgment as evidence that the United States openly
asserted its right.29 Third, it cited the ICJ judgment, with reference to
inaction or toleration, as proof of acquiescence by foreign nations.29'
In United States v. Maine, the Supreme Court addressed
Massachusetts' contention that it had "ancient title" to the Nantucket

285. United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 99 (1986); United States v. Louisiana (Alabama
and Mississippi Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93, 102, 107 & n.10, 110 (1985); United States v.
Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 43 n.55, 69, 71 & n.93 (1969); United States
v. California, 381 U.S.139, 164 (1965).
286. 394 U.S. at 43 n.55.
287. Id. at 43-47.
288. 470 U.S. at 101-02.
289. See 470 U.S. at 102 ("there is substantial agreement that a fourth factor to be taken into
consideration is the vital interests of the coastal nation, including elements such as geographical
configuration, economic interests, and the requirements of self defense" (citations omitted). See
also Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 1.C.J. 116, 142.).
290. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. at 107 ("There is no doubt that
foreign nations were aware that the United States had adopted this [10-mile] policy. Indeed, the
United States' policy was cited and discussed at length by both the United Kingdom and Norway
in the celebrated Fisheries Case."); see also id. at 107, n.10 ("It is noteworthy that in the
Fisheries Case, the [ICJ]...ruled that the consistent and prolonged application of the Norwegian
system of delimiting inland waters, combined with the general toleration of foreign states, gave
rise to a historic right to apply the system.").
291. Id. at 110 ("There is substantial agreement that when foreign governments do know or
have reason to know of the effective and continual exercise of sovereignty over a maritime area,
inaction or toleration on the part of the foreign governments is sufficient to permit a historic title
to arise" (citations omitted) See also Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. at 138-139."); see
also Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. at 107, n. 10.
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Sound.292 The Court assumed that "ancient title" resembled "historic
title" and held that Massachusetts would have to establish that it
"occupied" the Sound to obtain clear original title. It defined
"occupation" as acts attributable to the sovereign manifesting an
assertion of exclusive authority over the waters and cited the Fisheries
Case as one of the "two most publicized cases convey[ing] the
'
international understanding of occupation." 293
In explaining the ICJ
judgment, it noted that Norway's occupation was evidenced by
Norwegian fishermen exploiting fishing grounds from time immemorial
and that Norway had excluded fishermen from other states for three
centuries until 1906.294 It then contrasted this with Massachusetts'
practice to conclude that there was ineffective occupation. The Court
thus imposed an occupation requirement, used the ICJ judgment (and
one other foreign court judgment) to convey an understanding of the
requirement, and finding it lacking in the case at hand, disposed of
Massachusetts' claim.
This brief summary of Supreme Court references to one ICJ
judgment in the context of boundary disputes underscores how
important international tribunal decisions may be when the Court views
international law as critical for resolution of cases before it. It is not
inaccurate to state that the Supreme Court used the Fisheries Case in the
Louisiana Boundary Case to confirm the meaning of a treaty provision
which was dispositive, in the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case
to identify the existence of one requirement and the satisfaction of two
others, and in United States v. Maine to give meaning to a requirement
that proved fatally lacking. More generally, the particular reliance by
the Court on the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone 95 also indirectly reflects reliance on the Fisheries Case, for the
drafters of the Convention were greatly influenced by the ICJ
decision.2 96 To use the language of Paquete Habana, "questions of right
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

475 U.S. at 93-96.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
See, e.g., id. at 94.
See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11,68-70 (1969).
The drafters of the Convention.. .were aware that international law permitted...
island fringes in some circumstances to enclose inland waters. The principle was
recognized and applied by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case....
Thereafter, with the Fisheries Case as the model, attempts were made to draft concrete
rules for the uniform treatment of such island fringes.... There was, however, too little
technical information or consensus among nations on that and related subjects to allow
the formulation of uniform rules. It was agreed, therefore, that the problem should be
handled as it had been by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case: each
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depending upon [international law were] duly presented
for... determination" and the Supreme Court relied upon the ICJ
decision
as "trustworthy evidence of what the law [of nations] really
''
is.

297

Federal courts also have referenced decisions of the International
Court of Justice in numerous other contexts.298 ICJ decisions have been
cited in support of a variety of principles, including corporate law, 299 the
doctrine of preemptory norms (jus cogens),3 °° and violations of
international law.3" 1 According to one scholar writing in 1998, "[s]ince
the creation of the International Court [of Justice], forty-two cases in
federal courts have applied fifteen I.C.J. decisions or advisory opinions
as evidence of international normative content., 30 2 This includes "six
relevant uses in the Supreme Court, nineteen uses in the circuit courts,
sixteen uses in the district courts, and one citation in the Court of
Trade. 3 3 Such frequency of use lends further support to the assertion
that federal courts are integrating decisions of international tribunals
such as the International Court of Justice to ascertain the law of nations.
C.

Normative Application

This model marks a dramatic shift in emphasis with respect to federal
court treatment of international tribunal decisions. The first three
models required direct recognition and enforcement if the judgment
satisfied, respectively, the requirements of the ICSID Convention, New
York Convention, or international comity criteria set forth in Hilton v.
Guyot. The Charming Betsy model required, as a matter of statutory
construction, the interpretation of an ambiguous statute to be consistent
nation was left free to draw straight baselines along suitable insular configurations if it
so desired.
Id.
297. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
298. For a helpful summary of the use of ICJ decisions by national courts, see Jordan J. Paust,
Domestic Influence of the International Court of Justice, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787
(1998).
299. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 628 n.20 (1983); McKesson Corp. v. Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Porto v.
Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679, 1981 WL 381, *3 (N.D. I1. 1981).
300. Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992); Comm. of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939-41 (1988).
301. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 n.I, 843 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1983); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617
F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Nat'l Airmotive v. Gov't & State oflran, 491 F. Supp. 555, 556
n.7 (D.D.C. 1980).
302. Paust, supra note 298, at 791-92.
303. Id. at 792.
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with international law. By contrast, this model anticipates discretionary
deference. This model simply recognizes that in certain circumstances
international law is part of our law and that the decisions of
international tribunals often will be the best source for ascertaining the
content of that law. 304 If applying international law is required to resolve
the case presented to the federal court, then courts have a responsibility
to give content to that law. In exercising that responsibility, the court
will scan the horizon of international law sources, and often an
international tribunal decision will provide useful guidance for
application and integration. But because the decision is only persuasive
authority, the decision to defer to the ruling of the international tribunal
is a matter wholly within the discretion of the domestic court.
The most common application of the Paquete Habana model is in
those instances in which content of international law is required for
resolving a federal common law question arising out of statutory
interstices. The use of international law to resolve the boundary disputes
in the above discussion represented the enunciation of federal common
law in the absence of sufficient congressional guidance in the
Submerged Lands Act. Likewise, Congress' failure to give further
content to the elements of the Alien Tort Claims Act represents a similar
use of international law to create federal common law based on
statutory interstices." 5 The Alien Tort Claims Act states only that
"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."3" 6 The vagaries of this statute require
federal courts to fashion common law notions of international legal
obligations. As illustrated below, decisions rendered in application of
the Alien Tort Claims Act have relied upon international tribunals to
ascertain the law of nations.
The most important human rights case to be decided by a federal
court was the Second Circuit decision in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,which
paved the way for the modern application of the Alien Tort Claims Act

304. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
305. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("the Alien Tort Claims

Act establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give
effect to violations of customary international law."); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d. 401,
418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (federal case law has developed reflecting
the emergence of a set of decisional rules federal courts have crafted to give scope and
content to the cause of action the ATCA creates as it relates to international human
rights law.... [T]hese precedents represent... the natural evolution of common law, and
the organic branching of federal substantive rules through the ATCA.).
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
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to redress human rights abuses. °7 In Filartiga,a Paraguayan national
brought suit alleging that his torture at the hands of another Paraguayan
national constituted a violation of international law actionable under the
Alien Tort Claims Statute. Significantly, the Second Circuit relied on
Supreme Court precedent, including Paquete Habana and Smith, to
determine the sources of international law. "The law of nations 'may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists...; or by the general usage
and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and
enforcing that law.' 318 In this latter category, the Second Circuit
referenced the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
and held that "[h]aving examined the sources from which customary
international law is derived the usage of nations, judicial opinions and
the works of jurists we conclude that official torture is now prohibited
by the law of nations. 30 9
A recent example of the use of international tribunals in discerning
the content of human rights obligations is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Doe I v. Unocal.310 In Doe I, the Ninth Circuit was a faced with a claim
of corporate liability for aiding and abetting human rights abuses in
Myanmar. The Ninth Circuit noted that
[d]istrict [c]ourts are increasingly turning to the decisions by
international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the
standards of international human rights law under our civil
ATCA. We agree with this approach. We find recent decisions
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda especially
helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and
abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA.3 1 1
307. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
308. Id.
at 880 (citations omitted).
309. Id. at 884 & n.16 citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Jan. 18, 1978
(European Court of Human Rights) (holding that Britain's subjection of prisoners to sleep
deprivation, hooding, exposure to hissing noise, reduced diet and standing against a wall for hours
was "inhuman and degrading," but not "torture" within the meaning of the European Convention
on Human Rights).
310. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57107, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (emphasis omitted), vacated, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 0056603, 005-55628, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir., Feb. 14, 2003).
311. Doe 1,2002 WL 31063976 at *12 (citations and emphases omitted). Significantly, Judge
Reinhardt refused to join the majority because he rejected the standard of third-party liability
under which Unocal was held responsible for the human rights violations, arguing that the
question of Unocal's liability should not be resolved, as the majority holds, "by applying a
recently-promulgated international criminal law aiding-and-abetting standard." Id. at *24
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt argued that reliance on international tribunals was
inappropriate given the existence of well-established federal common law principles for aiding
and abetting. Id. at *28-30. "Having declared that international law governs, and that the
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The Court then examined international tribunal decisions and,
applying the standard articulated therein, concluded that issues of

material fact existed as to whether Unocal aided and abetted the
government's forced labor campaign." 2 Doe I thus represents an

important instance of an appellate court relying almost exclusively on a
standard articulated by an international tribunal to deny summary
judgment in an ATCA case. It remains to be seen whether the Ninth
Circuit en banc will adopt a similar approach.

Other landmark decisions in the human rights arena likewise relied
upon international tribunal decisions to determine the content of
international law.31 3 In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit relied

upon the Nuremberg Trials as evidence of the liability for private
individuals for committing war crimes.314 In Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Nuremberg Trials
and the International Court of Justice in defining fundamental human
rights which are binding under international law even absent state
consent (jus cogens norms).315 Two significant district court cases
likewise cited the Nuremberg trials as evidence that forced labor
constitutes a violation of international law.3" 6 Another recent case relied
upon the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in establishing facts supporting a claim for human
rights abuses arising out of the war in Yugoslavia. In determining

whether a violation of the law of nations had occurred, the court noted
that "the statutes of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) and recent opinions of these tribunals are
particularly relevant."3 7 Such cases amply illustrate the proclivity of

Yugoslav Tribunal's standard constitutes the controlling international law, the majority cannot
then escape the implications of being bound by the law it has selected." Id. at *30, n. 9.; see also
id. at *13, n. 28 (responding to Judge Reinhardt, the court clarified that nowhere did it declare
that the Yugoslav Tribunal's standard constitutes the controlling international law or that it is
"bound" by every aspect of that standard. It only declared that decisions by these tribunals are one
of the sources of international law, an approach the Court described as "not particularly
noteworthy, let alone improper.").
312. Id. at *12-15.
313. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885, n. 16 (2d Cir. 1980).
314. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
315. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992), cert
denied, Republic of Argentina v. De Blake, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993). See also Sampson v. Germany,
250 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 2001).
316. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1309-10 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (active
participation an element of offense of forced labor); lwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) (enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during World War 11
constitutes a crime against humanity).
317. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
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national courts to resort to international tribunal decisions to illuminate
the content of international law.
Litigation involving boundary disputes and human rights abuses are
two of the more significant arenas in which decisions of international
tribunals have been utilized to ascertain the content of international law.
What is noteworthy is that when federal courts are required to
understand and apply international law to resolve a case, they
increasingly utilize decisions of international tribunals as one of the
principal sources for determining its content. As Justice O'Connor
wrote in discussing Paquete Habana,
[t]he flow of ideas from our Court to other tribunals around the
world is well-chronicled, but we have not seen fit to reciprocate
in kind.... As our domestic courts are increasingly asked to
resolve disputes that involve questions of... international law
about which we have no special competence,.. .there is great
potential for our Court to learn from the experience and logic
of... international tribunals.318
An understanding of the different models will assist courts in
addressing the uses and abuses of persuasive authority as they seek to
draw a line between the requirements of their own legal system to
resolve cases presented, and the resources available to aid in that
process, including international tribunal decisions.319 While the use of
persuasive international decisional authority is appropriate . in
circumstances such as those outlined above, application of the Paquete
Habana model is more problematic in those instances in which
international law is not required to resolve a case. In its traditional
usage, resort to international tribunal decisions is appropriate where
international law "must be ascertained and administered" when
"questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.""32 However, parties are increasingly citing international
tribunal decisions as persuasive authority when other questions-such
as the content of constitutional protections-are presented for
resolution. As discussed in the "no deference" model, such an approach
rarely succeeds in carrying the day.

318. O'Connor, supra note 5, at 18.
319. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 191, 19899 (2003).
320. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700.
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VI. THE SPECIAL MASTER MODEL
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The sixth model for domestic courts to confer deference on decisions
of international tribunals is perhaps the most novel and the least likely
to be repeated with any regularity. Nonetheless, its success in at least
one instance suggests that it could be a model for the future inter-play
between federal courts and international tribunals. This approach would
permit a national court to utilize the expertise of an international
tribunal to assist in resolving certain questions with respect to liability
or the distribution of assets under a settlement. In at least one instance, a
pre-existing international tribunal has been utilized by a federal court as
a specio!l master to distribute funds to claimants in a class action
settlement. Such an approach posits that an international tribunal might
serve as a court-appointed expert to resolve difficult questions of
international law. Under this model, the decision-making process that
gives rise the international tribunal decision is subject to the direct
control and supervision of the national court. The international tribunal
is, as it were, always looking over its shoulder, anticipating whether the
national court will defer to its decision.
A.

Special Masters Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure

Special masters are an increasingly common tool in the hands of
federal judges faced with complex litigation. Article 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
The court in which any action is pending may appoint a special
master therein. As used in these rules, the word "master"
includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an assessor .... A
reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In
actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when
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the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury,
save in matters of account and of difficult computation of
damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that
some exceptional condition requires it.... The master shall
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to the master by the
order of reference and, if required to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the master shall set them forth in the
report.... In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall
accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous....
The court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or
may reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence
or may recommit it with instructions.3"'
The growth of special masters is one of the more remarkable
developments in federal civil procedure. The traditional role of special
masters is to address judicial limitations or shortcomings in the
adjudicatory system, such as time constraints, lack of expertise, or lack
of skill in certain roles. The historical function of special masters has
been ministerial, such as accounting or the calculation of damages, but
recent ministerial permutations have expanded to include the
distribution of settlement assets in large class action civil litigation. 2
Special masters have also been used for evidentiary purposes in
complex or mass tort and commercial cases for the discovery of
significant quantities of information. Masters have supervised pre-trial
phases of litigation, facilitated settlement as a negotiator or conciliator
between the parties, or assisted in shaping, monitoring, or enforcing
compliance with post-judgment relief.323 In short, whatever may have
been the historical limitations of special masters, today they have
consistently been used to assist in all phases of litigation: pre-trial, trial,
and post-trial.324
As for the appointment of the special master, courts traditionally have
appointed one or more judges, lawyers, or academics to serve as
masters. But there is nothing to prevent more novel forms of special
masters, such as appointing a respected jurist in significant part because
he has a large staff capable of assisting the special master with his
mandate. Although rarely discussed, in mass claims litigation the

321. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
322. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394, 395 (1986).
323. Linda J. Silbernan, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited: The Proliferationof Ad Hoc Procedure,
137 U. PA. L.REv. 2131, 2135 (1986).
324. Id.
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officially-appointed special master often establishes a "quasi-agency 3 25
to fulfill his mandate, which often consists of a large machinery of
personnel who actually perform many of the functions of the special
master. The appointment of one or more judges of an international

tribunal may simply be a manifestation of this form of special master.
To be sure, the use of an international tribunal as a special master will

rarely be necessary or appropriate. But there are those unusual cases
when a federal court may wish to entertain the option. International

tribunals may be particularly appropriate as remedial masters when
there are matters of public importance that include government
involvement in a class action litigation where there is a twin desire to

provide a global settlement to the class generally while also providing
for individual, case-by-case relief to specific class members. The global
settlement of the litigation will involve the court responding to the
lawyers and various government officials addressing the public policy
interests at large, while the court will rely on the special, master to focus
on the implementation for the individuals affected. If the court does

appoint a special master as part of a global settlement, whether or not
this in involves an international tribunal, there will be little chance for

appellate review of the appointment given the acquiescence or
acdeptance of the special master by the parties.
With respect to public disputes, in the domestic context it is well

known that special masters have been actively involved in a number of
high-profile public disputes with the government.32 6 Given that remedial
325. James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of
Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 825 (1991); see also Brazil, supra note 322 at
415.
326. These include, among others, (I) Agent Orange class action litigation by Vietnam
veterans against chemical companies and the United States government, see In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Silberman, supra note
323, at 2147; PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTER IN THE
COURTS 4 (1986); (2) the government-initiated break-up of AT&T and some of its operating
companies, see United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978); Brazil,
supra note 322 at 406; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul R. Rice, Judicial Management of the
Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, in WAYNE D.
BRAZIL, ET. AL., MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF
SPECIAL MASTERS 77, 82-86, 100-108 (1983); (3) the Freedom of Information Act litigation by
the Washington Post against the United States regarding the procurement of documents pertaining
to the Carter Administration's failed attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages in 1980, In re United
States Dep't of Def., 848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Silberman, supra note 323, at 2155; Patricia
Wald, "Some Exceptional Condition" - The Anatomy of a Decision Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53(b), 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405 (1988); and (4) litigation concerning a state agency
polluting the Boston Harbor in violation of state and federal environmental laws. Quincy v.
Metro. Dist. Comm'n, Civ. No. 138,477 (Mass. Super. Ct., Norfolk County Dec. 17, 1982). The
case is unreported but is described in detail in Timothy G. Little, Court-Appointed Special
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special masters have been frequently used for such "public law
litigation" 327 in the domestic context, it is not surprising that they may
be utilized for very public disputes in the international context. The
United States is the preferred choice for a number of different types of
transnational disputes, including, for example, human rights litigation
against corporate or government defendants under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. As one commentator has put it, the "new trend of 'mass
tort' transnational litigation is an inevitable development both in human
rights litigation in the U.S. and in the realm of international human
' Given this fact, we can likewise anticipate that
rights law in general."328
such litigation may involve special masters. As Linda Silberman has
noted, modern United States litigation has developed an "almost
Pavlovian response to the complicated case-delegation to a special
master."32
As for the latter concern for a global settlement with particularized
relief, such concerns have been increasingly relevant in the domestic
context. Alternative dispute resolution processes, including the use of
one or more arbitrators or a special master, have been used to allocate
portions of a settlement fund to claimants according to specified criteria
established by the court. Under this approach, the alternative dispute
resolution process is not simply the means for achieving a final
resolution, it actually becomes the final resolution.33 ° As one
Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of Quincy v. Metropolitn District
Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 473-75 (1984); see also Brazil, supra note 322, at
416-17; DeGraw, supra note 325, at 825-26.
327. "Public law litigation" as been described as litigation with the following characteristics:
(1) the scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by the court and
parties; (2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous; (3) The fact
inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and legislative; (4) Relief is not conceived
as compensation for past wrong in a form logically derived from the substantive liability and
confined in its impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on
flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons
including absentees; (5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated; (6) The decree does not
terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its administration requires the continuing
participation of the court; (7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and
statement of governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible fact
evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome; (8)
The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights,
but a grievance about the operation of public policy. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302-03 (1976). For a description of the use
special masters in public litigation, see DeGraw, supra note 325 at 802-38; Silberman, supra note
323, at 2161-62.
328. Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human
Rights at the CorporateLevel, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1140-41 (1999).
329. Silberman, supra note 323, at 2158.
330. David W. Rivkin, ADR and Mass Claim Resolution: Life Insurance Class Action
Experiences in the United States, at 5, presented to the Swiss Arbitration Association on January
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commentator has put it:
[s]ettlements involving the establishment of a fund must address
how the fund can be equitably divided among the claimants.
Some fund settlements... involve appointing either a single
arbitrator, special master, or panel of neutrals to divide a fund.
Another option is to design a tiered ADR system to resolve
individual claims. The tradeoffs are clear: the more elaborate the
claim determination process..., the more expensive and timeconsuming it will be to administer the proceeding. The smaller
the fund and the more expedited the claims review process, the
more likely the potential for settlement "opt-outs." 33'
The use of arbitration as a means to provide particularized relief in
the domestic context is perhaps best illustrated by the class action
litigation against New York Life Insurance Company. Pursuant to this
litigation, the insurance company reached a settlement that provided
class relief and individualized damages for those class members who
wished to pursue a special alternative dispute resolution before an
arbitration forum established pursuant to the settlement. Class members
could opt for certain pre-determined class relief or pursue arbitration
that provides for the award of monetary damages within specified
ranges according to defined criteria.332 One of the special features of this
insurance litigation was that it provided an innovative use of established
ADR techniques in a new context. More specifically, it provided
claimants with a centralized, expeditious, and fair procedure permitting
claimants to tell their particularized story while also affording
defendants an economically viable model that limited the marginal cost
of claims resolution and capped defendant's total exposure to liability.333
If one recognizes that arbitrators as special masters are an appropriate
tool for a federal court to use in dividing settlement funds in the
domestic class action context, it is not a large leap to extrapolate that an
international dispute before a federal court involving a matter of
significant public importance may also benefit from such an approach.
An international tribunal with specialized skills in resolving mass
claims will be among the avenues that the parties or the court might
pursue for resolution of fund settlement disputes.
22, 1998. (on file with author).
331. Lynn Cohn, The Use of ADR in the Settlement of Class Actions, published in Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, (Aug. 2001).
332. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1441, n. 394 (1995).
333. Rivkin, supra note 330, at 16-18.
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The Special Master Model and the Claims Resolution Tribunal

In the mid-1990s Swiss banks faced tremendous public pressure for
an independent audit of Swiss bank account for evidence of closed or
dormant accounts held by Holocaust victims. In May 1996, the Swiss
Bankers Association and the World Jewish Congress established the
Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (Volcker Commission) to
appoint an independent auditing company and to establish an
international tribunal to resolve claims to dormant Swiss bank
accounts.334 Although established by a memorandum of understanding
between private parties-the World Jewish Congress, the World Jewish
Restitution Organization, and the Swiss Bankers Association-it clearly
had the imprimatur of the Swiss and Israeli governments.335 The purpose
of the Claims Resolution Tribunal was to "establish an expeditious
judicial process, working under liberal rules of evidence, that would
fairly and objectively determine the legitimate owners or heirs of the
' Reflecting the
assets in dormant accounts identified by the auditors."336
intended independence of the tribunal, following the filing of the class
action litigation in federal court by Holocaust victims against the Swiss
banks, Paul Volcker wrote in opposition of the litigation, stating that it
would cripple the resolution process being conducted by the Volcker
Commission.33 v However, the independence between the tribunal and
334. Memorandum of Understanding Between The World Jewish Restitution Organization
and the World Jewish Congress and The Swiss Banker Association, reprinted in INDEPENDENT
COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI
PERSECUTION IN SWISS BANKS, (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter VOLCKER REPORT], available at
http://www.icep-iaep.org/final-report/ICEPReport english.pdf at Appendix A, A-Is. (last
visited February 10, 2003).
335. Letter from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Mr. Edgar M. Bronfman (Sept. 10, 1995),
reprintedin VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 334, at Appendix B, A-3.
I was pleased to learn during our conversation that you will be meeting in
Switzerland with the Bankers Association and the Government Banking Commission, in
the matter of restitution of Jewish assets deposited in Switzerland, along with the issues
of restitution of Jewish Property which you have been dealing with in countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. I look forward to hearing of your success in this matter in
which, as President of the World Jewish Restitution Organization, you represent the
Jewish people and the State of Israel.
Id.;
Declaration of the Swiss Federal Council on Dormant Accounts from World War II, dated
May 8, 1996 reprinted in VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 334, at Appendix C, A-4. ("The Swiss
Federal Council welcomes the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding of May 2, 1996
between Jewish organizations and the Swiss Bankers Association establishing a joint committee
of eminent persons whose task it will be to review the investigations of Swiss banks into dormant
accounts from World War II."); VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 334, at Annex 8, 115 (describing
the involvement of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission in the establishment of the Claims
Resolution Tribunal).
336. VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 334, at Annex 8, 115.
337. Michael J.Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in the United
States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 41, n. 169 (2000).
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the New York class action litigation changed in 1998, when, with the
court's approval, the parties agreed, that any awards rendered by the
tribunal would be used to reduce the amount owed under the $1.25
billion settlement. 38
This change in the mission of the Claims Resolution Tribunal is
reflected in its procedures. The tribunal has had two distinct phases in
its adjudicative process. During the first three years of its existence,
under the CRT I procedures, the tribunal acted independently of the
federal court, resolving claims to accounts published by the Swiss
Bankers Association in 1997 under the originally established procedure.
As noted above, the CRT I procedure likely falls within the arbitration
model. However, pursuant to a settlement reached in In re Holocaust
Victims," beginning in February 2001 a new procedure-the CRT II
procedure-was established in which the international tribunal became
a judicial adjunct of the federal court litigation. The sole purpose of the
tribunal under CRT II was to distribute a portion of the funds provided
under the settlement agreement.34
Under this procedure, the Claims Resolution Tribunal did not
expressly become a special master, but rather it serves as the courtappointed administrator of a portion of the settlement amount.
According to the court's appointment memorandum, "[t]he Zurichbased Claims Resolution Tribunal ("CRT") will administer the
Deposited Assets Class claims process on behalf of the Court" with the
court appointing two special masters, Paul Volcker and Mike Bradfield,
as "CRT Special Masters to closely supervise the day-to-day
338. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 at 2 (E.D.N.Y., 2000); Class
Action
Settlement
Agreement,
Article
4.2,
available
at
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/exhibit I toPlanofAllocation.pdf (last
visited
February 10, 2003).
Settling Defendants shall pay Matched Assets, together with interest and fees ... to
rightful claimants as and when determined by the ICEP or the Claims Resolution
Tribunal. Such payments of Matched Assets shall be deemed to be included in, and part
of the Settlement Amount and shall in no event cause the Settlement Amount to be
increased.

Id.(emphasis added).
339. Inre Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (2000). For a discussion of
the claims resolution process, see generally, Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunal, supra note
7, at 259-267; see also Sylvain Beauchamp, The New Claims Resolution Tribunalfor Dormant
Accounts in Switzerland: Distribution Organ, Mass Claims Adjudicative Body, or Sui Generis
Entity, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 999 (2002); Thomas Buergenthal, Arbitrating Entitlement to
Dormant Accounts, 15 ICSID REVIEW 301 (2000); Suzannab Linton, Righting a Wrong or
Prolongingthe Agony?: The Work of the Claims Resolution Tribunalfor Dormant Accounts in

Switzerland, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 373 (1999).
340. For a discussion of the claims resolution procedures, see generally, Alford, The Claims
Resolution Tribunal,supra note 7, at 259-67.
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' The
supervision of the CRT and to regularly monitor its activities."341
reasons cited by the court for the decision to use the tribunal was that it
was an "already existing adjudicative body comprised of arbitrators,
attorneys, and other staff, who now have several years of experience,
and are serving under outstanding leadership" and could "best assure
that the tens of thousands of claims expected to filed against Swiss bank
'
accounts are resolved speedily, equitably, and accurately."342
Also
relevant was the fact that the parties and the original special master,
Judah Gribetz, appointed to develop a distribution plan, all
"unanimously support[ed] the use of the Claims Resolution Tribunal to
'
resolve... claims, under Court supervision."343
The original special master appointed to develop the distribution
plan, Judah Gribetz, was even more explicit in the reasons for utilizing
the international tribunal. He addressed the appropriate mechanism for
distributing the deposited assets and concluded that the Claims
Resolution Tribunal had unique strengths. First, the settling parties
intended that the claims resolution process in Zurich continue after
settlement was reached. Second, a federal court had previously
determined that the international tribunal was already administering a
fair and efficient claims process claims to dormant Swiss bank accounts.
Third, the Volcker Commission had previously concluded that the
tribunal functioned under outstanding leadership with speed and
effectiveness and recommended that claims to the accounts be
channeled through the tribunal. Finally, the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission had made clear that under Swiss law, bank records and
account database and audit work papers must be archived in
Switzerland. 3" Because of these and similar strengths, the special
master concluded that "it is clear that bank account claimants must
continue to benefit from the CRT [Claims Resolution Tribunal's]
expertise. The CRT should be charged with the resolution of the
Deposited Assets Class claims, under Court supervision, and with the

341. See Memorandum and Order, In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., at 2 (E.D.N.Y.,
Dec.
8,
2000),
(No.
CV
96-4849)
available
at
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/96cv4849moI2800.pdf. (last visited February 10,
2003).
342. Referral to Special Masters For Claims Resolution Process for Deposited Assets, In re
Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. CV 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.specialmasters.org/_press-releases/96cv4849ref12800.pdf. (last visited February 10,
2003).
343. Id.
344. Special Master's Proposed Plan ofAllocation and Distributionof Settlement Proceeds,
in In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., Special Master's Proposal (Sept. 11, 2000) at 99-104
available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/VolumelPlan.pdf. (last visited February
10, 2003).
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express approval of the Swiss Confederation. 34 5

Under this new mandate, the Claims Resolution Tribunal began
receiving claims to 21,000 accounts published in February 2001 and
now is in the process of resolving approximately 25,000 claims to these
accounts. The CRT II procedures established by the Claims Resolution
Tribunal to administer the funds make it clear that they serve as the
judicial adjunct of a federal court. The tribunal will not render
arbitration awards per se, but will "make determinations regarding the

rights of claimants to accounts in Swiss banks" which will then "be
certified to the Court for payment by the Special Masters [Volcker and
Bradley] subject to Court approval. 346 Article 37(3) provides that
"[c]ertified awards shall be paid by the Special Masters after approval
of such awards by the Court. Upon Court approval of awards certified

by the Tribunal, the full amount of the awards shall be paid....
Pursuant to these rules, the Claims Resolution Tribunal has begun
3 48
certifying awards to the Court for payment.
The case of In re Holocaust Victims thus establishes a new precedent

for utilizing the resources of an international tribunal as a judicial
adjunct of a United States federal court. Although not expressly a
special master, the tribunal is under the supervision of two special
masters and serves as the sole mechanism for administering the claims

resolution process for Swiss bank claims involving the disbursement of
up to $800 million of the $1.25 billion settlement amount.349 In the
court's view, an international tribunal established by private parties with
governmental imprimatur had the recognized experience to resolve
claims to Holocaust accounts and was viewed as an ideal mechanism for

345. Id. at 101-02.
346. Rules Governing the Claims Resolution Process, [hereinafter CRT Rules] at i, and Arts.
2-3 available at http://www.crt-ii.org/_pdf/governing rulesen.pdf. (last visited February 10,
2003).
347. Id. at 37(3).
348. See, e.g., Certified Award to Claimant Georgi Evdokiev Markov in re Account of
Florentine Amstutz,
(Nov.
5,
2001),
available a t
http://www.crtii.org/_awards/_apdfs/AmstutzFlorentine.pdf (last visited February 10, 2003).
The Tribunal is of the opinion that the Claimant has presented a strong claim to the
Account, thus substantially reducing the likelihood of competing claims. On this basis,
and taking into account the instructions of the Special Masters, the Tribunal
recommends approval of the present Award by the Court for payment by the Special
Masters in accordance with Article 37(3) of the Rules.
Id.
349. See http://www.crt-ii.org/introduction.htm (last visited February 10, 2003). ("The Plan
of Allocation and Distribution set aside up to $800 million of the $1.25 billion settlement"
payment by the Defendant Swiss banks for awards to claimants for deposited assets in Swiss
banks.).
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resolving claims to these funds. More than merely integrating decisions
of an international tribunal into a domestic court, if the court decides to
defer to the tribunal, the awards of the international tribunal actually
become the decision of the domestic court.
C.

Normative Application

The special master model falls near the end of the continuum of
deference because, for the first time, the international tribunal is under
the supervision and control of the national court. As a consequence, not
only is there no obligation to defer to the international tribunal decision,
but the decision-making process of the international tribunal will be
shaped out of concern to secure that deference. The international
tribunal will remain independent and impartial as between the parties,
but its decisions will be subject to the approval of the national court and
not binding in the absence of such approval. One might say that with the
first model-the full faith and credit model-the national court becomes
the handmaiden of the international tribunal; with this model, the
international tribunal has become the handmaiden of the national court.
As noted above, it will be relatively rare for an international tribunal
to serve as a special master for a U. S. federal court. To date, no other
international tribunal has served in such a capacity.35 ° While the special
master model is relatively unique, the Claims Resolution Tribunal may
serve as a model for other international tribunals to serve as a special
master in appropriate circumstances. With class-action litigation before
federal courts in which the parties reach a globalized settlement of
international claims that requires particularized relief, the use of an
existing international tribunal as a special master may be appropriate.
350. In the same order that appointed the Claims Resolution Tribunal to resolve claims to
Swiss bank accounts, the U.S. court also appointed three international agencies - the Conference
on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, Inc., the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee, and the International Organization for Migration - to serve process claims involving
slave labor and refugee claims. These entities may be viewed as international tribunals in a broad,
sense, but they are more accurately described as governmental and non-governmental
international agencies rather international tribunals. See Memorandum and Order, In re Holocaust
Victims Assets Litig., (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2000) (No. CV 96-4849), available at
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/96cv4849moI2800.pdf (last visited February 10,
2003); see also Claims Conference: Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, at
http://www.claimscon.org (last visited February 10, 2003); Holocaust Victims Assets Programme,
at http://www.swissbankclaims.iom.int (last visited February 10, 2003). In addition to processing
the distribution of funds under In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation, the International
Organization for Migration ("IOM") also has been designated by the German Government to
resolve claims arising out of the German slave labor claims. The German Forced Labour
Compensation Programme is the division within IOM charged with processing these claims. See
generally, German Forced Labour Compensation Programme at http://www.compensation-forforced-labour.org/index.htm. (last visited February 10, 2003).
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After all, an international tribunal is particularly well-suited to serve as
a special master where a judicial discretion is required in distributing
settlement funds.
[A] claims tribunal with a narrowly defined and wellcircumscribed jurisdiction can advantageously be used where
payments call for mass determinations on precise factual or legal
issues which cannot be resolved by reference to objective criteria
with minimal exercise of judgment. In such cases, independent
and disinterested judgment applied with the requirements of the
judicial functions by a claims tribunal may be much better suited
to distribute the proceeds of a settlement agreement.35'
The central requirements for use of an international tribunal as a special
master are that: (1) there are parallel proceedings before a United States
court and an international tribunal over the same or similar factual
issues; (2) there are common parties appearing in the United States
litigation and before the international tribunal; (3) the international
tribunal has recognized expertise in a particular aspect of the litigation;
(4) the entities appearing before or establishing the international tribunal
are willing to have the international tribunal serve the function of
special master; and (5) the parties appearing before the United States
litigation, as well as the judge presiding over the United States
that the international tribunal should
litigation, concur in the assessment
35 2
master.
special
a
as
serve
Applying these principles, one can posit that other international
tribunals may serve as special masters in the future. To illustrate how
such an approach could be taken with another extant international
tribunal, one may revisit the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. As
discussed above, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, as currently
established, arguably fits the foreign judgment model. That is, decisions
rendered by the Commission should be recognized and enforced in
federal courts in the same manner as foreign judgments. But one could
posit a scenario in which this tribunal could also be a candidate for the
special master model. The Peace Agreement signed by Ethiopia and
Eritrea on December 12, 2000 established the Claims Commission to
address "the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian
' According to the agreement establishing the commission,
population."353
351. Beauchamp, supra note 339, at 1030.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 344-345.
353. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
and The Government of the State of Eritrea, Dec. 12, 2000, art. 5(i), available at http://www.pcacpa.org/RPC/E-E%20Agreement.html. (last visited February 10, 2003).
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[t]he mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding
arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one
Government against the other, and by nationals.. .of one party
against the Government of the other party or entities owned or
controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict
that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the Modalities
for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or
other violations of international law.354
The agreement anticipates that this claims process shall be exclusive,
with an important caveat. It stipulates that "[e]xcept for claims
submitted to another mutually agreed settlement mechanism in
accordance with paragraph 16 or filed in another forum prior to the
effective date of this agreement, the Commission shall be the sole forum
for adjudicating claims described [above]. '355
This provision is significant because six months prior to the signing
of the agreement, a class action lawsuit was filed in federal district court
in Washington, D.C. alleging that Eritrean nationals had property
expropriated by Ethiopia in violation of international law.35 6 On August
2, 2001, the D.C. district court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In so doing, it
argued that the Claims Commission provided an adequate forum to
resolve the claims presented against Ethiopia, applying the traditional
forum non conveniens test which examines whether an adequate
alternative forum exists, balances various private and public interest
factors, and considers whether plaintiffs could reinstate their suit in the
alternative forum.357 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that
the Claims Commission provided an inadequate forum.358
But if the facts are changed slightly, the Claims Commission could be
structured in a manner not unlike the Claims Resolution Tribunal. With
the D.C. Circuit finding that the Claims Commission is an inadequate
forum, the government of Ethiopia may not wish to challenge the class
action, and may wish to settle the case and structure an arrangement that
354. Id.
355. Id. at art. 5(8).
356. Nemariam v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 392 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
357. Id. at 393.
358. Id. At 394-395. The Court reasoned that "the Commission's inability to make an award
directly to Nemariam, and the possibility that Eritrea could set off.. an award in her favor
against.. an award in favor of Ethiopia, render[ed] the Commission an inadequate forum." Id. at
394.
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limits its total financial exposure under both proceedings. Under such a
scenario, the federal court should consider settlement of the class action
lawsuit in a manner that incorporates the special master model. If
settlement of the class action were reached, the five commissioners of
the Claims Commission could be appointed by the district court to serve
as special masters with respect to those claims at issue in the United
States litigation. Such an appointment would be in recognition of the
fact that the settling parties wished the Claims Commission to continue
notwithstanding the settlement, that the Commission was administering
a fair and equitable procedure under outstanding leadership, and that the
claimants could benefit from the expertise developed by the Claims
Commission with respect to other claims under review. Any decisions
rendered by the Claims Commission concerning such claims would be
reported to the district court judge for review and approval. Upon court
approval of awards by the Claims Commission, the full amount of the
awards shall be paid under the settlement amount.
The frequency with which a federal court will have occasion to
require a special master to resolve international disputes is rare.
Nonetheless, in those instances in which parties to United States
litigation are able to secure a global settlement and wish to provide a
mechanism for particularized relief to affected individuals, the use of an
international tribunal is a viable candidate for a federal court. The
Claims Resolution Tribunal is an example of such a success story, and
other instances may present themselves in which a similar avenue could
be pursued.
VII. THE "No DEFERENCE" MODEL

b

i

The final model represents the extreme on the continuum of
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deference. This model differs from the Paquete Habana model because
courts are not being asked to resort to international tribunal decisions
when "questions of right depending upon [international law] are duly
'
presented for their determination."359
With this model courts are asked
to ascertain and administer international law when constitutional
questions of right are at issue. Courts respectfully decline. This model
posits that for constitutional questions federal courts confer no
deference on decisions of international tribunals, finding the decisions
irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary to resolve the cases that are
presented to them for adjudication.
A.

ConstitutionalandHuman Rights: Same Direction,Different
Tracks

The civil liberties embodied in the U.S. Constitution have corollaries
in human rights instruments. Freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly, and the right of equal protection, are all
constitutional 6 ° and human rights.36' Likewise, the Constitution362 and
human rights instruments 363 protect against unlawful takings, cruel and
unusual punishment, unreasonable searches and seizures, or
deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Born out of the horror of the Second World War and influenced by
the civil liberties inherent in democratic society, these core human
rights instruments were intended to guarantee to the rest of the world the
359. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."); Id. at amend. XIV, § I ("No State
shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
361. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 3 (U.N. 1948) ("Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person."); Id. at art. 5 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Id. at art. 7 ("All are equal before the
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."); Id. at art. 18
("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."); Id. at art. 19
("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression."); Id.at art. 20 ("Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.")
362. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."); Id. at
amend. V ("No person shall be.. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."); Id.at amend. VIII
("[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.")
363. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 3 (U.N. 1948) ("Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person"); Id. at art. 5 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Id. at art. 12 ("No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation."); Id. at art. 17 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property.")
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protections already cherished at home. But recent decades have seen a
dramatic shift in emphasis. Human rights are no longer simply exported
abroad for foreign consumption. Attempts began to import international
norms and utilize domestic courts to enforce those norms. While the
attempt largely has been aimed at giving binding domestic legal effect
to these rights through a tapestry of federal statutes, self-executing
treaties, and preemptory norms, more novel attempts have also been
fashioned to internalize these norms as part of the process of
constitutional interpretation.
Thus far, the experiment of judicial internalization of international
ideals through constitutional interpretation has failed. Although
constitutional liberties and human rights may be headed in the same
direction, they are on decidedly different tracks. This is because for
constitutional and human rights the same questions are asked, but
domestic courts and international tribunals ascertain the answers from
different source material. Constitutional liberties find their source in
text, structure, history and national experience. 3" Human rights find
their source in international custom and canonical conventions.
Although parties will frequently invite reliance upon international
norms in an attempt to give meaning and shape to a constitutional
requirement, the courts are not accepting the invitation. Constitutional
guarantees embody universal concepts of humanity and decency; but
universal concepts of humanity and decency do not shape those
guarantees. Courts essentially remain convinced that the use of extraconstitutional material, including international human rights decisions,
to give meaning to the content and scope of constitutional guarantees is
illegitimate. As the Court succinctly put it, "[c]omparative analysis [is]
36 Whether a
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.""
364. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 1-15, at 75 (3d ed. 2000)
("[V]alues and commitments, if they do not obviously originate in constitutional provisions,
structures, or history, must find their location in some other source deeply linked to our national
experience."). For a helpful introduction to constitutional interpretation, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1185,
1187-1206 (2003) (discussing textualism, structuralism, historical originalism, living
constitutionalism, and neo-federalism). For a nuanced discussion of theories of constitutional
interpretation, including textual, historical, structural and ethical (i.e., American ethos)
arguments, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, 3-119 (1982). For a
useful debate on constitutional interpretation, see Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law (1997) (with contributions by Justice Scalia and Laurence Tribe,
among others).
365. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921, n.l 1 (1997) (The "dissent would have us
consider the benefits that other countries, and the European Union, believe they have derived
from federal systems that are different from ours. We think such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to
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constitutional civil liberty is consistent or inconsistent, broader or
narrower than an international norm is simply not germane.
Consequently, the decisions of international tribunals interpreting those
norms are likewise viewed as irrelevant. To conclude otherwise would
dramatically "expand the canon of authoritative materials from which
' and in so
constitutional common law reasoning might go forward,"366
doing, so broaden the Court's constitutional vision that it would, as
'
Anne-Marie Slaughter predicts, "change the course of American law."367
Of course, this is not to say that international law is not "part of our
law"36 as reflected in federal common law,369 or that it is otherwise
unimportant for federal courts.37 It is only to say that for certain
answers to certain questions-such as the content of constitutional
guarantees-federal courts have rejected invitations to view
international law and international tribunal decisions as relevant.
B.

The "No Deference" Model and Human Rights Tribunals

The most important example of recent unsuccessful attempts to use
international law generally, and decisions of international tribunals in
particular, to give content to the scope of constitutional guarantees has
arisen in death penalty litigation. Scholars have noted the use of
international law "to assist in interpreting the -scope of constitutional
norms" in other countries, and argued that "[d]eath penalty
jurisprudence provides one of the most dramatic examples of th[e]
synergy between international and domestic human rights law."37' Not
in the United States. As Justice O'Connor has noted, the Supreme Court
has "refused to consider international law and the law of other nations
'
when interpreting our own Constitution."372
Despite precedent by
the task of writing one.").
366. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges, Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y,
807, 819 (2000).
367. Slaughter, supra note 319, at 203-04 (commenting on Charles Fried's article and the
import of constitutional cross-fertilization).

368. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700.
369. For a brief summary of uses of international law as federal common law, see Harold
Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1835-38 (1998).
370. Indeed, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act create rights
of action based on violations of international law.
371. William A. Schabas, InternationalLaw andAbolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 797, 817 (1998); see also Slaughter, supra note 319, at 194-204 (discussing
"constitutional cross-fertilization").
372. O'Connor, supra note 2, at 350. But see Slaughter, supra note 319, at 195-99
(contending that certain members of the Supreme Court are beginning to borrow from other
constitutional courts). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action as an International
Human Rights Dialogue, 18 BROOKINGS REV. 2,
3 (2000) available at
http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/dybdocroot/press/review/winter2000/consider.htm (The
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international human rights tribunals that the death penalty violates

international human rights,37 ' and notwithstanding that such decisions
have been cited in United States death penalty litigation in support of
the argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional,374 the Supreme

Court has never considered such information germane. Nor has it
considered international law particularly relevant. At most it has
considered the actual practice of other countries as potentially relevant
to the constitutional inquiry.
The Eighth Amendment is succinct, simply prohibiting the infliction
of "cruel and unusual punishment. '375 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that "the ultimate decision as to the appropriateness of
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment... must be decided on

the basis of our own judgment in light of the precedents of this
Court.,

376

The critical constitutional inquiry in recent decades has been

what information should be brought to bear by the Court in making the
determination as to whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual. In
making this determination, fierce disagreements have ensued within the

Court as to the relevance, if any, of contemporary standards of decency
reflected in the practice in the United States, and more controversially,

world opinion as expressed by the practice of states and evolving
international norms.
That evolving standards of decency should be utilized in determining

Supreme Court has not shown "readiness to look beyond one's own shores") (last visited Mar. 21,
2003).
373. See, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Question of the Death
Penalty, U.N. HCHR Res. 2001/68, U,N. HCHR, 57th Sess., T 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (2001); U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Question of the
Death Penalty, U.N. HCHR Res. 000/65, U.N. HCHR, 56th Sess.,
3, U.N.Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000); U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Question of the
Death Penalty, U.N. HCHR Res. 1999/61, U.N. HCHR, 55th Sess.,
3, U.N.Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989);
Recommendation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of the Mentally I11, Inter-Am. C.H.R., available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6e.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001); The Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of
Law, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, ser. A, No. 16 (1999); see also State v.
Makwanyane and Mchunu 1995 (3) SA 391, at 17 (South African Constitutional Court summary
of international tribunal decisions pertaining to death penalty); David Heffernan, America the
Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH.
U. L. REV. 481, 518-39 (1996) (summarizing cases).
374. See infra text accompanying notes 396-400.
375. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
376. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 604 n.2 (1977) (Powell, J. concurring); see also Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 344-45 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823, n.7 (1988);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
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the scope of the Eighth Amendment was settled in 1958. In Trop v.
Dulles, a plurality of the Court recognized that the words of the Eighth
Amendment are not precise, nor their scope static. Therefore, "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
' Recognizing
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."377

such evolving standards, the Court found that the punishment of
denationalization-rendering a person stateless-is "a condition
'
deplored in the international community of democracies."378
In support

of this conclusion, it noted that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are
in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as
punishment for crime" and that a "United Nations' survey of the
nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two
'
countries... impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion."379
In subsequent decades the Court took a similar approach to the death
penalty and referenced the practice of other countries in determining
whether its application in particular contexts was cruel and unusual."

However, the relevance of the practice of other countries was largely
rejected in the late 1980s. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality noted
"the relevance of the views of the international community in
38 but the
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual,""

concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor referenced only a "national
'
consensus" in determining the "evolving standards of decency."382

Moreover, three dissenting justices concluded that in discerning any
evolving societal consensus, all that is relevant is legislation in this
society."'
377. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion).
378. Id. at 102.
379. Id. at 102-03.
380. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596, n.10 (citing Trop, Court noted that it is "not irrelevant here that
out of 60 major nations in the world ... only 3 retained the death penalty for rape."); Enmund, 458
U.S. at 796, n.22 ("[T]he climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment" is an additional consideration which is "not irrelevant.")
381. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830, n.31.
382. Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
383. Id. at 868 (Scalia, J,, dissenting) ("it is obviously impossible for the plurality to rely
upon any evolved societal consensus discernible in legislation-or at least discernible in the
legislation of this society, which is assuredly all that is relevant."). The dissent all but eschewed
the need to inquire into world opinion or practice.
The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to
determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical
accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that it occupies a place
not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well. [citations
omitted] But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the
views of other nations.. .cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. In
the present case, therefore, the fact that a majority of foreign nations would not impose
capital punishment upon persons under 16 at the time of the crime is of no more
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The following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court held that in
determining evolving standards of decency, "we have looked...to those
of modem American society as a whole. 38 4 It emphasized that:
it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive....
While the "practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice
uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but
rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it
occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in
'
our Constitution as well."385
The Supreme Court has never departed from this standard in applying
the Eighth Amendment to the death penalty. As Harold Koh has noted,
"[a]fter Stanford, U.S death penalty jurisprudence has proceeded largely
'
without reference to the opinions of mankind."386
Thus, evolving
standards are critical in determining whether a particular punishment is
cruel and unusual, but these standards are determined based on a
national consensus. The practice of other nations is relevant only after
uniformity has been established within the United States and even then
only to show that this uniformity was not merely accidental, but rather
so fundamental to an ordered society that it is deserving of
constitutional prohibition. Under Stanford, reference to the practice of
other nations actually inures to the benefit of death penalty proponents,
rendering the global consensus relevant as an additionalcheck on the
national consensus, making the constitutional bar even higher to
overcome.
Notwithstanding this precedent, litigants have continued to argue that
the practice of other countries is relevant to the constitutional inquiry
(and helpful to their cause). The most recent example was in the context
relevance than the fact that a majority of them would not impose capital punishment at
all, or have standards of due process quite different from our own.
Id.at 864, n.4. (Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.).
384. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). In her concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor again emphasized that evolving standards must be measured based on a national
consensus. Id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Four justices disagreed. The dissent observed
that "[tihe views of organizations with expertise in relevant fields and the choices of governments
elsewhere in the world also merit our attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable
in a civilized society." Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent argued that
"objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis." Id.at 389.
385. Id. at 369, n.l (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69, n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(emphasis in original).
386. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1101 (2002).
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of imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded, a practice that
one source has argued is unique to the United States."' Marshalling
evidence that executing the mentally retarded is abhorrent to
international standards of decency, briefs filed with the Supreme Court
in the recent case of Atkins v. Virginia3.8 argued that there is a growing
international consensus against the practice." 9 The Supreme Court
agreed that the practice of executing the mentally retarded was
unconstitutional, finding that a national consensus has developed
against the practice.39 But it did not depart from the approach taken in
Stanford regarding the relevance of the practice of other nations. It
noted a national consensus and then concluded that this consensus was
3 9 To bolster
shared by a "broader social and professional consensus.""
this conclusion, it cited additional evidence, such as the practice within
the world community, which is "by no means dispositive," but "lends
further support to the conclusion that there is a consensus among those
'
The protestations of the dissents
who have addressed the issue."392
393
notwithstanding, this analysis closely mirrors the Stanford approach.
In Stanford, the Court found that evolving standards of decency must be
387. Id. at 1124.
388. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
389. Brief for Petitioner at 43, n.46, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-0452)
("Among countries that have the death penalty, the practice of executing defendants with mental
retardation is essentially unknown in the Twenty-First Century."); Brief of Amicus Curiae for the
European Union in Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975, (2001) (No.
00-8727) cited in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347, n.21, available at 2001 WL 648609.
390. 536 U.S. at 347.
391. Id.at 347, n.21.
392. Id.Surprisingly, the Court gave equal weight to opinions by the American Psychological
Association and religious communities as to the practice of nations to support this broader
consensus.
393. Id. at 353 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas)
I fail to see.. .how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their
citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination.... For if it is
evidence of a nationalconsensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other
countries simply are not relevant.
Id.
But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate "national consensus"
must go to its appeal...to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations,
members of the so-called "world community," and respondents to opinion polls....
[Il]rrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are
(thankfully) not always those of our people.
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America
that we are expounding.... Where there is not first a settled consensus among our
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution.
Id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) (quoting
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
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determined by a national consensus, and assuming national uniformity
has been established, the practice of states may be relevant to determine
whether such uniformity is accidental or implicit in any ordered society.
In Atkins, the Court did much the same, finding a national consensus
and then, in a "tantalizingly vague and imprecise footnote, 394
concluding that this national consensus is consistent with a much
broader consensus shared by others who have considered the matter.395
394. Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the
Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1480 (2002).
395. A simple reading of the majority opinion suggests that the dissent overstates the majority
position when it reasons that the majority relied on international opinion to "support its
conclusion that a national consensus has developed." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority only cited international opinion as reflective of a "much broader social
and professional consensus" after concluding that a "national consensus has developed against it."
Id.at 347, n.21. As already suggested, this is not unlike the approach in Stanford. 492 U.S. at 369,
n.I. No doubt however, a few members of the Court, joined by death penalty opponents, will
seize upon the vague language in the Atkins footnote to present a capacious interpretation of its
meaning. See, e.g., Patterson v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 24, 24 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Given
the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international community against
the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be appropriate
for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity."); id. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(same); Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 471 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Just as 'attention to
the judgment of other nations' can help Congress determine the justice and propriety of
[America's] measures, so it can help guide this Court when it decides whether a particular
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.) (internal citations omitted); see also Paolo G.
Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger ": The Death Penalty and the Global lus Commune of Human
Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 (2003) (the dissenters
response hardly seems proportionate to the majority's bare mention, in very indirect
fashion, of the existence of an international consensus; it only makes sense to the extent
that the reference to global developments is a sign of a larger and more significant
presence looming just beyond the current reach of U.S. law.... The dissenters succeeded
in highlighting that in its death penalty jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court is on the
threshold of participating more fully in a substantial transnational normative community
that could, in principle, have a significant impact on U.S. law.).
Yet such expansive interpretations would sub silentio overrule the interpretative approach
taken in Stanford, something Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who joined the majority in both
Atkins and Stanford, are unlikely to have intended without comment or explanation, particularly
given a more plausible reading of Atkins that renders the decisions consistent with one another.
Cf Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391 (1983 ("the
same respect for the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also requires us.. to
seek consistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time."). Indeed, in other
contexts Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have extolled restraint in overruling prior Supreme
Court holdings. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (Seven justices,
including Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, finding that "'[w]hile stare decisis is not an
inexorable command,' particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, 'even in
constitutional cases the doctrine caries such persuasive force that we have always required a
departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special justification."") (internal citations
omitted); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55
(1992)
(when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by
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What is remarkable in these death penalty cases is the Supreme
Court's total disregard of international law or decisions of international
human rights tribunals. One would think that international law and

particularly decisions of human rights tribunals that have addressed the
matter might be relevant to determining evolving standards of decency.
Petitioner and their amici certainly thought so in Atkins. The petitioner
argued that "numerous international and regional intergovernmental
bodies have passed resolutions and other statements expressing strong
opposition to the execution of any individuals who have mental
'
retardation."396
One amicus brief by nine highly-respected retired
American diplomats argued that

[i]nternational opinion has always informed this Court's
understandings of the social values of the United States and, in
particular, what our society considers to be "cruel and unusual
punishments." In an increasingly globalized society, the opinions
of other nations are more relevant today than at any time since
the Founding. In this context, the Court's evaluation of "evolving
standards of decency" must continue to reflect not just the views
of the American community, but the views of the international
community as a whole.397
In support of the proposition of an evolving global standard, they
cited, inter alia, resolutions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights

urging states not to impose the death penalty on persons suffering from
any form of mental disorder.39 8 Likewise, the European Union filed an
amicus brief arguing that "[t]he United Nations and other bodies

concerned with human rights have articulated a body of [international]
norms and standards that prohibit the execution of the mentally

a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, whether the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine, or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
(internal citations omitted)); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (O'Connor, J.)
("Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.").
396. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 389, at 43, n.46.
397. Brief of Amici Curiae for Diplomats Morton Abramowitz in Support of Petitioner,
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975, (2001) (No. 00-8727), available at 2001 WL 648607.
398. Id. at 8.
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'
retarded."399
In support, they cited decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.400

Notwithstanding these attempts at judicial internalization of

international norms, 40 1 the Supreme Court has all but ignored these and
similar international law arguments and eschewed any reference to
decisions of human rights tribunals. Atkins presented the Supreme Court

with an invitation to begin the process of internalizing global norms
against the death penalty, and give "new energy to 'vertical' efforts to
40 2
internalize international law norms into domestic constitutional law.,
But the Supreme Court declined the invitation. The lone citation in
Atkins offered by the Court for the proposition that the world
community overwhelmingly disapproved of United States practice was

a section in the European Union amicus brief that outlined actual
practices of countries.4

3

Nor has the Supreme Court accepted the invitation in the past. Only
in a plurality opinion in Thompson and in the dissent in Stanford did
four justices footnote the existence of international human rights treaties

regarding the death penalty, and even then they failed to explain the
importance to be attached to these treaties.4

°4

In no instance involving a

399. BriefofAmicus Curiae for the European Union, supra note 389.
400. Id. at 12-13, 17 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called on member states
of the Organization of American States (including the United States) to "guarantee respect for the
fundamental freedoms and human rights of persons with mental disability.. .incorporating
international standards and the provisions of human rights conventions that protect the mentally

ill.")
European Court of Human Rights has considered the issue of penalty in criminal
cases where applicants have challenged their extradition to third states that apply the
death penalty. It has held that the manner in which the death penalty is imposed or
executed, and the circumstances of the condemned persons, can bring treatment within
the proscription of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Id.
401. Koh, supra note 386, at 1129, n.181.
402. Id.at 1129.
403. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347, n.21 (2002). This portion of the European
Union's brief deals exclusively with a summation of the practice of nations.
The United States stands virtually alone in its practice of sentencing to death those
defendants who show any significant level of mental retardation.... Most countries in
the world bar the execution of the mentally retarded, and since 1995, only three
countries are reported to have carried out the execution of a mentally retarded defendant.
Brief of Amicus Curiae for the European Union, supra note 389, at 4.
404. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 831, n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390, n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In addition, Justice O'Connor
in Thompson cited to United States signature of these same three treaties to show the absence of
congressional reflection on the relationship between federal capital punishment statutes and
juvenile offender statutes. 487 U.S. at 85 1-52 (Noting absence of legislative history suggesting
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death penalty case has the Supreme Court relied upon an international
tribunal decision to ascertain the evolving standard of decency.
The Supreme Court also has declined opportunities to consider the
relevance of international human rights tribunal decisions arguing that a
prolonged delay on death row is itself cruel and unusual punishment. In
Knight v. Florida, the Supreme Court denied certiorarion such a
petition, but Justice Breyer dissented to the denial, arguing that "a
growing number of courts outside the United States.. .have held that
lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel."4 5 In support, Justice
Breyer cited the famous European Court of Human Rights case of
Soering v. United Kingdom.4 °6 Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial
of certiorari, ridiculed such a reference to international tribunals, stating
that "were there any... support in our jurisprudence [for this argument],
it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the
European Court of Human Rights [and foreign courts].""4 7
Lower courts have entertained similar Eighth Amendment arguments
regarding this so-called death row phenomenon and likewise noted-but
disregarded-human rights tribunal decisions. In McKenzie v. Day, for
example, the Ninth Circuit rejected such a claim by the defendant, who
relied upon Soering and similar foreign court decisions, concluding that,
with all due respect to our colleagues abroad, we do not believe
this view will prevail in the United States.... The delay has been
caused by the fact that McKenzie has availed himself of
procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are carried
that Congress considered possibility that federal statutes could render juveniles eligible for death
and the striking absence of such legislative history in light of U.S. signature of three treaties).
405. 528 U.S. 990, 994-95 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Elledge v. Florida, 525
U.S. 944, 944-46 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
406. 528 U.S. at 995. In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights held that the United
Kingdom was prohibited from extraditing a potential defendant to Virginia in large part because
the 6- to 8- year delay that typically accompanied a death sentence amounted to cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment forbidden by the European Convention on Human Rights.
See id. citing Soering v. United Kingdom, II Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 111 (1989).
407. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring). A near identical post-Atkins debate between Justices
Breyer and Thomas occurred in the more recent denial of certiorari in Foster v. Florida. 123 S.Ct.
470, 470 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to
consider the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.") (emphasis in
original); Id. at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(Courts of other nations have found that delays of 15 years or less can render capital
punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel. Just as "attention to the judgment of other
nations" can help Congress determine the justice and propriety of [America's] measures,
so it can help guide this Court when it decides whether a particular punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment.)
(internal citations omitted).
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out only in appropriate circumstances.... We cannot conclude
that delays caused40 by satisfying the Eighth Amendment

themselves violate it.

The Eighth Circuit took a similar approach to the unconstitutionality
of extended delays on death row.4 °9 In dicta,41° the court addressed the

death row phenomenon in deference to the "respect that we owe to the
foreign courts that have accepted this argument., 41 The court cited
Soering and other foreign court decisions, but again noted that "the

essential point for our purposes... is whether or not the Eighth
Amendment is being violated" and concluded that "[d]elay has come
about because Chambers.. .has contested the judgments against him. 41 2
C.

Normative Application

The attempts to utilize international norms to inform the scope of
constitutional protections is, in reality, a simple extrapolation of the

impulse for government to mirror majoritarian values. An international
majoritarian paradigm would posit that if the overwhelming global

consensus is that the death penalty is cruel and unusual, then this
majoritarian value should be reflected by abolishing the practice in the
United States. 43 The problem arises when the international majoritarian
impulse is at odds with the domestic majoritarian impulse. The
majoritarian impulse in the United States, or at least in many states, is

that the death penalty is a legitimate form of punishment and this is
reflected in legislative enactments. Lacking the ability to satisfy the
408. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1995).
409. Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1998).
410. The failure to raise the constitutional claim in state court was held to preclude his claim.
Id. at 568-69.
411. ld. at569.
412. Id. at570.
413. For a critique of this approach, see John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance
Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 213-15 (2000)
Americans in the last several decades have soberly examined the death penalty, and
by and large reaffirmed it in a textbook demonstration of popular sovereignty at work.
This result enrages the Globalists.... In response, they have launched a multifaceted
campaign-entirely consistent with their larger effort to create binding worldwide
human rights standards-to internationalize whether and to what extent the United
States will be able to employ the death penalty.... In addition, international pressure is
being applied through mechanisms such as the UN Human Rights Commission.... The
real agenda.. of course, is to leverage the stature and legal authority of the United
Nations (such as they are), into our domestic debate, an effort most Americans would
find fundamentally illegitimate. Yet this is precisely a case where the GlobalistAmericanist debate is most vividly expressed.
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impulse through the political branches, the international majoritarians
resort to the courts. Although the Supreme Court is frequently criticized
for thwarting the popular will, what is unusual about Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is the absence of a "counter-majoritarian
'
difficulty."4 14
Supreme Court has adopted a majoritarian paradigm,
which it dubs the "national consensus." If the national consensus is of
the view that a certain punishment is cruel and unusual, then this
American conception of decency will be dispositive." 5 The international
majoritarians thus face a different "counter-majoritarian difficulty": to
the extent that constitutional protections are responsive to popular will,
how can they be interpreted to give expression to the international
majoritarian impulse to protect the individual from democratic
governance? With the Supreme Court's majoritarian paradigm
articulated in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the answer is they
cannot.
There is certainly logic to the international majoritarian strategy. If
the Court has concluded that evolving standards of decency are relevant,
then one would think that international standards of decency might have
some relevance to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. One would also
think that international law and the decisions of international human
rights tribunals might have some relevance to ascertain those
international standards of decency.4 16 But the Supreme Court has
declined to attach any importance to international law or the
international judiciary in undertaking its constitutional analysis. This is
because a majority of the Court considers that the issue of whether a
punishment is unusual or cruel should depend not on international
norms, but on a national consensus giving expression to the sovereign
414. The counter-majoritiarian difficulty is concerned with the problem of squaring the belief
that democracy entails responsiveness to popular will with a branch of government whose
members are unaccountable to the people and have the power to overturn popular decisions.
Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962). On the
absence of a counter-majoritarian difficulty, see Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty:
Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
415. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369, n.] (1989).
416. The South African Constitutional Court expressed such a view. See State v.
Makwanyane and Mchunu 1995 (3) SA 391, at 18 ("The international and foreign authorities are
of value because they analyze arguments for and against the death sentence and show how Courts
of other jurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue. For that reason alone they require our
attention."); see also Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 371-72 (1997) (discussing the South African
court decision); Schabas, supra note 371, at 817 (same); Harvard Law Review, The International
Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic ConstitutionalCourts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2049, 2056-57 (2001) (same).
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7
will of the American people as to what is fair and decent punishment.'1
At most, it has looked to the actual practice of other nations to assist it
in determining if there is an evolving standard abroad that is consistent
with our national consensus.418
The Eighth Amendment is the premier example of the "no deference"
model because international norms are perceived by international
majoritarians as relevant to the constitutional analysis, while the
Supreme Court does not. This clash provides a useful heuristic for the
"no deference" model. But for other constitutional guarantees, there is
little debate as to the relevance of international tribunal decisions. The
Fifth Amendment "Takings Clause" jurisprudence underscores the
irrelevance of international tribunals in defining constitutional
guarantees.
Although international law has an extremely robust body of law
concerning unlawful takings without just compensation,419 the Supreme
Court has never considered it relevant. For example, in defining when
and whether government regulations may constitute a compensable
taking, international tribunals are quite explicit. The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal has held that:
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under
international law through interference by a state in the use of that
property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal
title to the property is not affected. While assumption of control
over property by a government does not automatically and
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken
by the government, thus requiring compensation under
international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever
events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental
rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not
merely ephemeral.42

This definition is consistent with other international tribunal
decisions.42 1 Thus, under international law, regulatory takings that
417. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369, n.l.
418. See, e.g., id at 370.
419. See generally CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED

STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 369-612 (1998).
420. Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy & Stratton v. Tams-Affa, Award No. 141-7-2 (June 22,
1984), reprintedin 6 U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984).
421. One celebrated NAFTA tribunal has expressed an even more liberal standard, holding
that an expropriation includes "covert or incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-tobe-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
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deprive the owner of fundamental rights are compensable.
The Supreme Court jurisprudence on regulatory takings is
remarkably less solicitous toward property owners.422 In early regulatory
takings cases the Supreme Court held that "if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. 4 23 In fact, regulations can go quite far
before they constitute a taking.4 24 The Court has held that where a
regulation does not deprive an owner of all economically beneficial
use,4 25 the Court eschews a set formula and engages in "essentially ad
'
hoc, factual inquiries."426
Among the factors it considers is "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the "extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct...expectations. '4 27 But
the "ultimate constitutional question" is the "fairness and justice" of
requiring individual property owners to bear the burdens that should be
borne by the public as a whole.428
One could argue that determining how "fair and just" it is to require
private individuals to bear public burdens could benefit from inquiry
into international norms or the practice of other countries. One could
say that international opinion has always informed the Court's
understandings of social values of the United States and that in an
increasingly globalized society, the opinions of other nations are more
relevant today that at any time since the founding.429 One could say that
the Court's evaluation of "fairness and justice" or "just compensation"
must reflect not just the views of the American community, but also the
views of the international community as a whole. One could cite to
international tribunal decisions as having articulated a body of
international norms and standards that clearly prohibit regulatory
host State." Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (2000) 103 reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
422. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?: NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. _ (2003) (forthcoming).
423. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
424. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, n.8 (1992).
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing...
[b]ut that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity between the
landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the
landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who
recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations.
Id.
425. Id. at 1019.
426. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1481 (2002).
427. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1019, n.8 quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978); see also Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1483.
428. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
429. See supra note 397.
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expropriation of private property without compensation.

But the "no deference" model rules the day in Takings Clause
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has never considered international

norms to be relevant in determining the content of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. Nor do petitioners even suggest its relevance. In the
43 ° none of
most important recent regulatory taking case of Tahoe-Sierra,
the briefs cited international law as potentially relevant. Yet the

disconnect between international and constitutional law is so
pronounced that the same property owner who owns property at Lake
Tahoe, California arguably has a compensable claim under NAFTA if

he is Mexican or Canadian, but no claim under the Fifth Amendment if
"'
he is American.43

Despite the Court's clear reluctance to use international tribunal
decisions to interpret the Constitution, petitioners in other contexts
continue to reference such decisions as constitutionally relevant. Most
recently, in the pending sodomy case of Lawrence v. Texas,432
prominent scholars filed an amicus brief arguing that "foreign and

international courts have barred the criminalization of sodomy between
consenting adults" and that the Supreme Court "has regularly and
traditionally used international and foreign law rulings to aid its
'
But in support of the argument that the
constitutional interpretation."433
Supreme Court has "throughout history" looked to the opinions of the
' the
"world community,"434
brief cites to no instance in which a majority
of the Court has referenced an "international law ruling" as an aid in
interpreting the Constitution. Almost every citation offered is to foreign
country decisions or practices, and even those citations generally are

from "members of this Court," i.e., concurring and dissenting
opinions.435 Although the Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is still
430. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
431. Compare Metalclad Corp., ICSID 103 with Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S Ct. at 1485-89.
432. 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661
(2002).
433. Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence v.
Texas, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *2; see also Brief
of CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence v. Texas, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002)
(No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342, at *27; Brief of Human Rights Campaign, et.al. as Amicus
Curiae, Lawrence v. Texas, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152347,
at *20-21; Amicus Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence v. Texas,
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164108, at *2-3, 24, n.15.
434. Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence v.
Texas, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *5.
435. See id. at *3-8 citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 n.21 (2002)
([W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.... Although
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[factors including world opinion] are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the
legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus
among those who have addressed the issue.)
See also Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence
v. Texas, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *3-8. citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion) (looking to global
standards on execution of fifteen year-olds); Thompson, 487 U.S. 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that U.S. had agreed by ratifying Article 68 of the Geneva Convention to set a minimum
age of 18 for capital punishment in certain circumstances); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting European law on legislative standing but declining to find it in
U.S. constitutional regime); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16, 785-87
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (declaring that "in almost every State--indeed, in almost every western
democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide" and noting that "other countries are embroiled in
similar debates" concerning physician-assisted suicide, citing Canadian Supreme Court, British
House of Lords Select Committee, New Zealand's Parliament, Australian Senate, and Colombian
Constitutional Court); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-797 n.22 (1982) (White, J.) (noting
elimination or restriction of felony murder in England, India, Canada, and a "number of other
Commonwealth countries"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (this Court has
repeatedly recognized, the very concept of "ordered liberty" is not uniquely American, but is
"enshrined" in the legal history of "English-speaking peoples," including neighboring legal
systems); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488 n.59, 521-22 (1966) (comparing U.S. practice
with that in India, Sri Lanka, and Scotland); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955)
(finding practice "supported by long- standing tradition here and in other English-speaking
nations"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Due Process Clause obliges courts to
ascertain whether laws offend "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples"); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366
(1916) (Constitution embodies "'only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally
understood by all English-speaking communities"') (quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09
(1902); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that
particular detention of aliens "accords with international views" and referencing Report of U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' Guidelines
on Detention of Asylum-Seekers); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (finding Court's First Amendment jurisprudence consistent with decisions
of European Court of Human Rights and Canadian Supreme Court); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that "this Court has long
considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards
roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances"
and that "[in doing so, the Court has found particularly instructive opinions of former
Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our
own [Bill of Rights]"); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (parallel international
and foreign law rulings necessarily "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
[national] solutions to a common legal problem.") (Breyer, J., dissenting);. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 785-87 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (examining Dutch constitutional practice on physicianassisted suicide); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (Australian, Canadian, and English legislation banning anonymous campaign speech
suggest that such bans need not impair democracy); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (mentioning voting systems of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New
Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe in assessing race-consciousness in U.S. voting system);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.l (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing abortion decisions by West German Constitutional Court and
Canadian Supreme Court); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Nuremberg Military Tribunals in arguing
against non-consensual medical experimentation on humans); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548
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pending, if its past practice is any indication it will decline once again
the invitation to reference international tribunal decisions in delineating
the contours of constitutional guarantees.436
A century ago, Justice Holmes famously observed that "the
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Static. 437 Today one might say the message from the Court is that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit all punishments reported by the
U.N. Human Rights Commission. Nor is the Fifth Amendment defined
by the pronouncements of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal or
NAFTA panels. If the source of constitutional protections is embodied
in text, structure, history and national experience,438 then the Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence suggests that international decisions,
declarations, and exhortations have no location in those sources.439 To
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (delimiting notion of privacy in the home by looking to "common
understanding throughout the English-speaking world"); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[tihe safeguards of 'due process of law' and 'the
equal protection of the laws' summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking peoples");
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (states in
this nation can "serve as...
laborator[ies]" for "social and economic experiments"). Please note
that all parentheticals are as set forth in the text or footnotes of the amicus brief.
436. Specifically in Lawrence the amicus brief argues that the equal protection and privacy
guarantees of the Constitution should be interpreted in light of, among other things, the European
Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights. Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae, Lawrence v.
Texas, cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 661 (2002) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *9-12.
437. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) Justice Holmes'
point is that the Constitution is not about upholding majoritarian views or personally-held
convictions.
If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of
this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which
we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and
which, equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.... But a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural
and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.
Id.at 75-76.
438. TRIBE, supra note 364, §§ 1-15, at 75.
439. This is in sharp contrast with other constitutions, such as the South African Constitution,
which embodies a textual commitment to comparative analysis. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 § 36(1)
(1996) ("The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom."). For a discussion of the impact of this
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conclude otherwise would be to "introduce a whole new range of
materials to the texts, precedents, and doctrines from which the
Herculean task of constructing [constitutional] judgments in particular
cases proceeds.""44
The larger point of the "no deference" model is that in protecting
constitutional guarantees, the constitutional inquiry is separate and
independent from the larger human rights agenda to globalize civil
liberties. The fact that the United States is perhaps more protective than
most of the civilized world on rights such as free speech, freedom of
religion, and the rights of women and minorities, but perhaps less
protective on rights such as the juvenile death penalty and regulatory
takings is certainly deserving of genuine attention. Aberrant practices at
home and abroad may give rise to legislative action or meritorious
litigation.44 1 But it does not, in and of itself, rise to the level of
constitutional importance." 2 To disregard international law or
international tribunals in constitutional decision-making is not to
suggest any disrespect for international law or its adjudicative bodies.
Rather, the question presented simply renders unnecessary certain
avenues of inquiry. Federal courts are requested to confer a degree of
deference to international tribunal decisions in resolving constitutional
questions-usually to use an international decision as persuasive
authority of international norms, d la the Paquete Habana model-and
they respectfully decline.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It is accepted wisdom among the uninitiated that international law is
"soft law" in which nations offer a lukewarm porridge of hortatory or
precatory exhortations, without the meaty commitments of enforceable
clause on the South African Constitutional Court's practice of comparative constitutionalism, see
Fried, supra note 366 at 820-21.
440. Slaughter, supra note 371, at 203 quoting Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges, Reason
and Power, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 807, 820-21 (2000).
441. It may, for example, give rise to "legislative norm-internalization" whereby international
law norms are embedded into binding domestic legislation. It may also promote "judicial norminternalization" with judicial incorporation of human rights norms either implicitly under
Charming Betsy, or explicitly, through litigation pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act and
similar statutes. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2657 (1997). For an example of the latter applied to United States practices, see AlvarezMachain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2001).
442. Of course, evolving international standards of decency reflected in state practice and
international law may indirectly be of constitutional relevance. For example, the fact that we are
out of step with the rest of the world in engaging in a particular practice may shape a national
consensus of our own standards of decency, which is of Eighth Amendment relevance. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
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legal rights and obligations. But as the chattering class continues to
debate just how "soft" is the body of international law, and precisely
why nations "obey" or "disobey" international law, behind the scenes
inventive chefs have found a recipe for success. They first have resorted
to internal mechanisms for enforcement, as is evident in the
enforcement proceedings available under the World Trade Organization
and the United Nations Compensation Commission. If that ingredient is
missing, they offer a substitute of external mechanisms for recognition
and enforcement, with national courts as the secret ingredient. The
shape and form of such external recognition is varied, reflecting the
particular milieu of each international tribunal. But it is an ineluctable
fact that decisions of international tribunals are increasingly being
recognized and enforced by national courts, offensively and defensively,
directly and indirectly. It is simply facile to categorically maintain that
international law is soft law when one analyzes the internal and external
enforcement mechanisms available to parties appearing before a whole
host of international tribunals.
Of course, international tribunals are anything but uniform or
homogenous in nature and function. The diversity of international
tribunals also is reflected in the diversity of mechanisms for
incorporating their decisions into national courts. Rather than debate
whether international tribunal decisions are binding or not,443 a far more
fruitful inquiry is to consider the continuum of deference accorded to
international tribunals, with national courts granting varying degrees of
respect depending on the circumstances presented. At one extreme are
the full faith and credit and arbitration models. Under these models
there are binding federal instructions to federal courts that guide them as
to what effect to give to tribunal judgments. Under the foreign judgment
model, in the absence of binding instructions, courts show significant
deference to decisions of international tribunals, enforcing them in the
same manner as foreign judgments as a matter of international comity.
Courts show even less deference under the Charming Betsy model
because direct recognition is not sought, and a tribunal decision is used
only when interpretation of an ambiguous statute is at issue. The
Paquete Habana model is among the weakest along the continuum,
because decisions of international tribunals offer only persuasive
authority as to international law, and national courts will selectively
choose among the various decisions of international tribunals to inform
443. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings,
96 AMER. SOC. INT'L PROC. 45 (2002) with A. Mark Weisburd, Problems with the Concept of
"Vertical Conflicts," 96 AMER. SOC. INT'L PROC. 42 (2002).
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the content of international law. At the other extreme on the continuum
of deference are the special master and "no deference" models, which
confer little or no deference on decisions of international tribunals. With
the special master model, although the parties seek direct enforcement,
such an international tribunal actually becomes an adjunct of the
national court as a special master rendering decisions subject to the
approval of the presiding judge. With the "no deference" model,
national courts confer no deference in resolving certain disputes, such as
the scope of constitutional guarantees, finding them irrelevant to resolve
the question.
What lessons can be learned from this continuum of deference? The
thesis of this article is that federal courts must think far more deeply
about the degree of "respectful consideration"" 4 they must accord to
international tribunal decisions. The models that have been outlined in
this article provide a starting point for a more thoughtful methodology
of deference. International tribunals are not homogenous, and courts
should not assume that the degree of deference they confer upon their
decisions is uniform. Nor should they assume that a particular
international tribunal fits only one model-particularly given that four
models anticipate direct enforcement while three models seek indirect
recognition.
Numerous factors will counsel greater or lesser deference. Is a party
seeking to directly or indirectly enforce the international tribunal
decision? Is the United States a signatory to the treaty establishing the
tribunal, and if so, what are the requirements for the degree of
recognition set forth in the treaty and implementing legislation? Is the
tribunal resolving interstate disputes or are private parties involved? If
the United States is a party to the dispute, what are its commitments as a
party to respect the opinion? If the United States is not a signatory to the
treaty creating the tribunal, what confidence does the federal court have
in the integrity of the process giving rise to the decision? If the party is
seeking indirect recognition, is a United States statute subject to
interpretation by the international tribunal? Is that statute clear and
unambiguous? How respected and authoritative are the decisions of the
international tribunal as a source of international law? Have the parties
settled their dispute in federal court but willing to utilize the expertise of
an international tribunal to provide particularized relief?. Are the parties
relying on persuasive international decisional authority to resolve a
question that requires reference to international law or are they using it
to expand the canon of constitutional interpretative material? These and

444. Breard v. Greene 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
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similar questions must be addressed when courts are asked to confer
deference to decisions of an international tribunal. The methodology
proposed offers federal courts the beginnings of a systematic that will
assist them in a more thoughtful analysis of the degree of deference
required.
Of course this article also raises numerous questions that it does not
begin to answer. Numerous other avenues of inquiry arise from the
continuum of deference. At least five questions not addressed here
immediately spring to mind. First, in establishing a new tribunal one of
the principal concerns always is the enforcement question. As has been
suggested, the question of how international tribunal decisions are
honored must often include thoughtful consideration of the vertical
variation of the inquiry. If there is not an internal mechanism for
enforcement, or the internal enforcement mechanism is only partial,
how can the tribunal be established to enhance the likelihood of national
court enforcement? Moreover, even if direct enforcement in national
courts is not contemplated, indirect reliance upon the decisions of the
international tribunal requires that international tribunal bureaucrats
consider how best to communicate their decisions to a wider audience,
recognizing that national courts will utilize them to discern the content
of international law. Some international tribunals, such as the Claims
Resolution Tribunal, render hundreds of awards and yet publish only a
small percentage.445 How can international tribunals establish a more
effective channel of information distribution to inform national courts of
the content of international law that is being promulgated by these
tribunals.
Second, the continuum of deference raises questions for 'those
aggrieved parties who wish to intelligently forum shop in deciding
where to initially file their complaint. For example, a foreign investor
may have the option of pursuing a claim before an ICSID tribLnal under
a bilateral investment treaty, before the World Trade Organization for a
WTO violation, or in private commercial arbitration pursuant to a
government contract. How significant 'will the likelihood of
enforcement under the various models be in forum shopping? Perhaps
the certainty of full faith and credit under ICSID may be more appealing
than the vagaries of enforcement under the New York Convention or the
WTO's internal enforcement mechanism.
Third, the question of national court deference to decisions of
international tribunals is relevant not only for the United States.

445. See http://www.crt-ii.org/_awards/index.phtm. (last visited February 10, 2003).
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National courts across the globe wrestle with the degree of deference
that should be accorded to international tribunal decisions. The
methodology presented in this article is focused on the United States,
but many if not most of the models presented have the potential for
application in other jurisdictions. An analysis of the deference accorded
tribunal decisions in other contexts is of urgent concern, and scholarly
comparative analysis is critical for a fuller understanding of the process
of deference. Such comparative analysis is unusually difficult, because a
variety of international tribunals should be examined across a variety of
national jurisdictions. While the questions may be the same across
jurisdictions, the answers will be fluid, and will depend on the particular
country involved. The degree of deference that a European national
court will confer upon the decision of an European Court of Human
Rights will obviously differ from a U.S. federal court, but how similar
or different will a European court and a federal court treat a decision of
the World Trade Organization, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
or the International Court of Justice? How similar or different is the
obligation of federal courts to grant full faith and credit to ICSID
tribunal decisions from the obligation of European Member State courts
to grant automatic recognition to decisions of the European Court of
Justice?" 6 These and similar questions are ripe for further inquiry.
Fourth, the proliferation of international tribunals, in all their glorious
varieties, is occurring so fast that the legal academy is breathless in its
attempt to understand the collective import. An inquiry into comparative
international adjudicative institutions should be in the offing, but the
trans-substantive nature of these tribunals leads to selective analysis.
Human rights scholars understand and dialogue with other human rights
experts about the various human rights institutions, and trade and
investment lawyers discourse with each other about investment tribunals
and the World Trade Organization. But adjudication before international
tribunals as a separate and independent sphere of inquiry has not yet
developed. The commonalities of the various tribunals, as well as their
distinctions, should be analyzed and explained to the international
community. This article offers modest conjectures about one small piece
of the international judicial puzzle that could be emulated for other
trans-substantive procedural inquiries.
Finally, the degree of deference that national courts accord to
decisions of international tribunals is a missing piece in the larger
puzzle about the enforceability of international rights and obligations.
446. See SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 1101-02 & n.5 (suggesting that the basis for full faith
and credit to be given to ICSID awards was modeled on the Treaty of Rome obligation imposed
on Member State courts to grant automatic recognition to the European Court of Justice).
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The "hard law" and "soft law" debate could be contextualized to the
international judicial system, with deeper reflections on why, for
example, the architects of one convention fashioned a regime that grants
full faith and credit to international tribunal decisions, while the
architects of another established few if any binding enforcement
mechanisms. Such contextualization will focus the debate about why
nations obey international law. In this larger debate, the blind men
describe the shape of the elephant, 4 7 and "each [are] partly in the right,
'
and all [are] in the wrong."448
A more pointed inquiry is why nations
"obey" international tribunals. Those engaged in this more focused
inquiry perhaps will do so with eyes wide open, describing only one
facet of the elephant, and knowing that in so doing they may be in the
right, but only partly so.

447. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 441, at 2602.
448. JOHN

GODFREY

SAXE,

THE

BLIND

MEN

AND

THE

ELEPHANT

at

http://www.noogenesis.com/pineapple/blindmen elephant.html (last visited February 10, 2003).
("And so these men of Indostan, disputed loud and long, each in his own opinion, exceeding stiff
and strong, though each was partly in the right, and all were in the wrong!").

